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Trade credit in the form of delayed input payments is an important source of nancing
for all types of rms. Empirical evidence on business cycle patterns and the usage of trade
credit in the US economy suggests that trade credit comoves strongly with GDP and was
severely aected at the onset of the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis. Motivated by these
observations, this thesis studies the role of trade credit for the propagation of nancial
shocks in a production network and its implications for aggregate and sectoral outcomes.
To this end, I introduce a static quantitative multisector model featuring trade in in-
termediate inputs and endogenous trade credit linkages and costs between representative
rms in each sector. Firms face working capital constraints and are required to nance
their production costs using both bank and supplier credit. In response to a tightening
of credit conditions, the endogenous adjustment in the volume and cost of trade credit
captures two counteracting mechanisms: (1) Firms smooth interest rate shocks by substi-
tuting bank and supplier nance. (2) Any increase in the interest rate that a rm charges
on trade credit tightens the nancing terms of its customers thereby amplifying nancial
shocks. In equilibrium, the working capital constraint distorts the demand for production
inputs and aggregate output as common to models with distortions. The interdependency
of credit distortions further aects the propagation of nancial shocks and it is shown that
sectors extending a lot of trade credit to their customers relative to their own nancing
needs play a crucial role in the transmission of shocks to the cost of external funds.
In a quantitative application of the model to the US economy during the crisis, sim-
ulations featuring nancial shocks only show that the model captures approximately a
third of the drop in output, half of which can be attributed to the existence of trade
credit linkages alone. I also show that the ability of rms to adjust their borrowing port-
folio overall decreases aggregate volatility by less than two percent. This suggests that
the smoothing mechanism of trade credit was operative, though small. In a nal appli-
cation, I quantify the predictions of the model and show that rms acting as important
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The 2008-2009 Financial Crisis was characterized by a global collapse of credit markets
that quickly transmitted to the corporate sector and led to a severe contraction of the
aggregate economy. While the link between banks and rms has received considerable
attention in the literature, the nancial aspect of inter-rm trade as a propagation mech-
anism is a relatively new research agenda. Since trade credit in the form of delayed input
payments is an important source of nancing for all types of rms, this thesis studies the
role of trade credit for the propagation of nancial shocks in a production network and
its implications for aggregate and sectoral outcomes.
After an introduction in Chapter 1, Chapter 2: Trade Credit in the US Economy,
presents empirical evidence on business cycle patterns and the usage of trade credit in
the US economy. I nd that trade accounts payable of publicly traded, non-nancial US
rms account for approximately 11% of total corporate liabilities and its growth rate is
pro-cyclical with, and more volatile than, the growth rate of real GDP. At the onset of
the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis, the composition of short-term borrowing shifted towards
bank credit, suggesting that liquidity in the market for trade credit was severely aected.
In order to capture the heterogeneity of trade credit usage across rms, I propose a
novel credit measure - the net-lending position of a rm - dened as the ratio of trade
credit extended to customers and total production costs net of trade credit obtained from
suppliers. The majority of US rms extend less trade credit than their upfront cost
of production, while only a few act as nancial intermediaries as measured by their net-
lending position. I nd a positive correlation between the decline in sectoral output during
the crisis and a sector's overall dependency on supplier credit, suggesting that trade credit
linkages aect the transmission of nancial shocks and thus the real economy.
In Chapter 3, A Multisector Model with Financial Frictions, I propose a static quan-
titative multisector model with trade in intermediate inputs and endogenous trade credit
linkages and costs between perfectly competitive intermediate good producing rms in
each sector. Since rms face working capital constraints such that any sales are only
realized after production has taken place, rms are required to nance production using
both bank and supplier credit. In response to a tightening of credit conditions, the en-
dogenous adjustment in the volume and cost of trade credit captures two counteracting
mechanisms: (1) Firms smooth interest rate shocks by substituting bank and supplier
nance. (2) Any increase in the interest rate that a rm charges on trade credit tightens
the nancing terms of its customers thereby amplifying nancial shocks. In equilibrium,
the working capital constraint distorts the demand for production inputs and aggregate
output as common to models with distortions. The interdependency of credit distortions
further aects the propagation of nancial shocks and it is shown that sectors extending
a lot of trade credit to their customers relative to their own nancing needs play a crucial
iii
role in the transmission of shocks to the cost of external funds.
Whether nancial linkages amplify or dampen the eect of credit cost shocks on
output is ambiguous and depends on the relative strength of the substitution and ampli-
cation eects outlined in Chapter 3 and thus remains a quantitative question. In the
fourth and last chapter, A Quantitative Assessment of Trade Credit and Aggregate Fluc-
tuations, the model economy introduced in Chapter 3 is rst calibrated to the US at a
sector level. I then simulate the model using shocks to a sector's cost of bank credit only,
which are approximated using sector-level bond spreads obtained from the literature. The
model reproduces - both qualitatively and quantitatively - business cycle patterns of trade
credit as observed in the data and discussed in Chapter 2. It captures approximately a
quarter of the variation of, and one third of the drop in, aggregate output during the
nancial crisis. Model simulations yield three main results with respect to the role of
trade credit in propagating liquidity shocks during the 2008-2009 Great Recession: First,
the existence of trade credit linkages can account for approximately 16% of the drop in
aggregate output during the 2008-2009 crisis relative to an equivalent economy with bank-
nance only. Second, the endogenous adjustment of the volume and cost of trade credit
reduces aggregate volatility by 1.4%. Third, rms which extend a lot of trade credit in an
economy and therefore act as important nancial intermediaries for their customers are
systemically important and generate large spillovers, which quanties and conrms the
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The ow of payments from customers to their suppliers plays a crucial role in maintaining
the liquidity and turnover of products in a complex network of trade relations between
rms. However, the time lag between the purchase of inputs and the receipt of payments
for realized sales leads to a cash-ow mismatch for the producer and creates demand for
ex-ante liquidity. In day-to-day operations, it is thus common practice for suppliers to
oer payment terms in the form of trade credit, that allow customers to delay payments
until after the delivery of the product. (see Cuñat and García-Appendini, 2012)
Trade credit as a form of short- and medium-term debt "gives [rms] and [their]
suppliers more exibility to manage [their] businesses eectively through better cash ow
management"1 and represents an alternative source of nancing to bank and nancial mar-
ket debt for all types of rms (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). However, at the onset of the
nancial crisis, the market for trade credit experienced a severe contraction, consequently
forcing rms to use other sources of credit to fund their operations. (see Costello, 2017;
Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010) Anecdotal and empirical evidence2 highlights two coun-
tervailing features of trade credit: (1) Firms smooth interest rate shocks by substituting
bank and supplier nance. (2) A tightening of supplier nancing terms deteriorates the
credit conditions for customers and has adverse and exacerbating eects on maintaining
production.
In this thesis, I investigate the following two questions: Do trade credit linkages
amplify or dampen the propagation of nancial shocks? To what extent did the trade
credit network contribute to the drop in output during the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis?
1Kris Charles, Kellogg spokeswoman cited in Strom (2015), www.nytimes.com, 10/26/2018
2In 2008, there was considerable concern about the insolvency of GM and Chrysler and the resulting
domino eect through the supply chain: "I don't think that suppliers will be able to get through the
month without continued payments on their receivables" N.De Koker, CEO of the Original Equipment
Suppliers Association. (see Vlasic and Wayne, 2008, www.nytimes.com, 10/26/2018 ); As sales have been
declining since 2011, SEARS - an American retailer - faced a considerable tightening of payment terms
oered by their suppliers: "We cut their credit line and shortened payment terms [...] If they pay one
day late, we will cut them o. [...] We want them to stay in business, [b]ut not at the risk to MGA."
I.Larian, CEO of MGA Entertainment Inc. (see Kapner, 2017, www.wsj.com, 10/26/2018)
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For this purpose, I rst build a quantitative multisector model where representative
rms in each sector3 face working capital constraints and which explicitly accounts for
both the substitutability of bank- and supplier credit and the input-output relations
between sectors. In particular, I contribute to the literature by endogenizing the trade
credit intensity between rms in order to capture the stabilizing and amplifying features
outlined before. Subsequently, I apply the model to the US economy at a sector level
and quantitatively assess the importance of the trade credit channel for the real economy.
Furthermore, I derive a new credit measure - the net-lending position of a sector - which
is dened as the ratio of accounts receivable4 to the dierence between the total cost of
production and accounts payable. It is shown that this novel measure helps to identify
sectors which generate large spillovers through inter-rm credit linkages.5
This thesis makes three contributions to the literature: (1) I present stylised facts on
business cycle patterns and the heterogeneity of trade credit usage in the US. (2) I then
introduce a model which explicitly emphasizes the smoothing and amplifying features
of trade credit and the implications of interdependent distortions for the propagation
of shocks; and (3) I quantify the eect of trade credit linkages in the US economy on
aggregate output.
Trade Credit in the US Economy. In the second chapter, I present stylised facts
on business cycle patterns of aggregate trade credit in the US economy. Using yearly
balance sheet data from Compustat of a panel of publicly-traded, non-nancial rms
from 1997 to 2016, I rst calculate that trade accounts payable of non-nancial US rms
account for approximately 11.2% of total corporate debt and 5.0% of US GDP.6 It is then
shown that the growth rate of the volume of trade nance is pro-cyclical with and more
volatile than the growth rate of both current real GDP and total liabilities. In addition,
the data also suggests that bank and trade credit are substitutes.7 Finally, I use the novel
credit measure described above to show that, while there is heterogeneity across rms, the
majority of US rms extend less trade credit than their own nancing needs to cover their
production costs net of trade credit obtained from suppliers. Only a few act as nancial
intermediaries by extending relatively more trade credit to customers. Furthermore, the
direct and indirect exposure of sectors to their customers' and suppliers' trade credit
3With a slight abuse of language, I will use the term rm and sector interchangeably in the context
of the model and the quantitative application presented in Chapter 3 and 4, respectively.
4Accounts payable(receivable) are the total outstanding payments owed to suppliers (by customers)
for already delivered goods and services.
5Parts of this thesis have been published as a working paper version under the title "Finance-thy-
Neighbor. Trade Credit Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations", available on www.margit-reischer.com
6The sample includes all Compustat rm-year observations from 1997 to 2016 of non-nancial rms
with their head-quarter in the US and positive and non-missing observations of the respective variables
of interest. The sales of the rms included in the (reduced) sample represent approximately 34(19)% of
total gross output in the US. For details on the sample selection and composition, see Appendix B.
7These patterns are in line with the ndings in the literature. (see e.g. Cuñat, 2007, for an overview)
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usage is positively correlated with the decline in output during the recent nancial crisis,
suggesting that trade credit linkages play an important role for the propagation of liquidity
shocks. The model introduced in the third chapter of this thesis is evaluated based on its
ability to reproduce, both qualitatively and quantitatively, these observed patterns.
A Multisector Model with Financial Frictions. In order to analyse the role
trade credit plays in the propagation of nancial shocks across rms, I then build a static
quantitative multisector model with trade in intermediate inputs and endogenous credit
linkages between perfectly competitive intermediate good producing rms in each sector.
The banking sector is introduced in a reduced form by means of a sector-specic interest
rate on bank credit, which contains a risk premium over the federal funds rate. The risk
premium is subject to nancial shocks and increases in the share of sales extended on
trade credit to customers as suggested by the data. Since any sales are only realized after
production has taken place, rms face working capital constraints and nance production
using both bank and supplier credit.
At the beginning of a period, both productivity and nancial shocks are realized.
Prot-maximizing rms choose the composition of their borrowing portfolio to minimize
their cost of production and optimally set the quantity produced and the average trade
credit share extended to their customers, given demand, prices and interest rates. The
endogenous adjustment of the volume and cost of trade credit or "trade credit channel"
captures the two counteracting mechanisms presented earlier as follows: (1) On the de-
mand side, rms respond to shocks to their bank risk premium by optimally trading-o
credit costs on bank and trade credit and choosing the payment terms8 associated with
the transaction. Hence, rms are able to smooth out any interest rate shocks by adjusting
their borrowing portfolio which mitigates the negative eect of an increase in the bank
interest rate on output. (2) On the supply side, a rm acts both as a supplier of goods
and as a nancial intermediary. Consider a rm which experiences an increase in its bank
risk premium. Since the risk premium is increasing in the trade credit share extended
to customers, a rm will optimally reduce the share of delayed sales. Consequently, the
interest rate charged on trade credit increases, which directly aects the cost of credit and
thus production of downstream customers. Similarly, a shift in the borrowing portfolio
composition of a rm towards trade credit increases the cost of bank nance of upstream
suppliers. This creates an amplication mechanism by which idiosyncratic shocks to the
cost of bank credit are propagated both up- and downstream.
In equilibrium, it is shown that the working capital constraint introduces a credit
wedge between the rm's marginal revenue and costs thereby distorting a rm's optimal
8The optimal payment schedule is dened as the cost-minimizing share of input expenditures nanced
via supplier credit. The eective price a customer pays is a bundle of the actual goods price and the cost
of the nancial service provided by its supplier.
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input and output choice away from its optimal scale. At the aggregate level, the nan-
cial distortions manifest themselves in equilibrium as (1) an aggregate eciency wedge
decreasing Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and as (2) an aggregate labor wedge introduc-
ing a wedge between the household's marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and labor and the economy's marginal rate of transformation as common to models with
distortions. (see Bigio and La'O, 2017; Baqaee and Farhi, 2018) However, credit wedges
in this thesis are a weighted average of both interest rates on bank and supplier credit
and the weights are the optimally chosen link-specic trade credit shares. Therefore, this
paper features endogenous and interdependent distortions aecting the propagation of
nancial shocks. It is shown that to a rst order approximation, the net-lending posi-
tion of a sector determines the relative importance of the smoothing and amplication
mechanism of the trade credit channel.
Quantitative Application. Whether nancial linkages amplify or dampen the ef-
fect of credit cost shocks on (aggregate) output is ambiguous and thus remains a quanti-
tative question as the answer clearly depends on the relative strength of the substitution
and amplication eects outlined before. To this end, I rst calibrate the production
structure and the inter-industry credit ows of the model-economy to the US at a sector
level. I then simulate the model using only shocks to a sector's risk premium based on
sector level bond spreads derived in Gilchrist and Zakraj²ek (2012), GZ-spreads hereafter.
Thereby, I exclude any additional source of variation aecting the economy such as pro-
ductivity shocks. Simulations then show that the model reproduces - both qualitatively
and quantitatively - business cycle patterns of trade credit as observed in the data. In
particular, the model featuring the endogenous adjustment of the volume and cost of trade
credit captures approximately a quarter of the variation in aggregate output while solely
taking into account nancial shocks. The model predicts that in response to an increase in
sector-specic bank risk premia during the recent nancial crisis, bank and supplier credit
rates rose by approximately 45bps(20.1%) and 105bps(26.5%) on average. Since bank and
trade credit are treated as substitutes, the model implies a drop in the share of inputs
purchased on supplier credit by 3.4%, which accounts for 18.7% of the decline observed
in the data presented in Chapter 2. Ultimately, the increase in the cost of bank nance
translated into a 0.9% and a 0.6% decline in GDP and labor, respectively, accounting
for approximately 34.3% and 10.0% of GDP and labor movements documented during
the crisis. As the model predictions are based on nancial shocks only, this highlights
the quantitative importance of changes in nancial frictions and their eect on aggregate
output which corresponds to the ndings in Christiano et al. (2015). I then quantify the
role of trade credit for the propagation of liquidity shocks during the 2008-2009 Great
Recession. The three main results are as follows:
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In order to evaluate the aggregate eect of the trade credit network, I dene the trade
credit multiplier as the ratio between the percentage drop in the variable of interest gen-
erated by an economy with both trade and bank nance and an equivalent economy with
bank nance only. The latter represents the benchmark economy discussed in BL(2017).
The counterfactual exercise predicts a multiplier of around 1.9 for output, implying that
the existence of the trade credit network per se almost doubled the decline in output dur-
ing the crisis relative to an economy with bank nance only. In other words, the model
suggests that approximately 16% of the drop in output during the nancial crisis can be
accounted for by trade credit linkages alone. Thus, the existence of an inter-rm credit
network increases aggregate uctuations following an aggregate nancial shock.
The contribution of the trade credit channel - the endogenous adjustment of the
volume and cost of trade credit - to changes in aggregate output is evaluated by comparing
the general to the partial equilibrium response of the variables of interest. The latter is
obtained when both trade credit interest rates and shares are kept at their steady state
level. The dierence can be attributed to the trade credit channel. Simulations suggest
that the trade credit channel reduces aggregate volatility by 1.41% and dampened the
drop in output during the nancial crisis by 1.75%. Lastly, I quantify the main result of
the theory section of this thesis and show that the trade credit multiplier implied by a
nancial shock to the top ve sectors with the highest net-lending ratio is signicantly
higher than the trade credit multiplier generated by the same nancial shock to the ve
sectors with the lowest net-lending ratio, as predicted by the model.
Related Literature. This thesis relates to four strands of literature: First, trade
credit contracts have been studied more commonly in the corporate and trade nance lit-
erature: A growing theoretical literature - Emery (1984), Smith (1987), Biais and Gollier
(1997), Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), Cuñat (2007) among others - investigates both the
characteristics and motives of rms to engage in nancial intermediation, rationalizing
the existence of trade credit with the presence of transaction costs, imperfect market
competition, information asymmetries or moral hazard problems. (see Cuñat and García-
Appendini, 2012) The improvement in the availability of data has also spurred empir-
ical contributions investigating and quantifying the empirical relevance of each motive
for nancial intermediation among rms. (i.a. Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Huang et al.,
2011; Giannetti et al., 2018) In the context of international trade, nancial frictions have
been recognized as an important determinant of export decisions of rms (Manova, 2013;
Chaney, 2016). The recent 2008-2009 Financial Crisis has led to a growing literature
investigating the optimal payment contract choice to nance international transactions
(Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2013; Antras and Foley, 2015) as well as their implications for trade
ows and the economy (Chor and Manova, 2012). Although related, this thesis focuses
on the macroeconomic eects of credit markets on the domestic economy.
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Second, starting with Bernanke et al. (1996), credit market frictions and their im-
plications for the macroeconomy have received considerable attention in the literature.
In these models, distortions in nancial markets are at the origin of transmitting and
amplifying nancial shocks to the real economy by aecting the borrowing constraints of
rms. Since the trade credit channel disucssed in Chapter 3 also features a mechanism
that amplies the negative eect of nancial shocks on output, it is related to the con-
cept of the nancial accelerator introduced in Bernanke et al. (1996). However, while the
literature on the nancial accelerator emphasizes the role of net-worth for collateral con-
straints and investment decisions, this thesis studies the direct interplay between bank-
and trade credit in the context of a production chain where rms face working capital
constraints, the relevance of which for the macroeconomy is still understudied.
Third, this thesis is related to an extensive literature investigating the eects of
micro-level distortions on aggregates outcomes. This strand can be broadly classied into
two substrands: The rst sub-strand abstracts or limits the extent of inter-sectoral trade
(see i.a. Chari et al., 2007), the second sub-strand explicitly accounts for (some degree of)
intermediate goods trade (see i.a. Jones, 2011). More recent contributions by Baqaee and
Farhi (2018, 2019) develop a more unied framework for the aggregation of micro-level
distortions. Since my model builds on Bigio and La'O (2017), BL(2017) hereafter, it is
clearly related to the second strand. While BL(2017) treat the distortions as exogenous,
my contribution to this literature is the emphasis of the role of interdependent endogenous
distortions for the propagation of shocks in the form of credit linkages among rms due
to working capital constraints.
Fourth and foremost, this paper is related to the growing literature which studies
distortions in the context of a production network. Since the seminal contribution of
Long and Plosser (1983), a growing literature investigates the importance of production
networks - the structure of intersectoral trade - for understanding how idiosyncratic shocks
aect aggregate dynamics in an economy. (see Carvalho, 2014; Carvalho and Tahbaz-
Salehi, 2018, for an overview)
Following the 2008-2009 recession, the interconnection of banking institutions and
their role in the propagation of nancial shocks have been studied extensively (see i.a.
Acemoglu et al., 2015). The nancial crisis also spurred empirical contributions on the real
eects of credit shocks by focusing on the link between banks and rms (i.a. Chodorow-
Reich, 2014; Iyer et al., 2014; Cingano et al., 2016; Alfaro et al., 2018). However, the
nancial aspect of inter-rm trade as a transmission mechanism is a relatively new re-
search agenda. While the eect of the interconnectedness of rms via customer-supplier
relations on a rm's nancial policy has recently received more attention in the corporate
nance literature (Kale and Shahrur, 2007; Hertzel et al., 2008; Banerjee et al., 2008; Gao,
2014), this thesis is related to the strand of literature focusing on the role of production
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and nancial linkages for the propagation of shocks to the real economy. Recent empirical
contributions by Raddatz (2010) at a sector level and Jacobson and von Schedvin (2015),
Costello (2017), Cortes et al. (2018), Dewachter et al. (2018) at a rm level conrm the
relevance of trade credit linkages among production units for the propagation of liquidity
shocks and thus real outcomes. Despite their quantitative importance, trade credit link-
ages have received little attention in the existing theoretical literature on business cycle
uctuations and comovements, with the exceptions most related to this thesis discussed
below.
The relevance of trade credit for the propagation of liquidity shocks in a credit chain
due to trade credit defaults has rst been recognized in the important contribution by
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). However, the role of the network of trade credit relationships
for the propagation of nancial shocks and their aggregate implications in a business cycle
model was rst explicitly highlighted in Altinoglu (2018). Recent contributions by Zhang
(2017), Luo (2018) and Shao (2017) investigate the implications of trade credit relations
for sectoral comovement, the relative eect of nancial shocks on up- and downstream
sectoral outcomes and for aggregate uctuations, respectively. This thesis contributes
to the literature by quantifying (a) the role of trade credit as both a stabilizer and an
amplier of nancial shocks and (b) the implications of credit linkages for the interde-
pendency of credit distortions and subsequently for aggregate and sectoral outcomes. By
emphasizing these counteracting features of trade credit, I relate to the mixed empirical
evidence on the role of trade credit for rm level outcomes presented in, for example,
Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) and Costello (2017). The set-up of the
model allows me to discuss mechanisms via which nancial shocks propagate, and to de-
compose the response of output into eects attributed to each channel. Therefore, this
thesis also relates to a sub-strand of the networks literature investigating the contagion
and stabilization potential of linkages which have been discussed more extensively in the
context of banking networks (i.a Allen and Gale, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2015).
Since the main novelty of this thesis is the introduction of interdependent distortions
via trade credit linkages in a multisector model, I now contrast the modelling approach
in this thesis to that used in related work featuring endogenous trade credit choices:
First, in order to endogenize the credit link intensity between rms I follow Luo (2018)
and let the share of input expenditures nanced using trade credit be chosen by a prot-
maximizing rm. This contrast the set-up in Zhang (2017), where all rms engage in Nash-
bargaining and in Shao (2017), who introduces the level of trade credit as a choice variable.
Altinoglu (2018) assumes the extend of credit links to be a xed proportion of rms' sales.
Second, unlike Zhang (2017), Luo (2018) and Shao (2017) where the extension of trade
credit aects a rm's borrowing constraint, I explicitly impose the timing restriction that
at the time a rm needs to nance its input expenditures, no sales have been realized.
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Third, as opposed to Zhang (2017), rms choose the input-specic credit mix in order to
minimize cost of production similar to Luo (2018), such that trade credit in this model
is introduced by aecting the total cost of production via prices rather than collateral
constraints. Fourth, by exploiting the positive empirical relationship observed in the data
between sectoral credit spreads and the share of sales made on credit (see Chapter 2),
I impose that the cost of short-term bank credit lines is increasing in the share of sales
extended on trade credit. In particular, this assumption introduces a direct upstream
cost-eect independent of any additional frictions in the banking sector, through which
trade credit aects bank interest rates directly. In contrast, Luo (2018) generates both up-
and downstream propagation patterns by explicitly modeling the nancial sector following
Gertler and Karadi (2011) such that bank credit costs are only indirectly aected by the
credit portfolio choice of rms. Fifth, unlike Luo (2018) and Zhang (2017), I explicitly
model the cost of trade credit extended to a rm's customers - similar to Shao (2017) -
while rms take both input prices and the cost of supplier credit as given. Lastly, while
Shao (2017) introduces trade credit into a dynamic general equilibrium two sector model
with heterogeneous rms, the model proposed in this thesis features a more general and
richer network structure with a representative rm in each sector instead. In particular,
this allows to study the implications of rms simultaneously borrowing and lending from
other rms for the transmission of nancial shocks.
To summarize, I contribute to the literature on endogenous trade credit linkages in
a production network by providing a tractable model that allows to study (a) the role
of trade credit as both an stabilizing and a contagion device of nancial shocks and (b)
the relationship between bank and supplier nance over the business cycle by explicitly
modelling the price of trade credit. To the best of my knowledge, this thesis is the rst
to explicitly emphasise and quantify non-linearities in the eect of interlinked distortions
on aggregate outcomes while explicitly taking into account the direct interaction between
bank and supplier credit via prices in a simplied framework.
Outline. The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses
empirical regularities of trade credit over the business cycle and of the heterogeneity of
the net-lending position across sectors. Chapter 3 introduces the model: In Section 3.1
I characterize the equilibrium of this economy and Section 3.2 derives the main results
with respect to the business cycle implications of trade credit linkages in an economy as
suggested by the model. Chapter 4 presents a quantitative assessment of the role of trade
credit in the US economy during the Great Recession.
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Chapter 2
Trade Credit in the US Economy
The 2008-2009 Financial Crisis was characterized by a global collapse of credit markets
that quickly transmitted to the corporate sector and led to a contraction of real (US)
GDP in advanced economies by 3.4(2.6)%1. An important role in the transmission of the
liquidity shock from the banking to the real sector was played by trade credit relations
among rms. (see e.g. Jacobson and von Schedvin, 2015; Costello, 2017) In order to
incorporate credit linkages into a multisector model, Section 2.1 rst summarizes stylized
facts on the relevance and cyclical properties of trade credit in the US economy at an
aggregate and sectoral level, that will be informative for the set-up of the model in Chapter
3. Section 2.2 then elaborates on the eect of trade credit on output growth during the
recent 2008-2009 recession.
For this purpose, I obtain yearly balance sheet data from Compustat of a panel of
publicly-traded, non-nancial rms2 from 1997 to 2016, whose nominal sales represent
approximately 34% of total gross output in the US. Although trade credit is more inten-
sively used by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with a lower degree of access
to both bank nance and nancial markets (see i.a. Petersen and Rajan, 1997), supplier
credit still represents a non-negligible source of nancing for large publicly-traded rms.
In particular, total accounts payable (receivable) account for approximately 11.2(9.5)% of
total liabilities (assets) and make up approximately 5.0(6.5)% of US GDP3. Even though
these magnitudes represent a lower bound for the usage of trade credit by US rms, they
highlight the quantitative importance of supplier credit for the aggregate US economy
1Source: World Economic Outlook and BEA
2For more details on the sample of rms selected, see Appendix B.
3Since both accounts payable and receivable are likely to contain trade credit volumes from foreign
transactions, I also calculate the share of the respective balance sheet item in US GDP adjusted for
exports and imports, respectively. Then, accounts payable (receivable) make up approximately 4.4(5.9)%
of US GDP including imports (exports). Notably, total R&D expenditures of the same sample of US
rms account for less than 1% of US GDP. Overall, the BIS (2010) estimates that at a global scale two
thirds of world trade are supported by inter-rm credit.
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and are also consistent with related statistics documented in previous contributions by
Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Giannetti (2003). Using a sample of non-nancial Euro-
pean rms from 1993 to 1997 and a sample of G7 rms in 1991, respectively, Giannetti
(2003) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) document that the share of accounts receivable in
total assets ranges from 15 to 40% and the share of accounts payable in total liabilities
from 15 to 60% of the average rm in their sample.4
2.1 Macroeconomic Features of Trade Credit
In the following, I rst illustrate cyclical features of trade credit and its relation to other
external nancing sources such as bank and nancial market debt in the US economy
at an aggregate level for the time-period 1997-2016. For this purpose, I restrict the
previously obtained panel of publicly-traded, non-nancial US rms from Compustat to
consist of rms with non-missing observations over the entire sample period only.5 Panel
(a) of Figure 2.1 plots the log-changes of real GDP (Y ), total accounts payable (AP ) and
accounts receivable (AR) in terms of 2007 dollars using the implied GDP-deator provided
by the BEA. Panel (b) presents the log-changes of real accounts payable and both, total
(LT ) and current (LC) liabilities. In addition, I also report the standard-deviation and
the pairwise correlation of the respective series in Table 2.1. Panel (a) and (b) of Figure
2.1 highlight three business cycle features of trade credit in the US:
(F1) The growth rate of the volume of trade nance is pro-cyclical with the growth rate of
current real GDP. In other words, the growth rate of accounts payable and receivable
increases during expansions and decreases during recessions.
(F2) Trade credit is more volatile than the growth rate of total value added.
(F3) Trade credit is more volatile than rms' total liabilities and exhibits a volatility of
similar magnitude of current liabilities.
4Note that the balance-sheet decomposition presented in Table 2 in Rajan and Zingales (1995) and
Table 3 in Giannetti (2003), respectively, is reported for the average rm in the corresponding sample
rather than for the aggregate. The numbers presented in the main text are inferred from the statistics
reported in either table.
5While the patterns remain the same qualitatively, restricting the sample ensures that the log-changes
in the level of nancial variables presented below are not the result of any changes in the composition
of the sample. Nominal sales of the reduced sample represent approximately 19% of total gross output
in the US. Total accounts payable (receivable) account for approximately 12.8(10.0)% of total liabilities
(assets) of the same sample of rms and make up approximately 2.7(3.3)% of US GDP. Accounting for
foreign trade implies that accounts payable (receivable) make up approximately 2.4(3.0)% of US GDP
including imports (exports). Notably, total R&D expenditures of the same sample of US rms account
for less than 0.3% of US GDP.
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Figure 2.1: Business Cycle Properties of Trade Credit in the US
(a) Fact 1-2 (b) Fact 3
(c) Fact 4 (d) Fact 5
Note: The panels in this gure plot the evolution of the log-change in percent of aggregate US GDP (Y ),
Accounts Payable (AP ), Accounts Receivable (AR), Total (LT ) and Current (LC) Liabilities, the share of AP in
Current Liabilities (θT ), the aggregate credit spread index - GZ-spread (GZ) - derived in Gilchrist and Zakraj²ek
(2012), the net percentage of domestic banking institutions reporting a tightening of their standards for C&I
loans (LS), the share of AP in Total Costs of Goods Sold (θP ) and the share of AR in Total Sales (θR). All
variables are reported in real terms using the aggregate price-index. The sample includes all Compustat rm-year
observations from 1997 to 2016 of rms - excluding nancial rms (NAICS 52 and 53) - with their head-quarter
in the US and positive and non-missing observations of the respective variables of interest. The sample is further
restricted to rms with non-missing observations over the entire time period 1997-2016, yielding a panel of 15,920
rm-year observations for 796 unique rms whose total nominal sales represent approximately 19% of total gross
output in the US. For details on the sample used to generate these graphs, see Appendix B.
The same cyclical patterns of trade credit have been found in Cun et al. (2018) for a
sample of Chinese industrial enterprises, which suggests similarities in the usage of trade
credit of rms in advanced and emerging markets. (see i.a. Love et al., 2007; Love and
Zaidi, 2010) In addition, it should be noted that the level of total accounts payable and
receivable are strongly positively correlated. This should not come as a surprise as the
same outstanding payment from a customer to its supplier will be recorded on the balance
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sheet of both the customer as accounts payable and of the supplier as accounts receivable.
Even though total accounts payable and receivable will not be equalized in the selected
sub-sample of US rms, their dynamics track each other closely as one would expect from
market clearing.
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Yt 1.000 1.63 LTt 0.606 3.42
ARt 0.614 0.614 5.85 LCt 0.808 0.750 5.27





















θPt 0.454 6.80 θ
T
t -0.172 3.43
θRt 0.435 0.965 5.42 LSt -0.569 -0.183 20.56
GZt -0.508 -0.384 -0.343 47.55 GZt -0.038 -0.678 0.525 47.55
Note: Each subtable presents the pairwise correlations between the log-changes as well as the standard-
deviation in percent of the log-changes of the time series plotted in the corresponding panel of Figure 2.1.
Trade versus Bank Credit. Given that the focus of this thesis is the role of trade
credit for the transmission of liquidity shocks during the Great Recession, I now discuss the
relationship between the usage of supplier and bank credit during this period of nancial
turmoil. For this purpose, I rst obtain two aggregate measures of frictions in the nancial
market. The rst measure is the aggregate credit spread index derived in Gilchrist and
Zakraj²ek (2012). The "GZ-spread" (GZ) is dened as the average dierence in the
yields on corporate bonds and yields on Treasury securities of comparable maturities and
represents an important indicator of the degree of tensions in the nancial system. The
second measure reports the tightening in lending standards (LS) by banking institutions
based on the Senior Loan Ocer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices conducted by
the Federal Reserve. The series corresponds to the net percentage of domestic respondents
tightening their standards for commercial and industrial (C&I) loans. Panel (c) of Figure
2.1 plots the log-change of the share of accounts payable in total costs of production and
the share of accounts receivable in revenues at an aggregate level on the left axis as well
as the change in logs of credit spreads on the right axis. As evident from Figure 2.1 and
Table 2.1:
(F4) The share of accounts payable and receivable in total costs of production and sales
are negatively correlated with aggregate credit spreads in the economy.
In other words, as credit markets tighten, both the share of production costs nanced
using trade credit and the share of sales extended on trade credit decline. This highlights
that the drop in the level of real accounts receivable and payable depicted in Panel (a) and
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(b) was not driven by a pure reduction in demand but rather coincided with the tightening
of credit markets, which preceded the decline in aggregate output. I then calculate the
log-change of the share of accounts payable in current liabilities (θT ) for the evolution of
the composition of short-term borrowing. Panel (d) of Figure 2.1 plots both measures of
nancial frictions (right axis) as well as the log-change in the share of accounts payable
in current liabilities (left axis). Together with the evolution of accounts payable, Figure
2.1d implies the following:
(F5) As credit spreads rose and lending standards tightened at the onset of the nancial
crisis in 2008, liquidity in the supplier credit market contracted immediately and
rms drew down their bank credit lines. The composition of short-term borrowing
shifted towards bank credit as rms substituted supplier with bank credit.
This observation is consistent with the empirical evidence on the evolution of bank
lending during 2008 documented in Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) and on supplier credit
presented in Costello (2017). Using data on syndicated loans from Reuter's Dealscan,
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show that, while syndicated lending fell, C&I loans as
reported on the balance sheets of US banks rose due to an increase in drawdowns of
existing credit lines at the onset of the nancial crisis. At the same time, receivables
contracted signicantly along the intensive margin as documented in Costello (2017) using
detailed transaction data at a rm level in the US. Thus, the compositional shift of
short-term borrowing towards bank credit in 2008 was due to the joint occurrence of
the reduction in the provision of supplier credit and drawdowns of unused credit lines.
However, the increase in C&I loans by approximately 17% in 2008 was followed by a
sharp drop of 6.5% in 20096, as the tightening of lending standards in 2008 translated
into a considerable decline in the availability of new credit lines. Simultaneously, accounts
payable and receivable increased such that the compositional shift reversed and rms
substituted bank with trade credit as evident from Figures 2.1a and 2.1d.
A reasonable explanation for the dierences in the speed of adjustment between
credit markets in response to a deterioration of nancial conditions is the contractual
enforceability or rather the lack thereof in the case of supplier credit. While existing
credit lines are prior commitments by banks to lend to corporations any amount up to
a preset limit at prespecied rates (see Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010), trade credit is
not subject to formal contracts (see Cuñat, 2007). The empirical observation on the
substitutability7 of supplier and nancial market debt is consistent with the ndings of a
6Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Commercial and Industrial Loans,
All Commercial Banks [BUSLOANS], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; October
6, 2018
7It should be noted, that a few papers nd evidence of a complementarity between bank and trade
credit (see Giannetti et al., 2011) consistent with a theoretical argument of the signalling function of
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large body of literature on the relationship between trade and bank credit over the business
cycle starting with Meltzer (1960). It is argued that during a contractionary period, rms
with access to liquidity will increase the amount of trade credit extended to customers,
thereby providing funds to credit rationed rms. (see i.a. Meltzer, 1960; Schwartz, 1974;
Kohler et al., 2000; Nilsen, 2002) As a result, trade credit serves as a liquidity insurance
across rms (see Cuñat, 2007; Wilner, 2000). In particular, Amberg et al. (2016) show
that rms manage liquidity shortfalls by increasing trade credit obtained from suppliers
and rationing credit extended to customers.
Cost of Credit. These observed patterns further raise the following two questions:
(a) Does the extension of trade credit aect a rm's cost of bank credit? and (b) What is
the relationship between the share of a rm's cost of production nanced by delaying pay-
ments to suppliers and the cost of credit? In order to address the rst question, I relate to
a strand of literature explicitly modelling nancial intermediaries and incorporating credit
markets into quantitative macro-models (see i.a. Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki
and Moore, 1997; Bernanke et al., 1999; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010). While a detailed
discussion thereof is beyond the scope and purpose of this thesis, I exploit the fact that
the interest rate on bank loans faced by rms and determined in equilibrium will be an
increasing function of (default) risk in the economy. (see e.g. Bernanke et al., 1999) Since
rms that sell their products on credit are subject to the credit risk of their customers
(see Jacobson and von Schedvin, 2015; Costello, 2019), I now investigate to what extent
the risk premium aecting the cost of bank loans (rZk ) is positively correlated with the
share of accounts receivable in total sales (θRk ). For this purpose, I estimate the following
equation





βvXvk,t + FE + εkt (2.1a)
using a panel of 45 sectors from 2000 to 2014 due to the data-limitations at a rm level.
As a baseline measure for the risk premium, I employ the sectoral credit spreads (rZkt) de-
rived in Gilchrist and Zakraj²ek (2012) and provided to me by the authors. The remaining
nancial variables are calculated by aggregating rm level data of a panel of Compustat
rms and include: the share of accounts receivable in total sales at a sector level (θRkt),
the leverage ratio (LV Skt), the ratio of current to long-term debt (θ
F
kt), the share of cash in
total production cost (θEkt) as well as the relative size of a sector (Sizekt) measured by the
share of a sector's assets in total assets. A detailed description of the variables and the
dataset is provided in Appendix B. Equation 2.1a is estimated by OLS including sector
trade credit on the solvency of borrowers (see Biais and Gollier, 1997). In other words, the extension of
trade credit conveys a positive signal on the creditworthiness of a customer, which induces banks to lend.
The co-existence of the substitutability and complementarity of bank and trade credit and its cyclical
pattern is investigated further in a recent contribution by Huang et al. (2011).
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and year xed eects. The estimated coecients and corresponding clustered standard
errors at the sector level are reported in Table 2.2a.
Table 2.2: Bank versus Trade Credit
(a) Cost of External Finance
VAR (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(θRkt) 0.33* 0.33* 0.34* 0.32*
(0.161) (0.157) (0.153) (0.151)
ln(LV Skt) 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03
(0.122) (0.122) (0.121) (0.120)






NObs 579 579 579 579
R2 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.77
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
(b) Trade Credit Shares
VAR (1) (2) (3)
rBkt 0.12+ 0.13+ 0.12+
(0.064) (0.063) (0.062)






NObs 579 579 579
R2 0.79 0.79 0.80
Constant Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Note: Panel (a) and (b) report the estimated coecients of Equation (2.1a) and (2.1b), where the dependent
variables are: (a) sectoral credit spreads (ln(rZkt)) derived in Gilchrist and Zakraj²ek (2012) and (b), the share of
accounts payable in total cost of production (θPkt). The set of control variables at a sector level derived from a panel of
Compustat rms includes: the share of accounts receivable in total sales (θRkt), the leverage ratio (LV
S
kt), the ratio of
current to long-term debt (θFkt), the share of cash in total production cost (θ
E
kt), the relative size of a sector (Sizekt)
measured by the share of a sector's assets in total assets and detrended total production costs (CXkt). A detailed
description of the variables and the dataset is provided in Appendix B. The estimated coecients are derived by
estimating Equation (2.1a) and (2.1b) by OLS including both sector and year xed eects. Clustered standard errors
at the sector level are reported in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
The estimation results of Equation (2.1a) suggest a positive relationship between the
credit spread and the share of accounts receivable in total sales such that a one percent
increase of the shares of revenues obtained on credit signicantly increases a sector's
risk premium by approximately 0.3 percent. These results are robust to the inclusion
of additional variables ({Xv}Vv=1) in order to control for the access to external funds, the
ability of rms to repay their debt and the size of the rm following related empirical work
by e.g. Petersen and Rajan (1997); Jacobson and von Schedvin (2015); Costello (2017).
Having established a positive relationship between trade credit extended to customers and
credit spreads, I now turn to the second question by estimating the relationship between
the share of production costs nanced using trade credit (θPkt) and the cost of bank credit
(rBkt)
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βvXvk,t + FE + εit (2.1b)
using the same panel of 45 sectors from 2000 to 2014 as before. Since price data on
the cost of trade credit are not readily available due to the nature of the contract, I limit
the analysis to the interest rate on bank loans which are approximated by calculating the
sum of the federal funds rate and the sectoral credit spread (rZkt) derived in Gilchrist and
Zakraj²ek (2012). In addition, the inclusion of the detrended total cost of inputs (CXkt)
allows me to control for the size of each sector in terms of their production costs. Equation
(2.1b) is also estimated by OLS including sector and year xed eects. The estimated co-
ecients and corresponding clustered standard errors at the sector level reported in Table
2.2b suggest a signicant and positive relationship between the cost of bank credit and
the share of production costs nanced by postponing payments to suppliers: An increase
in the cost of bank credit by 100 basis points (rBkt+0.01) increases the share of production
costs nanced using trade credit by 0.12 percentage points. This empirical evidence is in
line with the strand of literature modelling bank and trade credit as substitutes, which
will be exploited in the set up of the model presented in Chapter 3. In the last paragraph
of this subsection, I now discuss the heterogeneous usage of trade credit across rms in
the US economy.
Heterogeneity in Trade Credit Usage. While the dynamics of log-changes of
total payables and receivables presented in Figure 2.1 are informative for the business
cycle properties of trade credit, they contain little information on the heterogeneity of the
usage of trade credit across rms. In order to provide a summary measure of the trade
credit usage of a rm from both its perspective as a lender and a borrower, I rst dene
the net-lending position of rm k (θτkt).
Denition 2.1. The net-lending position of a rm k is dened as the ratio of total trade
credit extended to customers (accounts receivable) and the dierence between total cost of
production and trade credit obtained from suppliers (accounts payable).
In other words the net-lending position reects a rm's ability to extend trade credit
to their customers and obtain trade credit from their suppliers: How many future dollars
does rm k receive per dollar it needs to nance today. An increase in the net-lending
position of rm k implies that rm k extends relatively more trade credit to its customers
(accounts receivable) compared to its total cost of production net of trade credit (accounts
payable) obtained from its suppliers. Figure 2.2 plots the distribution of the average net-
lending position in 2004-2007 of the same sample of Compustat rms used to generated the
respective graphs shown in Figure 2.1. Since the distribution of the net-lending position
is skewed to the left, there is heterogeneity in the trade credit usage of US rms. In
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particular one key pattern of trade credit usage by US rms emerges:
(F6) The majority of US rms extends less trade credit than their own nancing needs
to cover their production costs net of trade credit obtained from suppliers. Only
a few act as nancial intermediaries by extending relatively more trade credit to
customers.
By taking a closer look at the industry-
aliation of rms, it becomes apparent
that rms which are more upstream in the
production chain (e.g. primary-industries,
manufacturing) tend to have a higher net-
lending position than more downstream
rms (e.g. retail, services). This observa-
tion highlights that the structure of inter-
sectoral trade plays a crucial role in deter-
mining which aspect of trade nance domi-
nates and conrms the ndings in Kalemli-
Özcan et al. (2014), that upstream rms
have higher accounts receivable compared
to nal product rms. The relationship
between the net-lending position of rms
(sectors) and the production network will
be investigated in more detail in Section
4.1, in the context of the calibration of the
model introduced in Chapter 3.
Trade Credit Usage of US Firms
Figure 2.2: Trade Credit Usage of US Firms
Note: The gure plots the distribution of the average
net-lending position dened as the ratio of accounts re-
ceivable and the dierence between total cost of produc-
tion and accounts payable over 2004-2007 of the sample
of Compustat rms described in Appendix B.
Having presented statistics on the business cycle properties on trade credit at an ag-
gregate level, the evolution of the composition and heterogeneity of short-term borrowing,
it becomes apparent that trade credit is an important source of short- to medium term
credit as an alternative to bank nance used by all types of rms and therefore plays a
crucial role for the propagation of shocks in an economy. As the focus of this thesis is
the role of trade credit linkages for the transmission of nancial shocks and consequently
its eect on sectoral and aggregates outcomes, the next subsection further investigates
the relationship between the usage of trade credit by US sectors and the drop in sectoral
output during the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis.
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2.2 Trade Credit and Output Growth during the
2008-2009 Financial Crisis
As already mentioned in the introduction, previous empirical contributions by Jacobson
and von Schedvin (2015) and Costello (2017) - among others - have emphasized the role
of trade credit linkages for the propagation of nancial shocks and its eect on rm level
outcomes. While Jacobson and von Schedvin (2015) focus on the role of trade credit
linkages as a transmission mechanism of bankruptcies, Costello (2017) highlights that
in response to a banking shock, rms adjust their trade credit contracts by being more
selective in their lending behavior and thus generate asymmetric adverse eects on their
customers' access to liquidity. This thesis contributes to the literature by focusing on
dierent and counteracting mechanisms through which trade credit can aect economic
outcomes at a macro-level, while emphasizing the role of rms as nancial intermediaries
in an economy for aggregate and sector level outcomes. In particular, I propose a new
summary measure - the net-lending position of a sector dened in 2.1 - which relates a
rm's/sector's engagement in nancial intermediation to their own nancing needs and
thus captures the relative importance of a rm as a recipient and lender of credit in an
economy. Following the discussion in the previous section, this section elaborates on how
dierences in the usage of trade credit across rms has aected sectoral outcomes during
the recent nancial crisis, by investigating simple correlation patterns.
The rst question that arises from the literature is: How did the drop in liquidity in
the market for trade credit aect sectoral output growth during the crisis? In order to
address this question, Figure 2.3 plots the change in sectoral real output in 2009 against
the change in a sector's net-lending position in 2008. In addition, the estimated coecient
of a simple OLS regression and corresponding T-statistic are also reported, while excluding
outliers if applicable. A simple inspection of Figure 2.3 and the implied correlations
suggests that: Sectors experiencing a sharper decline in their net-lending position in 2008
also experienced a stronger decline in output in 2009. Note that the decline in a sector's
net-lending position implies a stronger decline in trade credit extended relative to their
own requirements of funds net of trade credit obtained from suppliers, to nance their
cost of production. Overall, this observation suggests that changes in a sector's relative
usage of trade credit are correlated with its economic performance during the crisis, which
is in line with the ndings in the broader literature.
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Figure 2.3: Change in Trade Credit and Sectoral Output Growth in 2009
Note: This gure plots the change in sectoral real output in 2009 against the change in a
sector's net-lending position in 2008, based on Denition 2.1. The estimated coecient of a
simple OLS regression and corresponding T-statistic are also reported, while excluding out-
liers if applicable. Outliers excluded from the regression are represented by a green triangle.
The size of one observation represents the relative importance of the sector in the economy
measured by the share of a sector's average pre-crisis (2004-2007) value added in total value
added.
While the previous statement emphasizes the relationship between a sector's own
trade credit usage and its output response, the second question that follows is, how a
sector's exposure to the trade credit usage of its suppliers and customers aected its
outcome during the 2008-2009 nancial crisis. For this purpose, I rst construct the















From the perspective of sector k, the exposure measure is calculated as the weighted
sum of its suppliers' share of accounts receivable in total sales. By using the accounts
receivable shares of suppliers, this captures the extent to which suppliers of sector k engage
in inter-rm nancial intermediation and are therefore more exposed to changes in the
cost of bank nance, as suggested by the regression results presented in Table 2.2a. The
weights (wRkm) are a combination of sector k's expenditure share on inputs purchased from
supplier m and sector k's overall dependence on trade credit to nance its production.
The weights need not sum up to one but capture the dependency of sector k on supplier m
as a supplier of inputs and trade credit. Furthermore, note that due to data limitations,
I use aggregate rather than link-specic measures trade credit. The exposure variables
with respect to the net-lending position are calculated as shown above with the trade
credit shares of suppliers replaced with their net-lending position.
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Figure 2.4 then plots sectoral output growth during the crisis against the four-year
(2004-2007) pre-crisis average of the respective exposure measure. The correlation pat-
terns shown in Figure 2.4 suggest that sectors who were more exposed to suppliers with a
larger receivable share in their netsales and/or a higher net-lending position experienced
a larger decrease in output during the nancial crisis after the shock.8 This observation
is in line with the ndings in the empirical literature and highlights that sectors are not
only directly aected by changes in the liquidity in the market for trade credit but are
also aected indirectly through production and nancial linkages as measured by their
pre-crisis exposure to trade credit.
Figure 2.4: Output Growth and Exposure to Trade Credit of Suppliers
(a) Accounts Receivable (b) Net-Lending Position
Note: This gure plots sectoral output growth in 2009 against a sector's average pre-crisis (2004-2007) exposure
to (a) the accounts receivable shares of its suppliers (eRk ) dened in Equation (2.2) and (b) the net-lending position
of its suppliers. The tted line of an OLS-regression and corresponding coecient and T-statistic are also reported.
If applicable, outliers excluded from the regression are represented by a green triangle. The size of one observation
represents the relative importance of the sector in the economy measured by the share of a sector's average pre-crisis
(2004-2007) value added in total value added.
2.3 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has discussed the cyclical properties of supplier credit as well as the het-
erogeneity in the lending and borrowing behavior across rms. In particular, the data
suggest that liquidity in the market for trade credit was severely aected the onset of
the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis inducing a shift of the composition of short-term credit
towards bank nance. In order to capture the heterogeneity of trade credit usage across
rms, I propose a novel credit measure - the net-lending position of a rm - dened as
the ratio of trade credit extended to customers and total production costs net of trade
8The exposure measure to customers is constructed analogously to Equation (2.2) and yields similar
results as shown in Appendix B.
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credit obtained from suppliers. The majority of US rms extend less trade credit than
their own nancing needs, while only a few act as nancial intermediaries by extending
relatively more trade credit to customers. Furthermore, I nd a positive correlation be-
tween the decline in sectoral output during the crisis and a sector's overall dependency on
supplier credit, suggesting that trade credit linkages aect the transmission of nancial
shocks and thus the real economy. Overall, trade credit represents an important source of
nancing for all types of rms and aects the propagation of shocks and thereby sectoral
and aggregate outcomes.
In the next chapter I now build a model, which focuses on the contraction of the
liquidity in the trade credit market at the onset of the nancial crisis in order to investigate
the role of credit linkages in the propagation of the nancial shock. To this end, I abstract
from any dynamics by imposing the timing restriction that nancial markets contracted
at the same time as aggregate output such that the share of accounts payable (receivable)
in total production costs (sales) is now positively correlated with current rather than next
period's output. Although output declined with a time lag in response to the deterioration
of credit conditions as shown in Figure 2.1a, this simplication may be justiable as (1)
the sharp increase in credit spreads occurred in the second half of 2008 and (2) a rm's
production plans and therefore intermediate demand might be pre-determined. This
allows me to focus on the eect of a decline in supplier credit on aggregate output during
the crisis. In particular, I build a model in which rms face working capital constraints
and nance their input expenditures using both bank- and supplier credit. At this point
it should be noticed that, in order to keep the model tractable, I only consider a rm's
trade credit decision along the intensive rather than the extensive margin. In other words,
I do not explicitly model a rm's decision to enter the trade credit market in the rst
place. A growing theoretical literature, as highlighted in the introduction, investigates
both the characteristics and motives of rms to engage in nancial intermediation. A
detailed overview of the dierent strands of the theoretical literature is provided in Cuñat
and García-Appendini (2012) and is beyond the scope of this thesis. I now describe the




A Multisector Model with
Financial Frictions
In this chapter, I introduce a static1 quantitative multisector model in the tradition of
Long and Plosser (1983) with trade in intermediate inputs and endogenous credit linkages
between sectors. Representative rms in each sector face working capital constraints and
nance their input expenditures using both bank and supplier credit, while being subject
to sectoral productivity and nancial shocks to the cost of bank credit. The model nests
the economy introduced in BL(2017) if no credit linkages are considered. The main novelty
in this set-up is the introduction of endogenous credit linkages along the intensive margin
among sectors by, in contrast to previous work by Zhang (2017) and Luo (2018), explicitly
modelling the price of trade credit as well as introducing a direct link between the cost
of bank nance and the amount of trade credit extended to customers, as outlined in the
introduction. The model set-up is as follows.
Production Structure. The economy consists of M intermediate sectors indexed
by k = 1, ...,M producing M dierentiated goods, a nal good sector indexed by 0 pro-
ducing a composite nal good and a representative household. A continuum of perfectly
competitive rms within each sector produce an identical good using the same technology
such that there exists a representative rm per sector. Therefore, I use the words rm and
sector interchangeably. The production structure of the economy is depicted in Figure
3.1. An intermediate goods rm k produces output, qk, using capital, kk, productive labor,










1By abstracting from savings and investment dynamics, this thesis focuses on cross-sectional propaga-
tion patterns, which also have been the focus of a recent strand of literature see Bigio and La'O (2017),
Baqaee and Farhi (2018) and Baqaee and Farhi (2019) among others.
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where the composite of (productive) labor and intermediate inputs, Vk, as well as the

















While Ak denotes sector-specic productivity and is subject to productivity shocks, AVk
and AXk represent normalization constants as a function of the production parameters in-
troduced to simplify the equilibrium expressions derived below. The intermediate produc-
tion technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale (DRS), χk ∈ (0, 1), in its production
inputs. Due to the Cobb-Douglas technology, the production parameter ωXks ∈ [0, 1] de-





ks = 1 ∀k ∈ {1, ...,M}. The output of rm k is used both as an intermediate
input in production and to produce a composite nal good F consumed by the household
such that F = C holds in equilibrium.
Figure 3.1: Flow Chart of the Model Economy
Note: The gure depicts the ow of intermediate goods (X), the nal consumption good (C),
labor (L) as solid lines, and the ow of supplier (TC) and bank credit (BC) as dashed lines.












m = 1. Similarly, the production parameters ω
F
m ∈
[0, 1] denote the expenditure share on good m by the nal good rm. Productivity in the
intermediate and nal sector is subject to sector-specic, normally distributed shocks, zqi ,
and is given by Ai = exp(z
q
i )Ai∀i ∈ {0, 1, ...,M}. The sector-specic normalization con-
stants, Ai, are functions of the respective production parameters introduced for analytical
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convenience and are dened in Appendix C. For the purpose of the model, I assume that
zq0 = 0 such that I am abstracting from any shocks to nal demand. I now impose the
following constraint for intermediate good producing rms.
Assumption 3.1 (Working Capital Constraint). The production and delivery of products
along the supply chain is such that any sales are only realized after production has taken
place.
Figure 3.2: Timing of the Intermediate Good Firm's Problem
The timing of events is depicted in Figure 3.2 and is as follows: At the beginning
of a period both productivity (zqk) and nancial shocks to the cost of bank credit (z
b
k)
are realized such that there is no idiosyncratic or aggregate uncertainty in the model.
Within period I consider two stages: the pre-production stage and the post-production
stage. Due to the working capital constraint, rms make their production and borrowing
portfolio decisions prior to producing their output. Once rms produced, they sell their
output to both intermediate and nal good producers and retrieve the share of sales paid
on delivery. At the end of the period, rms repay their debt obligations and receive the
remaining share of revenues.
Financing Production. The representative intermediate good producing rm in
sector k faces a cash ow mismatch between input payments at the beginning of the
period and the realization of revenues. Wlog, I assume that rms have no internal funds
available such that rm k needs to nance its working capital using
(1) an intraperiod bank loan, BCk, at an interest rate rBk , and


















where θks ∈ [0, 1] represents the share of payments to supplier s that rm k postpones
paying until after its sales are realized. As evident from Equation (3.5), rms can only
postpone payments to intermediate good suppliers while any productive (`Qk ) and non-
productive (`Tk ) labor expenditures have to be paid upfront. Therefore, labor costs will be
nanced using bank credit only since rms are assumed to have no internal funds. Thus,










psxks ≤ BCk + APk (3.6)
which is binding in equilibrium. At this point, it should be noted that I abstract from a
micro-foundation of the incentives of rms to engage in nancial intermediation in the form
of trade credit in the rst place, which has been investigated in theoretical contributions
by Emery (1984), Smith (1987), Biais and Gollier (1997), Burkart and Ellingsen (2004),
Cuñat (2007) among others. (see e.g. Cuñat and García-Appendini, 2012, for an overview)
I now introduce two additional simplifying assumptions, which allow me to capture the
following two main features of the relationship between bank and trade credit presented
in Chapter 2 while ensuring the analytical tractability of a rm's optimization problem:
(1) A rm's short-term credit portfolio is composed of both bank and supplier credit; and
(2) The cost of bank credit are increasing in the share of sales extended on trade credit
to customers. Both assumptions are discussed in greater detail below.
Assumption 3.2 ( Management Cost of Credit Lines ). Firms face additional manage-
ment costs of credit lines in the form of a non-productive labor input (`Tk ).
Assumption 3.3 ( Cost of Bank Credit ). The cost of bank credit (rBk ) is an increasing
function in the share of total sales extended on trade credit to customers (θCk ).
Management Costs of Credit Lines. In order to manage its credit lines, a rm needs
to hire non-productive labor (e.g. accountants, sales people and managers), w`Tk , which
introduces an additional cost component into the rm's problem. The adjustment of a
rm's credit portfolio is subject to a combination of convex and non-convex frictions.
Formally, the total costs of managing credit lines is given by











where I adapt the ndings of a strand of literature related to the functional form of the
adjustment costs of capital (see Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006). The term θSk denotes the
average share of intermediate input payments obtained on trade credit. The rst term
implies that there are xed costs, κBk , involved in managing credit lines such that even if
sector k does not obtain any supplier credit, it still faces xed management costs. Similar
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to Luo (2018), the quadratic adjustment cost part captures the fact that it is costly to
change the credit composition. In addition, I further assume that while {κT1,ks}s ∀k is
always positive, the linear cost parameter, κT0,ks, may take on both positive and negative
values. This should highlight, that in adjusting the credit relationship with one's supplier
s, rm k may undergo an organizational restructuring of its supplier relationship thereby
increasing (e.g. switching suppliers within sector) or decreasing (e.g. intensifying the
business relationship) the management costs. Notably, I assume the variable adjustment
cost parameters to be specic to a rm-supplier pair.
At this point, it should be noted that in the absence of uncertainty3 from the model
and allowing for a frictionless adjustment of the credit portfolio, the choice between bank
and supplier credit will be such that rms will nance their expenditures using only
the cheapest credit source. While at the individual rm and transaction level this is a
reasonable outcome - e.g. a rm either settles its payment on delivery (θks = 0) or not
(θks = 1) - a mixture of both bank and trade credit is maintained at the sector level
as highlighted in Chapter 2, even if the interest costs of bank nance might be cheaper
than supplier credit as discussed in Cuñat and García-Appendini (2012). Therefore, the
introduction of non-linear adjustment costs of credit lines ensures that the representative
rm in each sector optimally chooses a credit portfolio of both bank and supplier credit
consistent with the empirical evidence presented in Chapter 2, while maintaining the
tractability of the model in the absence of uncertainty.
Costs of Bank Credit . Taking into account the empirical observations on the rela-
tionship between the cost of bank credit and trade credit extended to customers presented
in Chapter 2, I introduce the banking sector in a reduced form by imposing the following





























2 > 0. In other words, I assume that each sector is charged a risk premium,
rZk , over the federal funds rate, r
B
0 , which is a convex function in the average trade credit
share extended to rm k's customers, θCk . The additional parameter, θ
D
0 , is introduced
to ensure that the equilibrium interest rate on trade credit is well behaved and of similar
magnitude relative to the cost of bank credit as documented in the literature (Cuñat and
García-Appendini, 2012). The parameter, θD0 , will be calibrated to the average leverage
in the economy, thereby capturing a notion of aggregate default probability aecting the
overall cost of bank credit. While the positive relationship between the interest rate
charged on bank loans and the probability of default is a common modelling assumption
(see i.a. Khan et al., 2016) and is supported by empirical evidence (see i.a. Angbazo,
3In models where agents face a portfolio choice between e.g. equities (see e.g. Engel and Matsumoto,
2006), agents typically maintain a mixed portfolio, due to the existence of uncertainty.
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1997), I abstract from including a micro-foundation thereof in order to keep the model
tractable, while capturing observed empirical patterns on the interdependency of the cost
of credit. Clearly, this set up introduces a direct upstream credit link between the cost
of bank credit of rm k and trade credit extended to its customers: the higher the share
of delayed payments by rm k's customers, the higher the interest rate on bank credit
that rm k is charged. I am now able to formulate the intermediate good rm's prot
maximization problem.
Intermediate Production. Firms are price takers in both goods and credit mar-
kets. I assume that in the short-run capital is exogenously given and at its steady state
value, kk. The objective of the representative rm in sector k is to choose production in-
puts, the credit portfolio as well as the optimal level of production and the share of its sales
to extend on trade credit to maximise prots, while taking demand as given. Therefore,
the set of choice variables is given by V = {`Qk , {xks}Ms=1, Vk, {θks}Ms=1, θCk }. Taking into
account the production (3.13) and credit (3.14) feasibility constraints, the intermediate








k )pkqk − (1 + rBk )BCk −
M∑
s=1
(1 + rTs )APks, (3.9)
the production function (3.1), total bank (3.6) and supplier credit (3.5), the credit man-
agement cost function (3.7), the interest rate on bank credit (3.8), feasibility constraints
on trade credit shares θCk , θks∀s ∈ [0, 1] and non-negativity constraints `Qk , xks, Vk ≥ 0 ∀s.
(see Appendix C.3.2 for details)
Final Demand. The representative nal good producer is required to pay its input
expenditures at the time of the delivery of the product. Since I assume that the nal
goods producer does not face any working capital constraints, the prot maximization







subject to the production function (3.3) and a non-negativity constraint x0m ≥ 0 ∀m.

















The parameter εC > 0 denotes the income elasticity and εL > 0 denotes the inverse
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Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The budget constraint of the household indicates that
total income of the household - total wage bill, prots and interest income from extending
bank credit to rms - is spent on the aggregate consumption good. Ultimately, I assume
that banks are owned by foreign households such that any interest rate income, while
initially rebated to households, is treated as an import in the calculation of aggregate
GDP.
Market Clearing. As depicted in Figure 3.1 the intermediate good of sector k is
used both in the production of intermediate goods as well as in the production of the nal











k holds. Similarly, the interest rate on trade










holds. In other words, total accounts receivable of sector k equal total accounts payable
owed by its customers to sector k. A competitive equilibrium in this economy is then
dened as
Denition 3.1. A competitive equilibrium in this economy is a set of aggregate and sec-
tor level prices (w,P, {pm, rTm}Mm=1), quantities (C,F, L, {qm, `Qm, x0m, {xms}Ms=1}Mm=1) and
sector level trade credit shares {θCm, {θms}Ms=1}Mm=1 such that
(1) The representative household maximizes utility.
(2) Intermediate and Final-Good producers maximize prots.
(3) Goods and Factor markets clear.
(4) Financial markets clear.
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3.1 Equilibrium Characterization
Having introduced the model-set up in the previous section, I now discuss the eect of
working capital constraints and credit links on the optimal intermediate input choice and
credit composition before characterizing the equilibrium of the economy.
Firm Optimality and Credit Composition. In particular, I rst describe the
eect of distortions on the optimal input demand by the representative intermediate
good producing rm while taking both credit costs and the composition of the borrowing
portfolio as given.
Lemma 3.1 (Optimal Input Choice). Given a vector of prices (p), interest rates (rB, rT ),
credit links (Θ), and the wage rate (w), rm k's optimal demand for intermediate input
















where the credit wedges are given by




ks = 1 + (1− θks)rBk + θksrTs (3.18)





Proof. Provided in Appendix C.3.2.
Due to the Cobb-Douglas production technology, expenditures on any production
input are proportional to sector k's revenues. However, as evident from Equation (3.15)
and (3.16) in Lemma 3.1, the requirement to nance total input expenditures prior to the
realization of any sales introduces a credit wedge between the rm's marginal cost and
marginal revenue of the respective input, thereby distorting the rst order conditions.
While labor expenditures are exclusively nanced via bank credit, rm k nances its
expenditures on intermediate inputs obtained from supplier s using both bank and supplier
credit. The resulting credit wedge is a weighted average of both credit costs and the
weights are equal to the trade credit share. In addition, Lemma 3.1 also highlights that
an increase in trade credit extended to customers ceteris paribus increases sector k's
revenues due to an increase in the eective price charged (φRk pk) and thus also increases
sector k's demand for production inputs.
Corollary 3.1 (Marginal Costs of Production). Given credit links (Θ), the marginal cost
of production, pVk , can be decomposed into a combined credit wedge, φ
V
k , and a composite
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The combined sectoral credit wedge φVk > 1 is a Cobb-Douglas composite of the individual
credit costs. The marginal cost of production is increasing in the cost of bank, rBk , and
supplier credit, rTk , and increasing (decreasing) in the trade credit share taken from supplier





Proof. Provided in Appendix C.3.2.
Credit costs associated with the working capital constraint thus aggregate to a
marginal cost wedge, φVk , as shown in Corollary 3.1 and increase both, the total cost
of production and the optimal goods price charged as shown in Lemma 3.2. However,
if a rm also extends trade credit to its customers, the marginal revenue generated by
an additional unit sold, φRk , increases and the optimal price charged on the actual good
decreases.











and is increasing the composite credit wedge, φVk and decreasing in the revenue wedge, φ
R
k .
Proof. Provided in Appendix C.3.2.
The optimality conditions were derived while taking both interest rates as well as
trade credit shares as given. Therefore, I now describe the prot-maximizing supplier
credit share and the optimal interest rate charged on trade credit while taking both prices
and demand for trade credit as given.
Lemma 3.3 (Optimal Demand for TC). Firm k chooses {θks}Ms=1 to maximise prots.
For {θks}Ms=1 ∈ (0, 1), the FOC associated with θks is
∂πk
∂θks






























k , the optimal trade
credit share is decreasing in the linear cost parameter κT0,ks and decreasing (increasing)
in the quadratic cost parameter κT1,ks, if ∆ks > (<) 0. Similarly, given intermediate
expenditures, psxks, the optimal trade credit share is decreasing in the interest rate charged
on trade credit, rTs , and increasing in the interest rate on bank credit, r
B
k .
Proof. Provided in Appendix C.3.3.
In other words, rm k chooses {θks}s such that the combined change in the cost
of production and managing credit lines associated with changing the share of trade
credit obtained from k's supplier is zero at the optimum. However, it should be noted
that the sign of the interest-rate dierential governs the trade-o that a rm faces when
choosing the composition of its credit portfolio. In particular, if the interest dierential
∆ks = r
B
k − rTs is positive such that the interest rate on trade credit oered by supplier s
is cheaper than the interest rate on bank credit, then an increase in the trade credit share
obtained from supplier s reduces the marginal cost of production but increases the credit
management costs since κT1,ks > 0. If the interest dierential ∆ks = r
B
k − rTs is negative,
then an increase in the trade credit share obtained from supplier s increases total cost of
production such that rm k chooses the trade credit share to minimize total costs.
Lemma 3.3 further highlights that the optimal trade credit share obtained from sup-
plier s as determined by the rst order condition (3.21) exhibits the following properties.
It holds that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the interest rate on bank credit increases
both the marginal cost of production and non-productive labor costs including interest
payments of sector k, increasing the optimal share of purchases obtained on credit from
sector s. On the other hand, an increase in the interest rate on trade credit decreases
the optimal trade credit share for given intermediate expenditures, psxks. Given credit
costs, an increase in expenditures on output of supplier s, psxks, will either increase or
decrease the optimal share of inputs obtained on trade credit depending on the sign of the
interest dierential ∆ks. Similarly, while an increase in the linear cost parameter, κT0,ks,
unambiguously increases sector k's cost of non-productive labor and thus decreases the
optimal trade credit share, the eect of an increase in the quadratic cost parameter, κT1,ks,
governing the exibility of rms in adjusting their credit portfolio is ambiguous. The
latter is due to the fact that the eect of changes in the trade credit share on marginal
cost of production depends on the relative cost of credit.
The question remains: What is the optimal interest rate charged for extending trade
credit to rm k's customers? As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, rms operate
under perfect competition and therefore take the demand for trade credit as given. How-
ever, the rm faces the following trade o: On the one hand, an increase in the demand
for trade credit by its customers increases its revenues due to an increase in the interest
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income from lending to its customers. On the other hand, the rm internalises that it
also increases k's interest rate on bank credit due to Assumption 3.3 and therefore to-
tal marginal costs of production. While taking demand for trade credit as given, rm k
chooses the optimal share of total revenues extended on trade credit. This implies that
the prot maximizing interest rate on trade credit, rTk , equalizes the marginal revenue
and the marginal cost of extending trade credit to customers.
Lemma 3.4 (Optimal Interest Rate on Trade Credit). The optimal interest rate on trade




















where BCk = w`k +
∑M
s=1(1− θks)psxks denotes total bank loans obtained in equilibrium.
For a given share of bank loans in total revenues net of interest income from nancial
intermediation, the interest rate on trade credit is increasing in the responsiveness of the
bank interest rate to the share of sales extended on supplier credit, µ, for θZk > θ
Z
k and
increasing in the trade credit share extended to customers, θCk .
Proof. Provided in Appendix C.3.3.
Note that rm k sets a common contract rather than a link-specic contract. This
implies, if customer c of rm k increases its trade credit share such that - all equal - θCk
increases, the interest charged on trade credit by rm k to all customers rises. In other
words, the existence of common suppliers may lead to interest rate shocks spilling over
from one customer of supplier s to another via an increase in the interest rate of trade
credit. A common contract is assumed for simplicity - this should capture that it is costly
to maintain link-specic contracts. Even if, an increase in the borrowing of one customer
might aect the ability of rm k to lend to others as suggested in prior empirical work
by Jacobson and von Schedvin (2015) or Costello (2017) such that the introduction of
spill-overs via a common contract may be justied.
Appendix C.5 provides a summary of all equilibrium conditions of the model. At this
point, it should be noted that this economy does not feature any pecuniary externalities.
In other words, an eciency constrained social planner subject to the same working capital
constraints in each sector will choose the same allocations as agents in the decentralised
equilibrium. While customers do not internalize the eect of their portfolio choice on the
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cost of bank credit of their supplier, supplier will adjust the interest rate on trade credit
charged accordingly.
Partial Equilibrium. I now elaborate on how the existence of working capital re-
quirements distorts the economy by characterizing the partial equilibrium of the economy.
I rst make the following two assumptions: (1) The nominal wage rate is taken as the
numeraire; and (2) Capital is at its steady state level and investment is equal to zero in
equilibrium. The derivations largely follow BL(2017) with an important dierence: credit
wedges are also functions of the interest rates and the share of input expenditures obtained
on trade credit which are both determined in equilibrium. The equilibrium collapses to
that presented in BL(2017), if there are no trade credit linkages (θks = 0∀k, s) and rms
do not require the non-productive labor input (`Tk = 0∀k). Although both the cost of
credit as well as the credit portfolio are interdependent and endogenous in the model, the
model only admits an analytical solution of its partial equilibrium when taking interest
rates as well as trade credit linkages as given. Consequently, there exists almost a one-to-
one mapping of the partial equilibrium in this section to the general equilibrium analysis
presented in BL(2017) as shown below. For a detailed partial equilibrium analysis, I refer
to Appendix D and the discussion in BL(2017). To summarize, as shown in BL(2017),
the distortions manifest themselves as an aggregate eciency and labor wedge:
Lemma 3.5 (PE-Aggregate Eciency and Labor Wedge). Given interest rates on credit
(r) and credit linkages (Θ), an economy consisting of individual sectors operating with
Cobb-Douglas production technologies and engaging in intersectoral trade aggregates to a





where Zz denotes aggregate productivity and Φ
Z
φ represents the aggregate eciency wedge
which is a non-linear combination of all sectoral distortions. The aggregate labor wedge,








and is dened as a wedge between the household's marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and labor and the aggregate marginal product of labor.
Proof. Proofs are provided in Appendix D. (see also Bigio and La'O, 2017, for a com-
parison)
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As evident from Equation (3.25) and (3.26), the presence of distortions - in this thesis
working capital constraints - leads to a misallocation of resources and an eciency loss.
However, Equations (3.25) and (3.26) mask that the aggregate wedges are in fact not
only a function of the interest rates on bank and trade credit, but also a function of the
credit network, Θ, which in equilibrium is the outcome of rms minimizing their total
cost of production. Since rms are both lenders and borrowers of trade credit at the same
time, clearly, this implies that distortions in this economy are interlinked which aects
the propagation of liquidity shocks in this economy. I now discuss the role of endogenous
credit links for the propagation of liquidity shocks in the next section.
3.2 Propagation of Financial Shocks
It has been shown that - as common to models with distortions (i.a. Bigio and La'O,
2017; Baqaee and Farhi, 2018, 2019) - working capital constraints introduce an aggregate
eciency and labor wedge, thereby generating an eciency loss as resources are diverted
from being used for production. However, due to the nature of trade credit, distortions
in this model are not only endogenous but also interdependent. In particular, as rms
adjust both their lending rates and their borrowing portfolio, credit cost of production
and credit linkages are subject to changes along the intensive margin and consequently
distort the transmission of shocks.
This section discusses the role of endogenous credit links on the propagation of -
nancial shocks. In Section 3.2.1, I highlight that trade credit can both dampen and
amplify the output response of sectors following an idiosyncratic liquidity shock. The
rst round response of a representative rm in sector k to an increase in its cost of bank
credit illustrates how a nancial shock propagates both up- and downstream, generating
counteracting output responses: On the one hand, rm k will shift its borrowing portfolio
towards trade credit which reduces the output eect of the cost shock. On the other hand,
both the price of the good as well as the interest rate charged on trade credit increase,
subsequently exacerbating the reduction in the demand for k's output.
In Section 3.2.2, I discuss the equilibrium response of output by elaborating on the
determinants of its elasticity with respect to shocks to the cost of bank credit. For this
purpose, I log-linearize the model around its steady state as shown in Appendix E. This
allows a decomposition of the log-change of all variables of interest into changes attributed
to (1) productivity shocks, (2) general equilibrium adjustments in the aggregate labor
supply and (3) changes in distortions introduced as credit wedges. The credit wedges
summarize the composite eect of changes in credit costs and the composition of the
credit portfolio on sectoral sales, prices and output. Since distortions in this model are
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interdependent, I also dene the credit multiplier summarizing the total eect of shocks
to the bank risk premium on interest rates and the credit portfolio. It is shown that,
to a rst order approximation, the structural elasticities are functions of equilibrium
expenditures, accounts payable and receivables, which determines the strength of the
trade credit channel introduced in Section 3.2.1 on output.
3.2.1 Trade Credit Mechanism
In order to develop some intuition on how changes in credit costs propagate both up- and
downstream, I consider the following demand structure between sector k, its customer c
and its supplier s as depicted in Figure 3.3a: (1) sector k does not supply output to itself
(ωXkk = 0), (2) the ow of goods between a pair of sectors is directed such that each sector
clearly identies as either the customer or the supplier (ωXsk = ω
X
kc = 0) and (3) none of













Note: This gure depicts the demand structure between sector k, supplier s and
customer c and a shock to the bank risk premium of sector k, εbk > 0, only. Productivity
remains at its equilibrium level such that εqi = 0 for i ∈ {s, k, c}.
Using standard graph theoretical notation (see e.g. Carvalho, 2010), I will refer to
this subgraph of the production network dened by the intermediate and nal demand
input-output matrices, Ω = {ΩX ,ΩF}, as the line-subgraph, GL(Ω):
Denition 3.2 (Line-Subgraph). Let G(Ω) = G(V , E) be a directed sectoral trade linkages
graph, where V is the vertex set of (M + 1) intermediate and nal good producing sectors
labelled {v0, v1, ..., vM} and E is set of all ordered pairs of vertices {vi, vj} for which ωij > 0
holds. Dene the line-subgraph as GL(VL, EL) ⊂ G(V , E), where VL = {vs, vk, vc} and
EL = {{vs, vk}, {vk, vc}}.
Let the demand structure be given by GL(Ω). Consider now a nancial shock to the
bank risk premium of the representative rm in sector k, zbk = ε
b
k > 0, such that k's interest
rate on bank credit dened in Equation (3.8) increases. Using the results of the previous
section, Corollary 3.2 to 3.4 elaborate on the direct propagation of an idiosyncratic shock
to the bank risk premium of the representative rm in sector k, rZk , to its customer c
and supplier s, while abstracting from any feedback and general equilibrium eects. The
respective proofs are provided in Appendix C.4.
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Corollary 3.2 (Eects of Changes in k's Interest Rate on Bank Credit). An increase
in sector k's interest rate on bank credit, rBk , increases k's marginal cost of production.
Sector k's demand for inputs and therefore supplier s's output decrease. Sector k's price
charged for k's output and therefore customer c's marginal cost of production increase,
decreasing c's demand for inputs. Sector k's output decreases.
Corollary 3.2 describes how an increase in sector k's interest rate on bank credit, rBk ,
aects sector k's cost of production and translates into demand eects upstream and cost
eects downstream as depicted graphically in Figure 3.3b. Output in all three sectors
declines.








xks ↓ pk ↑
Note: This gure illustrates the demand and price eects of an increase in sector k's
interest rate on bank credit following a shock to k's risk premium, εbk > 0, along the
supply chain formed by sector k, supplier s and customer c. Productivity remains at
its equilibrium level such that εqi = 0 for i ∈ {s, k, c}.
It should be noted, that a shock to the interest rate on bank credit exhibits the
same propagation pattern as an increase in exogenous sectoral distortions in the model
economy introduced in BL(2017) or a negative productivity shock to sector k. However,
the existence of trade credit introduces additional propagation channels via changes in
both the cost of trade credit and trade credit shares, as will be discussed in the following
paragraphs. Corollary 3.3 summarizes the eect of an increase in sector k's bank risk
premium on k's interest rate charged on trade credit.
Corollary 3.3 (Eects of Changes in k's Interest Rate on Trade Credit). The increase
in sector k's bank risk premium, rZk , - ceteris paribus - increases k's interest rate charged
on trade credit, rTk , and customer c's marginal cost of production. Sector c's demand for
inputs and thus sector k's output decrease.
Using the results of Lemma 3.4, Corollary 3.3 describes how a shock to sector k's
bank risk premium, rZk , translates into cost eects downstream, operating in addition to
the traditional cost eect via prices described in Corollary 3.2. In other words, while
abstracting from any general equilibrium eects, an increase in sector k's interest rate on
trade credit increases customer c's production costs beyond the initial increase induced
by a rise in the price of k's output. Therefore, sector c decreases its demand for k's
output even further. Note that changes in k's interest rate on trade credit have no
immediate income and cost eects aecting supplier s's sales, prices and output. Similarly,
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by applying the results of Lemma 3.3 and abstracting from general equilibrium eects,
Corollary 3.4 describes the eect of changes in the credit composition of sector k.
Corollary 3.4 (Eects of Changes in k's Trade Credit Share). An increase in sector
k's interest rate on bank credit, rBk - ceteris paribus - increases sector k's share of inputs
obtained on trade credit from supplier s and consequently dampens k's initial increase in
marginal cost of production and decrease in output induced by the shock to k's cost of bank
credit.
Corollary 3.3 and 3.4 summarize how the direct response of trade credit costs and
shares of the aected sector distorts the up- and downstream transmission of a shock to
its interest rate on bank credit, as depicted in Figure 3.3c: On the one hand, as rms
also increase the interest rate charged on trade credit, the cost shock to their customers is
amplied beyond the traditional price channel. On the other hand, the ability of rms to
substitute bank and supplier credit implies that the own cost eect and therefore upstream
demand eect of an increase in bank nancing costs is dampened.








θks ↑ rTk ↑
Note: This gure illustrates the trade credit channel for a shock to sector k's risk
premium, εbk > 0, along the supply chain formed by sector k, supplier s and customer
c. Productivity remains at its equilibrium level such that εqi = 0 for i ∈ {s, k, c}.
Based on the previous discussion of the direct eects of changes in the cost of credit
and the input-specic borrowing portfolio, I now dene the Trade Credit Channel as
follows
Denition 3.3 (Trade Credit Channel). Consider an economy with working capital con-
straints and two sources of external funds: bank and trade credit. Let the optimal interest
rate on trade credit and the optimal credit share be dened in Lemma 3.4 and 3.3, re-
spectively. The ability of rms to delay input payments to their suppliers introduces two
opposing channels via which trade credit aects economic outcomes:
(a) (Amplication) An increase in the cost of bank nance of a rm directly translates
into an increase in interest rate charged on trade credit, thereby tightening the -
nancing terms for its customers.
(b) (Smoothing) The existence of two external nancing sources allows rms to smooth
any interest rate shocks via an adjustment of their borrowing portfolio by optimally
trading-o credit costs.
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In foresight of the quantitative application of the model, two observations are worth
mentioning: First, the strength of the amplication channel will be inuenced by the
elasticity of the bank risk premium with respect to the share of revenues extended on trade
credit, µ. This follows from the optimal interest rate charged on trade credit derived in
Lemma 3.4, which increases in the parameter µ for θZk > θ
Z
k . Second, the extend to which
rms are able to smooth credit shocks will depend on two conditions: (1) the parameter
governing the convexity of the credit management cost function, κT1,ks, dened in Equation
(3.7) and (2) the type of shocks present in this economy. The rst condition implies that
a lower cost parameter increases the ability of rms to substitute credit sources and thus
increases the smoothing channel in this economy. The second circumstance relates to
the fact that, in the case of an aggregate shock, rm k's supplier s of trade credit and
consequently s's interest rate charged on trade credit will also be directly aected by
the shock. Ultimately, the question of which eect dominates remains an quantitative
question and will be investigated in Chapter 4.
3.2.2 Equilibrium Eect on Output
While the previous section provided an insight into the up- and downstream propagation
channels introduced by trade credit, this section elaborates on the determinants of the
elasticity of output with respect to nancial shocks. For this purpose, I rst discuss the
(partial) equilibrium eects at work by log-linearizing the model around its steady state4.
The log-linearized equilibrium highlights, how the response of sales, prices and output can
be attributed to changes in the cost of credit and the credit portfolio. In the second part
of this section, I discuss the interdependency of credit costs and the implications thereof
for the response of output. For the remainder of the discussion in this section, I impose
the following restriction on the production parameters.5
Assumption 3.4. The vector of parameters governing the degree of decreasing returns to
scale in each sector, χ, is such that (1) an increase in the cost of the production function
increases prices and (2) a decrease in sales decreases output.
Assumption 3.4 takes into account that prices will be increasing in sales due to the
presence of DRS: Consider an increase in the cost of production which increases prices on
the one hand and reduces sales on the other. The latter eect on sales counteracts the
initial price increase. Similarly, a decrease in sales decreases output but also decreases
prices, which will have positive eect on output. Assumption 3.4 ensures that the coun-
teracting eects on prices and output introduced by DRS do not outweigh the standard
cost and demands eects. In the following, I now discuss the dierent channels through
4A denition of the log-linearized equilibrium is provided in Appendix E.1, Denition E.1 and E.2.
5A formal discussion is presented in Appendix E.1.
39
which distortions can aect economic outcomes. Proposition 1 characterizes the eects of
changes in intermediate credit (φ̂Lm, φ̂
X
mn ∀m,n), nal demand (φ̂RF ) and revenue wedges
(φ̂Rm ∀m) on prices, output and revenues of a representative rm in sector k.
Proposition 1 (Eects of Distortions). In the log-linearized equilibrium, an increase in
(a) sector k's credit wedges, as well as in its direct and indirect suppliers' credit wedges,
φ̂Lm, φ̂
X
mn ∀m,n, increases the cost of production and prices and decreases k's output.
(Cost Eect)
(b) sector k's direct and indirect customers' credit wedges, φ̂Lm, φ̂
X
mn ∀m,n, increases
the cost of production and decreases the demand for k's output. (Demand Eect)
(c) revenue wedges, φ̂Rm ∀m, from extending trade credit to customers directly and
indirectly increases k's income from nancial intermediation, decreases sector k's
price, and thus increases output. (Income Eect of Financial Intermediation)
(d) the nal demand wedge, φ̂RF , reduces the prot and interest income of households
and demand for the nal good. Sector k's price due to DRS, output and revenues
decrease. (Income Eect of Final Demand)
Proof. Provided in Appendix E.1.
Proposition 1 highlights that in addition to the standard cost and demand eects of
credit wedges associated with the working capital constraint, the extension of trade credit
to customers also introduces an income eect from nancial intermediation. As discussed
in the previous sections, a sector obtains revenues from both selling its output and acting
as a nancial intermediary by extending trade credit to its customers. Therefore, the
eective price paid by a customer of rm k is a bundle of the actual price and the interest
rate charged on the share of input costs obtained on trade credit. Taking the demand for
trade credit as given, an increase in the interest rate on trade credit increases k's revenue
wedge and consequently the marginal revenue of the additional unit sold on credit. As
a result, the increase in the revenue wedge reduces the output price. The reduction in
the price of input k increases the demand for k's output and subsequently production
and sales. However, credit and revenue wedges are interdependent and can further be
decomposed into eects attributed to changes in the interest rates on bank and trade
credit, and trade credit shares which aects the propagation of shocks as will be discussed
in the remainder of this section.6
6Lemma E.1 to E.3 in Appendix E.2 present a formal derivation of the composition of the credit
wedges aecting sales, prices and output into changes attributed to the interest rate and bank and trade
credit and the composition of the credit portfolio.
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Lemma 3.6 describes the rst order impact of changes in credit costs and shares on
revenues and credit wedges associated with nancing the cost of labor and purchasing
inputs from intermediate good suppliers, dened in Section 3.1.
Lemma 3.6 (Revenue and Credit Wedges). The labor, φLk , and the intermediate credit




s . The intermediate credit
wedge, φXks, increases (decreases) in the trade credit share, θks, if the equilibrium interest
rate dierential (rBk − rTs ) is negative (positive). The revenue wedge of sector k, φRk ,
increases in the interest rate on trade credit, rTk , and in the trade credit share extended to
customers, θCk .
Proof. Provided in Appendix E.2.
Combining the results of Lemma 3.6 and Proposition 1, it becomes apparent that
the existence of trade credit and resulting interdependency of distortions introduce coun-
teracting cost and income eects aecting the propagation of shocks to customers and
suppliers. In order to shed more light on the equilibrium eects generated by inter-rm
credit linkages in response to a nancial shock, the following paragraphs discuss the dif-
ferent channels through which changes in the interest rate on bank and trade credit and
trade credit shares aect sales, prices and output.7
First, note that in general, the eect of an increase in the share of input payments
obtained on trade credit on the cost of production and subsequently prices, output and
sales depends on the interest rate dierential and is ambiguous. Following Proposition
1, intermediate revenues are aected by changes in the credit costs of customers, the
income from nancial intermediation and household's income: An increase in customer
c's interest rate on bank credit as well as in sector k's interest rate charged on trade credit,
increases c's cost of production. Consequently, the demand for k's output and thus sales
decline. At the same time, an increase in sector k's trade credit rate or share of sales
extended on trade credit increases k's interest income from nancial intermediation and
thus sales as discussed above. Changes in the interest and prot income of households
due to changes in credit costs and shares are captured by the nal demand wedge. On
the one hand, an increase in c's bank rate increases the interest income of households
and subsequently intermediate sales. On the other hand, an increase in either sector k's
interest rate charged on trade credit or trade credit share obtained by sector c lowers the
prot income of households, and ultimately both nal and intermediate sales.
Changes in sectoral prices induced by changes in credit costs and shares are the result
7For illustrative purposes, I abstract from productivity shocks and consider the partial equilibrium
case only, assuming that both productivity and aggregate labor remain at their equilibrium levels. In
addition, I further simplify the discussion by abstracting from any feedback eects from changes in the
composition of sales.
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of two channels: (1) the cost- and (2) the demand channel. The latter feedback eect via
changes in sales is present due to DRS and according to Assumption 3.4 either reinforces
or dampens the cost channel, discussed in the following: An increase in the cost of credit of
sector k and k's direct and indirect suppliers increases the cost of production and therefore
the price charged on output of sector k. However, an increase in the interest rate charged
on trade credit as well as an increase in the customers' share of inputs payments obtained
on trade credit increases k's marginal revenues from selling its output on credit. The
resulting decrease in prices counteracts the cost eect. The response of output is the
result of the combined eect of distortions on the cost of production and demand. To the
extend that the cost eects described above dominates any counteracting income eects
from nancial intermediation and households, output decreases. Overall, the previous
discussion highlights that in general, the total eect of changes in the cost of trade credit
and the credit portfolio on economic outcomes is ambiguous and depends on the demand
and supply structure of the economy.
As evident from the Lemma 3.4 and 3.3 in Section 3.1, credit costs and the com-
position of the input-specic credit portfolio are interdependent such that there exists a
credit multiplier that captures the total eect - direct and indirect - of changes in credit
conditions on the variables of interest in addition to the feedback eects operating via the
production structure. The credit multiplier of the economy is dened as follows.
Denition 3.4 (PE-Credit Multiplier). In partial equilibrium assume that L̂ = 0 and
abstract from any feedback eect of changes in the composition of sales on the average
trade credit share extended to customers, ŵXck = 0 ∀c, k where wXck = xck(qk)−1. The vector
of changes in credit costs and shares, τ = [r̂B, r̂T , θ̂], is given by
τ = Eττ τ +E
Zb
τ εb (3.27)
where the elasticity matrices Eττ and E
Zb
τ summarize the equilibrium-network eects via
prices and sales on the respective variables of interest and are dened in Lemma E.4 and
E.5. The credit multiplier and its rst order approximation are then given by
Ψτ = (I −Eττ )−1 ≈ Ψ̃τ = I +Eττ . (3.28)
The log-linearization of interest rates and the portfolio choice derived in Lemma 3.4
and 3.3 and applying Denition 3.4 yields the rst order approximation of the partial
equilibrium responses of credit costs and shares.
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Proposition 2 (PE-Structural Credit Responses). Let the rst order approximation of the
PE-credit multiplier, Ψτ , be dened in 3.4. The partial equilibrium structural responses
of rBk , r
T
k and θks are
r̃B = +EZbB εb, r̃
T = [−EBT EZbB + (I +ETT )EZbT ]εb and θ̃ = [+EBθ EZbB −ETθ EZbT ]εb (3.29)
in the absence of productivity shocks, εqk = 0∀k. The elasticity matrices EvB,EvT and Evθ
for v ∈ {Zb, B, T, θ} denote the elasticities of the interest rate on bank and trade credit
and trade credit shares with respect to one-another and are derived in Lemma E.4 and
E.5 in Appendix E.4.
Proof. Provided in Appendix E.4.
It follows that sector k's interest rate on bank credit is increasing in shocks to the
sector-specic risk premium and in the trade credit shares extended to customers. The
response of the interest rate on trade credit charged by sector k depends on (a) the elas-
ticity of k's interest rate on bank credit with respect to shocks to the risk premium and
(b) the response of the share of bank loans in revenues, as evident from Equation (3.24)
and discussed in the following. An exogenous increase in the risk premium charged on
bank credit increases marginal costs of bank borrowing from extending trade credit to
customers. Similarly, an increase in the share of sales extended on trade credit to cus-
tomers also increases sector k's cost of bank credit due to Assumption 3.3. In either case,
sector k's interest rate charged on trade credit unambiguously increases. Simultaneously,
the response of the interest rate on trade credit will also be aected by changes in the
share of bank loans in revenues. From the previous discussion, an increase in the cost of
production decreases k's demand for inputs and subsequently total bank credit obtained
by k. Intuitively, the interest rate charged on trade credit decreases as k's dependency on
bank loans and therefore it's exposure to the nancial shock has decreased.
Sector k's prot maximizing share of inputs obtained on trade credit from supplier
s is dened in Equation (3.22). It follows that the response of k's credit portfolio to
changes in credit costs and shares depends on the relative change in the interest rates as
well as on the change in total intermediate expenditures on inputs from sector s following
a nancial shock. While the elasticity of sector k's share of inputs obtained on trade credit
from supplier s with respect to changes in input expenditures is ambiguous and depends
on the interest rate dierential as discussed above, the interpretation regarding the direct
eect of changes in credit costs is more intuitive. Given intermediate expenditures, an
increase in the interest rate on bank credit unambiguously induces a shift of the credit
portfolio towards trade credit from supplier s. Similarly, an increase in the interest rate
charged on trade credit by supplier s unambiguously decreases the trade credit share.
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Therefore, the equilibrium adjustment of the credit portfolio will depend on the relative
response of the cost of bank and trade credit. If the interest rate on trade credit displays
a higher increase than the interest rate on bank credit in response to a shock to the bank
risk premium, rms may still shift their credit portfolio towards bank credit. This pattern
has been observed in the data at the onset of the crisis as discussed in Chapter 2 and
suggests that the cost of trade credit may be more volatile than the interest rate on bank
credit.
The previous discussion highlights that the existence of trade credit linkages implies
that shocks to the cost of bank credit are passed on through the input-output network
both up- and downstream by aecting the cost of credit and portfolio choices. By com-
bining the rst order approximation of the credit multiplier dened in 3.4 as well as the
log-linearized equilibrium derived in Appendix E.1, I am now able to provide a charac-
terization of the partial equilibrium structural output response while taking into account
the interdependencies of trade credit costs and shares.
Proposition 3 (PE-Structural Output Response). Consider the partial equilibrium in
Denition 3.4 and let the response of the interest rate on bank and trade credit and trade
credit shares be given in Equation (3.29) in the absence of productivity shocks, εqk = 0.
(a) The rst order approximation of the structural output response to shocks to the cost















and represents the total eect of changes in the cost of bank credit (S̃QB,B) and of changes
in the interest rate on trade credit and trade credit shares (S̃QB,T ) on output.
(b) The components of the partial equilibrium structural elasticity of output wrt a nancial





















































are a linear combination of sector m's production costs that need to be nanced at the
beginning of the period (w`m, AP
−
ms) and accounts receivable (ARcm), where AP
−
ms =




Q,T } for v ∈ {L,X, θ},
44
are given in (E.31) and are functions of the elasticity of the output response wrt changes
in the interest rate on bank and trade credit, and the trade credit share, dened in Lemma
E.3, E.4 and E.5.
Proof. Provided in Appendix E.5.
The rst part of Proposition 3 illustrates that the partial equilibrium sectoral output
response is ultimately a function of the structural output wedge. The elasticity thereof
with respect to shocks to the bank risk premium can be decomposed into an elasticity
attributed to changes in the interest rate on bank credit (S̃QB,B), and to changes in the
credit composition and the interest rate on trade credit (S̃QB,T ). In the second part of
the proposition, Equations (3.31) and (3.32) derive that the elasticity of sector k's output
response is a function of: (a) k's elasticities of output with respect to credit costs and
shares and (b) m's production costs that need to be nanced using bank loans as well as
m's accounts receivable. In particular, the latter captures sector m's partial equilibrium
structural elasticities of the interest rate on bank credit, sector m's interest rate charged
on trade credit and of the credit portfolio with respect to nancial shocks.
To summarize, Proposition 3 highlights that the relationship between a sector's equi-
librium total up-front nancing needs and trade credit extended determines the elastic-
ities of the variables of interest with respect to nancial shocks. Therefore, I dene the
net-lending position of a sector as the ratio of total trade credit extended to customers (ac-
counts receivable) to the dierence between total cost of production and accounts payable
(see Denition 2.1). I conclude this section by elaborating on how the dependency of
an economy on trade credit can aect the response of output following a nancial shock.
In particular, I pose the question: How does a sector's net-lending position aect the
elasticity of sectoral output with respect to changes in the interest rate on trade credit
and the credit composition?
Proposition 4. Let the partial equilibrium elasticity of output with respect to shocks to
the cost of bank credit, εbm, be dened in Proposition 3. Let sector m be a net-borrower
(net-lender) in the economy such that [S̃QB,T ]km < (>) 0 holds. Then, the adjustment of
trade credit costs and credit shares will smooth (amplify) the negative eect of an increase
in the interest rate on bank credit aecting sector m on (partial equilibrium) output of
sector k.
Proof. Provided in Appendix E.5.
In other words, if a sector is aected by a nancial shock whose (weighted) upfront
total nancing costs are larger (smaller) than the (weighted) trade credit extended to
customers - the sector classies as a net-borrower (net-lender) according to Denition 2.1
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- then trade credit has a smoothing (amplifying) eect. Based on the discussion above,
the intuition thereof is as follows: A sector k's interest rate on trade credit will be more
sensitive to nancial shocks, the more trade credit k extends to customers. Consequently,
a nancial shock will induce a stronger increase in a sector's interest rate charged on
trade credit, who records higher accounts receivable. Therefore, the cost eect on output
discussed above will be amplied. Similarly, a sector with a higher equilibrium dependency
on bank credit will experience a stronger cost eect and therefore a greater reduction in
its demand for inputs and the share of bank loans in total sales. As a result, the interest
rate on trade credit declines and dampens the output response to a nancial shock. In the
case of trade credit shares, the eects depend on the interest rate dierential. However,
an increase in the dependency on bank credit may reinforce the positive eect of changes
in the credit portfolio on income from nancial intermediation, counteracting the increase
in prices discussed above. At the same time, an increase in a sector's reliance on trade
credit will amply any cost eects induced by changes in the credit composition. As a
result of Proposition 4, the following property holds
Corollary 3.5. Let the partial equilibrium elasticity of output with respect to shocks to
the cost of bank credit, εbm, be dened in Proposition 3. Consider the output elasticity
with respect to changes in the cost of trade credit and trade credit shares, S̃QB,T . Taking
{SB(v)Q,T ,S
T (v)
Q,T } for v ∈ {L,X, θ} as given and assuming that the respective matrix entries
are positive, the following property holds: the smoothing eect of the trade credit channel
on output decreases if the equilibrium share of intermediate inputs obtained on trade credit
by (1) sector m from supplier s and (2) customer c from sector m increases.
Proof. Corollary 3.5 follows directly from Proposition 3.
Corollary 3.5 implies that an increase in the dependency on trade credit by either
increasing trade credit obtained from suppliers or extended to customers, increases the
structural elasticity of output with respect changes in the interest rate on trade credit
and the credit composition increasing a sector's cost of production.
3.3 Concluding Remarks
This chapter introduced a static quantitative multisector model with trade in intermedi-
ate inputs and endogenous trade credit linkages and costs between perfectly competitive
intermediate good producing rms in each sector. Firms face working capital constraints
and are therefore required to nance production using both bank and supplier credit.
This implies that resources are diverted from a productive use of inputs such that the
cost of nancing production expenditures translate into cost-, and aggregate eciency-
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and labor-wedges, distorting the rst order conditions of agents in this economy. While
this result is common to any model featuring distortions, the nature of trade credit in-
troduces an interdependency of credit costs and portfolio choices as highlighted in this
chapter.
It is shown that the existence of trade credit in an economy distorts the transmission
of nancial shocks and has both smoothing and amplifying eects. In particular, as
credit conditions tighten in an economy, the endogenous adjustment in the volume and
cost of trade credit captures two counteracting mechanisms: (1) Firms smooth interest
rate shocks by substituting bank and supplier nance. (2) Any increase in the interest
rate that a rm charges on trade credit tightens the nancing terms of its customers
thereby amplifying nancial shocks. Furthermore, it is shown in Proposition 4 that sectors
extending a lot of trade credit to their customers relative to their own nancing needs
play a crucial role in the transmission of shocks to the cost of external funds. However,
the question of which aspect of the trade credit channel is more operative in an economy




A Quantitative Assessment of Trade
Credit and Aggregate Fluctuations
In this chapter, I apply the framework introduced in Chapter 3 to the US economy to
quantitatively evaluate the eects of trade credit linkages on business cycle comovement,
aggregate uctuations and sectoral outcomes during the 2008-2009 nancial crisis. In
particular, I provide answers to the following two questions: (1) Did the interrm credit
network amplify or smooth nancial shocks during the Great Recession in comparison to
an economy without trade credit? (2) To what extend does the trade credit channel -
the endogenous adjustment of trade credit volumes and prices - contribute to aggregate
uctuations?
To this end, I rst calibrate the equilibrium of the model at a sector level in Section
4.1, using the model's rst order conditions. The US production and trade credit network
is mapped based on the input-output tables provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis
and based on balance sheet data on accounts receivable and payable of a panel of US rms
from Compustat. Sectoral credit spreads derived in Gilchrist and Zakraj²ek (2012) are
used to calibrate and impute the sector-specic shocks to the risk premium of the bank
interest rate in Equation (3.8). The imputed nancial shocks are then used to simulate the
model economy in Section 4.2, while abstracting from any shocks to sectoral productivity.
A comparison of the model-implied responses of the credit portfolio of sectors and aggre-
gate output with the uctuation patterns presented in Chapter 2 suggests, that the model
reproduces - both qualitatively and quantitatively - business cycle patterns of trade credit
as observed in the data. In particular, the model captures approximately a quarter of the
variation of, and one third of the drop in, aggregate output during the nancial crisis.
A variety of simulation exercises are then conducted in Section 4.2 in order to quantify
the role of trade credit for business cycle comovement and aggregate uctuations during
the crisis. The following three main results are derived: First, the existence of trade
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credit linkages almost doubled the decline in output relative to an equivalent economy
with bank nance only and can account for approximately 16% of the drop in aggregate
output during the 2008-2009 crisis. Second, the endogenous adjustment of the volume
and cost of trade credit only reduced aggregate volatility by 1.4%, which suggests that
the smoothing mechanism of trade credit was operative, though small. Third, rms which
act as important nancial intermediaries for their customers are systemically important
and generate large spillovers, which quanties and conrms the predictions of the model
derived in Chapter 3.
4.1 Calibration Strategy
The static nature of the model and its analytical tractability allow me to conduct a period-
by-period mapping of the equilibrium of the model to the empirical counterparts of the
US economy at a sector level1 using the model's rst order conditions. In the following, I
rst discuss the calibration of the production structure as well as the trade credit network
following a standard approach applied in the literature (Bigio and La'O, 2017; Altinoglu,
2018). I then obtain the time series of shocks to a sector's bank risk premium inferred from
sectoral credit spreads derived in Gilchrist and Zakraj²ek (2012) as discussed below. In the
last paragraphs, the calibration of the cost parameters associated with the interest rate on
bank credit and credit management costs are discussed in further detail. Section 4.1.2 then
provides descriptive statistics of the calibrated US production and credit network obtained
in Section 4.1.1. I conclude this section by discussing additional business cycle statistics
of selected real and nancial variables as well as characteristics of sectoral distortions in
Section 4.1.3 and 4.1.4.
4.1.1 A Mapping of the US Product and Trade Credit Market
Production and Financial Network Data . The input-output tables from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA) are used to map the production structure of the US economy
at the 3-digit NAICS industry level at an annual frequency, covering the time period 1997-
2016. In total 45 sectors (excluding FIRE) are included in the analysis. While data on
the production structure of the US economy is readily available, data on trade credit ows
between production units at a rm or sectoral level is not2. In order to overcome these
1Due to the paucity data at a rm level, I conduct the quantitative analysis at a sector level, which
does not aect the qualitative implications of the model.
2An exception for the US is Costello (2017), who employs proprietary transaction data from Credit2B;
proprietary rm-to-rm transaction data are also used in recent empirical contributions by Jacobson and
von Schedvin (2015) for Sweden, Dewachter et al. (2018) for Belgium, Giannetti et al. (2018) for Italy or
Cortes et al. (2018) for Brazil.
50
data-limitations on the inter-rm credit network, I construct a proxy of inter-industry
credit ows using the approach suggested in Altinoglu (2018). The balance sheet data of
a panel of US rms3 from Compustat are used to calculate the share of accounts payable
in total input expenditures (θPk ) and the share of accounts receivable in total revenues (θ
R
s )
at an industry level. The inter-industry trade credit share from supplier s to customer k








and is non-zero only if both sectors also engage in trade in intermediate inputs.
The second complication in mapping the model to the data is the consistent assign-
ment of interest rate costs on bank and trade credit for the derivation of the production
function parameters. The nominal intermediate input expenditures recorded in the IO-
tables are net of any interest payments on bank credit associated with the transactions.
Note that any interest payments on trade credit are part of the eective price paid, and
are therefore already accounted for in the nominal intermediate expenditures shown in
the IO-tables. Bank interest rate expenditures, however, are recorded as part of the gross
operating surplus in the IO-tables net of interest-income. (see Horowitz and Planting,
2009). I thus decompose the gross-operating surplus into capital expenditures, dividend
payments and bank interest rate expenditures using the shares of the respective coun-
terparts in gross operating prots calculated from the income statements of the panel of
US rms from Compustat. Only then, using an iterative procedure, I can consistently
calibrate the parameters of the production function (3.1) - the labor, intermediate input
shares and returns to scale parameter - using the rst order conditions of the model pre-
sented in Lemma 3.1. Details on the calibration procedure and adjustments can be found
in Appendix F.
Prices and Labor Costs. Data on total hours worked and sectoral prices are
provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Total hours worked are then used
to infer an aggregate wage rate from total labor expenditures recorded in the IO-tables.
In order to ensure consistency with the model, where the wage rate is chosen as the
numeraire, all prices are normalized by the common wage rate. Sector-specic prices are
treated as input prices net of any interest cost on trade credit and are used to construct
the respective quantities. The price of the nal good is constructed using the results of
prot-maximization problem of the nal good producer. Since capital owned by rms is
included into the model as a constant and set to its steady state level, the real interest
rate on capital implied by a time preference rate of β = 0.96 is an annualized risk-free
rate of 4 percent. The household's preference parameters, εL and εC are set such that
3The sample description and selection criteria are discussed in Appendix B.
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εC : εL = 0.4, which implies that εL and εC vary around the values 0.5 and 0.2, a standard
calibration used in macroeconomics also used in BL(2017).
While the calibration of the production parameters, prices and quantities is rather
straight forward, in the remainder of this section I now discuss (a) the imputation of the
shocks to the sector-specic risk premium on bank credit as in Equation (3.8) and (b) the
calibration of the parameters of the credit management cost function in Equation (3.7) .
Credit and Financial Shock Identication. The sector specic interest rate on



















In other words, each sector is charged a risk premium over the federal funds rate. As a
baseline measure for the risk premium, I employ the sectoral credit spreads derived in
Gilchrist and Zakraj²ek (2012) and provided to me by the authors, adjusted to match
the calibrated bank interest rate expenditures imputed from the IO-tables. The "GZ-
spread" is dened as the sectoral average of dierences in the yields on corporate bonds
and yields on Treasury securities of comparable cash ows and maturities. As outlined
in Assumption 3.3, Chapter 3, the risk premium is assumed to be a convex function
of the average leverage in the economy and the average trade credit share extended to
customers. The components of the risk premium are calibrated as follows: First, the risk-
free interest rate on bank credit, rB0 , is set by calculating the time average (1997-2016) of
the federal funds rate. And second, the average leverage4 in the economy, θD0 , as well as
the sectoral average trade credit share, θCkt, can be directly calculated from the data. In
the spirit of the discussion in Chapter 2, the parameter µ is set to the weighted average of
the corresponding estimated coecient of sector-by-sector OLS-regressions of Equation
(4.2) as described in Appendix F.1. As a result µ equals 1.2 such that a one percent




kt increases the bank risk premium by 1.2 percent.
5 The implied
shocks to the risk premium on bank credit, ẑbkt = ε
b
kt, can then be constructed directly
from Equation (4.2). As a result, the calibrated equilibrium interest rates on trade credit
exceed the interest rate on bank credit for the majority of sectors, thereby mapping the
empirical observation on the relative cost of supplier and bank nance discussed in Cuñat
and García-Appendini (2012). The interest rate on trade credit is inferred directly from
Equation (3.8).
4The average leverage in the economy is set as the time average of the aggregate leverage, dened as
the ratio of total long-term and short-term debt in total assets, over the entire sample period 1997-2016.
The aggregate measure is calculated by aggregating the respective balance sheet data of the sample of
US rms from Compustat within each period.
5The exponent, µ, is required to be greater than one to be consistent with the prot-maximization
problem of the representative rm in sector k.
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Credit Management Costs. The expenditures on non-productive labor or credit
management costs, CTk = w`
T
k , are calibrated to be a share of total sectoral labor expen-
ditures recorded in the IO-tables. The sector-specic share is set equal to the share of
combined intermediate expenditures on management (NAICS = 55) and administrative
services (NAICS = 561) in total sectoral intermediate input costs. The parameters of the
credit management cost function (3.7) - {κBk , κT0,ks, κT1,ks} - are calibrated in two steps as






































Note that θPk is simply the share of aggregate accounts payable in total intermediate cost
of production excluding interest rate payments. The variable pqEk denotes the eective
net-interest expenditures on intermediate production inputs. It is dened as the weighted
discounted intermediate cost of production excluding interest rate payments (a), where
the weight is given by the sector-specic credit expenditure Hirschman-Herndahl Index
(HHI) (b). Similar to the interpretation of the traditional concept of the HHI-index
measuring the degree of monopoly power in an industry (Shepherd, 1987), the Credit-
HHI captures a sector's concentration of net-interest rate costs of production and ranges
from [min(∆k),max(∆k)] for ∆k = {∆ks}Ms=1: While the sign of the index depends on
sector k's relative cost of bank and trade credit, a higher value in absolute terms implies a
higher dependency on the relative cost of credit from a particular supplier. To summarize,
Equation (4.3) implies that the share of total intermediate cost of production obtained
on trade credit is increasing in the eective net-interest cost of production, as the cost-
parameter (κT1 ) is assumed to be positive following the discussion of Section 2.1.
Since actual data on the interest rate on trade credit is not readily available, I rely on the
mapping of the model to the data in order to obtain the data-counterparts of the share of
aggregate accounts payable in total intermediate cost of production (θPk ) and the eective
net-interest expenditures on intermediate production inputs (pqEk ). At this point it should
be noted, that while the accounts payable share is stationary, the interest-expenditures are
non-stationary such that I use the detrended7 eective net-interest expenditures, pqE,hkt ,
6For the purpose of the estimation of the respective coecients in Equation (4.3), I rst impose the










0 ∀k, s. The estimated
coecients are then used in the calibration of the link-specic cost parameters.
7The variable, pqEk , is rst detrended by applying an hp-lter using a smoothing constant of 6.25 as
suggested for annual data by Ravn and Uhlig (2002). The detrended series are then normalized by adding
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in order to estimate the coecients β0 and β1 in Equation (4.3). Equation (4.3) is then
estimated by OLS using a panel of 45 sectors from 2000-2014, while controlling for time
and sector xed eects. The estimated coecients and corresponding standard errors are
reported below in parenthesis8 in Equation (4.5)
θPkt = β0 + β1pq
E,h






∗pqE,hkt + F̂E. (4.5)
The estimated parameter β̂1 suggests that - since expenditures are measured in Mio
dollars - increase of the net-interest expenditures by one Mio increases the share of inter-
mediate expenditures obtained on trade credit by 24 percentage points. In the last step,
the link-specic parameters are then calibrated by matching the estimated coecient β̂1
in Equation (4.5) to the coecient of the eective interest rate expenditures determining
sector k's trade credit share obtained from supplier s in Equation (3.22) as described in
Appendix F. The remaining cost parameters, κT0,ks and κ
B
k , are calculated as a residual to
ensure that Equation (3.22) and (3.7) hold.
At this point, it should be highlighted that three parameters are central in determin-
ing the magnitude of uctuations in the economy with both bank and trade credit. The
degree of convexity of the risk premium in the joint default probability measure, µ, as well
as the average leverage in the economy, θD0 , determine (1) the relative size of the equilib-
rium interest rate on trade credit and (2) its volatility in response to bank credit shocks.
In other words, an increase in the convexity of the mark-up function and an increase in
the relative importance of the average trade credit share extended to customers for the
risk premium, increases the level and volatility of the trade credit interest rate, thereby
reinforcing the trade credit channel. Similarly, a decrease in the adjustment cost param-
eter κT1,ks, increases the extend to which rms are able to adjust the composition of their
borrowing portfolio between bank and trade credit, thereby increasing the substitution
eect and therefore smoothing aspect of the trade credit channel.
Table 4.1 lists the (average) values of the calibrated production and nancial param-
eters used in the simulations of the model. The values reported in this table are calculated
as the four-year-average (2004-2007) prior to the crisis. In addition, the sample is split
into net-lenders and net-borrowers according to the median net-lending position based
on Denition 2.1 obtained from the data presented in Chapter 2. The p-values for the
dierences in means between the two groups are reported in the last column when appli-
cable. The table reveals that the sub-samples dier both in their production and in their
credit management technology. In particular, the p-values for the dierences in means
between net-borrowing and net-lending sectors suggest that the two groups of sectors
dier in their capital, value-added (and therefore composite intermediate input) and nal
the cyclical component to the sectoral time-mean of the interest expenditures, pqEk .
8** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
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demand shares at a 1-10% signicance level. Net-borrowers tend to have a lower capital
(α) and composite intermediate input (1 − η) share while their nal demand share is
signicantly higher. This is in line with the empirical observation that sectors which are
further downstream and thus closer to the nal consumer are sectors producing with a
more labor intensive technology (e.g. service industry). In the case of the credit man-
agement technology, net-borrowers are calibrated to have a higher linear cost parameter
while the quadratic cost parameter is of similar magnitude in both groups.
Table 4.1: Calibrated Parameters
VAR Description All NB NL p-Value
H
H εC Income Elasticity 0.215







α Capital Share 0.344 0.275 0.417 0.002
η Value Added 0.465 0.512 0.416 0.062
χ DRS 0.833 0.834 0.832 0.917
ΩX Intermediate 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.757
ΩF Final 0.022 0.035 0.009 0.023
zq Productivity 2.972 3.365 2.561 0.056






µ Bank Credit - Convex 1.2
θD0 Bank Credit - Leverage 0.3
κB CMan.Cost - Fixed 0.448 0.620 0.269 0.305
κT0 CMan.Cost - Linear 0.061 0.070 0.051 0.096
κT1 CMan.Cost - Quadratic 0.047 0.048 0.046 0.515
θ Av.TC-Demand 0.102 0.096 0.108 0.078
#OBS 45 23 22 0
Note: This table describes the aggregate and the mean of the cross-sectional parameters used in the model
simulations. The production and nancial parameters, capital and productivity levels reported in this table
represent the four-year-average (2004-2007) prior to the crisis. In case of sector-specic parameters the
column (ALL) reports the mean of the parameter for the entire sample. The columns (NB) and (NL) report
the mean for a subgroup of sectors based on the net-lending position - see Denition 2.1. The p-values for
the dierences in means between the two groups are reported in the last column.
4.1.2 Properties of the US Production and Credit Network
I now summarize selected characteristics of the imputed (endogenous) trade credit network
of the US economy and contrast these with those of the complementary production-
network. Note that while I assume the production structure, Ω, to be constant, the credit
network, Θ, is endogenous along the intensive margin and varies over time. I rst dene
a sector's average input- and credit-demand share as the row sum of Ω(Θ) divided by
the number of suppliers. Analogously, a sector's average sales- and credit-supply share is
dened as the column sum of Ω(Θ) normalized by the number of customers. Following
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standard graph theoretical terminology (see e.g. Carvalho, 2010), the rst measure is
labelled the (weighted) in-degree, dIk, and the second measure refers to the (weighted)
out-degree of sector k, dOk .
9


















dOΘ -0.20 0.53 0.14
bDΩ 0.18 0.00 -0.21 0.05
bDΘ 0.18 -0.28 -0.26 -0.72 -0.17
bSΩ -0.35 0.00 0.94 0.06 -0.19 -0.18
bSΘ -0.17 0.40 0.24 0.45 0.19 -0.38 0.26
θτ -0.35 0.33 0.31 0.25 -0.04 -0.26 0.51 0.31
Note: This table reports the correlation between the following network properties of the pre-
crisis average of the calibrated US production (Ω) and credit network (Θ) in 2007 as derived
in Section 4.1: weighted demand (In-Degree, dIk) and supply shares (Out-Degree, d
O
k ), demand
(bDk ) and supply centrality(b
S
k ), net-lending position (θ
τ
k) as dened in Denition 2.1. A more
detailed description of the standard graph theoretical statistics can be found in Appendix A.
Figures 4.1a and 4.1b plot the distribution of the average demand- and supply shares
normalized by the median share of both networks in 200710, highlighting a well known
feature of the US production network (see Carvalho, 2010): While the US sectors exhibit
a considerable degree of homogeneity along the extensive margin of sectoral demand, US
sectors are heterogeneous in their role as input suppliers. These characteristics translate to
the approximation of the US credit network due to the complementarity of both networks.
Panel (c) of Figure 4.1 plots the distribution of the average net-lending position of sectors
in 2007 and highlights that it exhibits similar characteristics as that of the sample of
Compustat rms shown in Figure 2.2.11
The complementarity of the network structures may raise the concern that mainly
production rather than credit linkages among sectors aect the propagation of liquid-
ity shocks. To address this concern, I consider the network concept of the (weighted)
9Note that due to the complementarity of the production and the credit network - e.g. a credit link
between sector k and s exists if and only if sectors also engage in intermediate input trade - the cardi-
nality of a sector's set of customers and suppliers for each network exhibit (almost) perfect correlation.
Therefore, rather than analysing the extensive margin of each network structure, I focus on a combined
measure capturing both the extensive and intensive margins of sectoral trade in goods and credit.
10It should be noted that while the qualitative features of the US production and credit network are
constant over time, I chose the year(s) prior to the crisis to highlight these patterns. To be more precise, I
calculate the respective statistics based on the imputed credit network in 2007 and based on the pre-crisis
four year average (2004-2007) for the production parameters to be consistent with the calibration of the
model.
11Note that, there are only a few rms in the sample of Compustat rms used to generate Figure 2.2
in Chapter 2, that extend more credit to their customers than their up-front nancing needs. At a sector
level, I do not nd sectors with a net-lending position strictly greater than one. Nevertheless, I still refer
to sectors with a high ratio of accounts receivable to bank credit as net-lenders.
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Figure 4.1: Properties of the US Production and Credit Network (2007)
(a) In-Degree (b) Out-Degree
(c) Net-Lending Position (d) Credit Centrality
Note: The network statistics have been calculated using the calibrated production parameters and trade credit shares
of 2007 as derived in Section 4.1. Panel (a) and (b) plot the distribution of the average demand- (In-Degree) and
supply-shares (Out-Degree) of the production and the credit network, normalized by the respective median. Panel (c)
depicts the distribution of the average net-lending position as dened in 2.1. Panel (d) plots the relation between the
production- and the credit-supply centrality of sectors. The size of one observation represents the relative importance
of the sector in the economy measured by the share of a sector's average pre-crisis (2004-2007) value added in total
value added. A more detailed denition of the standard graph theoretical statistics can be found in Appendix A.
Bonacich centrality, bD(S)k . It describes the systemic importance of a sector based on the
total weighted number of walks between two sectors and is similar to the concept of the
Leontief-Inverse common to any input-output model. Panel (d) of Figure 4.1 plots the
relation between the pre-crisis average of the production and the credit centrality of sec-
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tors in 2007 and Table 4.2 reports the correlation of network properties. In particular,
the pairwise correlation coecient of the production and credit supply centrality of sec-
tors, ρ(bSΩ, b
S
Θ), is positive but of a lower magnitude. This suggests that despite a certain
degree of complementarity between the production and credit network, they are not per-
fectly correlated such that any shocks transmitted via the inter-rm credit linkages have
dierent implications for economic dynamics.
To summarize, Figure 4.1 and Table 4.2 highlight three properties of the production
structure and the calibrated trade credit network in the US:
(1) There is heterogeneity among sectors when supplying goods and credit to their
customers. In particular, the distribution of sales- and credit-supply shares is heavily
skewed to the left such that only a few sectors act as major suppliers of goods and
credit in the US economy.
(2) The systemic importance of a sector based on the production structure is weakly
positively correlated with it's credit centrality. In other words, a sector which plays
a central role in the trade of goods is also more likely to play a central role in the
provision of supplier credit.
(3) The net-lending position of a sector is positively correlated with the overall systemic
importance of a sector as a supplier of credit.
4.1.3 Business Cycle Statistics
Following the period-by-period mapping of the equilibrium of the model to the correspond-
ing data on the US economy discussed at the beginning of this section, I now document
business cycle statistics for selected real and nancial variables. Panel (a) of Figure 4.2
plots the sectoral mean of the implied banking shock and of the log-change of selected
production inputs across time. Panel (b) of Figure 4.2 plots the average log-changes in the
interest rates on bank and trade credit as well as in the trade credit shares. The sample
period covers two recessions: the dotcom-crash in 2001 and the 2008-2009 nancial crisis.
As documented in Chapter 2, real US GDP dropped by approximately 2.6% during
the crisis. Figure 4.2a documents that the implied shock to bank risk premia rose by
26.9% and lead to an increase of bank and trade credit interest rates by 17.8% and 23.1%,
respectively. Average sectoral output declined by approximately 16.0% caused by a drop
in labor and the composite intermediate input by 9.5% and 27.8%, respectively. At the
same time, the average trade credit share extended to customers declined by 17.2% and
the average share of intermediate expenditures obtained on trade credit dropped by 14.3%.
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Figure 4.2: Data - Mean Changes
(a) Real Variables and Financial Shocks (b) Financial Variables
Note: This gure plots the log-change in percent of the time series of selected real and nancial variables calculated
based on the data discussed in Section 4.1 from 1997-2016. Panel (a) plots the sectoral mean of the implied nancial
shock (zBk ), the log-change of real output (qk), labor (`k) and the intermediate input composite (q
X
k ). Panel (b) plots
the average log-change in the interest rate on bank (rBk ) and trade credit (r
T






For each sector, I now calculate the standard deviation of log-changes in the variables
of interest. I also derive the within sector correlation between (a) log-changes in output
and (b) log-changes in the cost of bank credit and the remaining real and nancial vari-
ables. The cross-sectional mean of the business cycle statistics are reported in Table 4.3.
In addition, I split the sample of sectors based on their net-lending position dened in 2.1
and obtained from the data presented in Chapter 2: a sector is counted as a net-lender if
its net-lending position is above the median of the distribution of net-lending shares.
Output, Labor and Intermediate Inputs. Over the entire sample period, 1997-2016,
average sectoral output exhibits a volatility of around 7%. Total sectoral hours worked
and the intermediate composite show a standard deviation of approximately 6.5% and
14.0%, respectively. In other words, on average, labor demand is less volatile whereas the
demand for the composite intermediate inputs is more volatile than output. Furthermore,
log-changes in output are positively correlated with both changes in production inputs.
The business-cycle statistics of the data-counterparts of the respective model variables on
sectoral output, labor and the intermediate composite for the entire sample are similar
to those reported in BL(2017). I now take a closer look at the mean and the standard
deviation of log-changes in both subsamples of sectors. The p-values for the dierences
in means between net-borrowing and net-lending sectors suggest that while there is no
signicant dierence in the volatility or output-correlation, the two groups of sectors seem
to dier in the average growth rate of employed labor and intermediate inputs at a 10%
signicance level.
Cost of Credit and Trade Credit. The imputed sectoral interest rates on bank and
trade credit exhibit a standard deviation of 11.4% and 16.8%, respectively and are thus
59
both more volatile than sectoral output. Table 4.3 indicates that the implied interest
rate on trade credit is more volatile than the interest rate on bank credit, which relates
to the stylised facts presented in Chapter 2 on the relative volatility of accounts payable
and liabilities. In addition, both interest rates comove strongly. The average trade credit
share extended to customers, θC , and obtained from suppliers, θS, are more volatile than
sectoral output but less volatile than the implied costs of trade credit. In addition, they
are negatively correlated with the cost of bank nance such that an increase in the cost of
bank credit decreases either shares. This is due to the fact that while the interest rates on
bank and supplier credit comove strongly, the latter exhibits a higher standard deviation.
Consequently, rms shift their borrowing portfolio towards bank nance in response to an
increase in credit market frictions as discussed in Chapter 2. Interestingly, the correlation
between the cost of bank credit and the interest charged on trade credit as well as the
average trade credit share obtained from suppliers seems to be signicantly higher for the
group of sectors classied as net-borrowers at a 10% signicance level. In other words,
as net-borrowers face a higher cost of bank nance, they are more likely to increase their
lending rates and shift more towards bank nance. This suggests that the substitution
eect of trade credit discussed in Chapter 2 may be more pronounced for net-borrowers.
Table 4.3: Data - Time-Series Correlation
(a) Real Variables
Total (97-16)





q 0.014 0.017 0.010 0.290
` -0.006 -0.001 -0.012 0.054
qX 0.008 0.016 0.000 0.072




q 0.069 0.068 0.069 0.921
` 0.065 0.052 0.078 0.282
qX 0.140 0.133 0.147 0.663




R (q,`) 0.557 0.601 0.512 0.440
(q,qX) 0.809 0.784 0.834 0.384
(q,zB) -0.418 -0.385 -0.453 0.300
#OBS 45 23 22
(b) Financial Variables
Total (97-16)





rB -0.008 -0.011 -0.005 0.160
rT -0.018 -0.020 -0.016 0.672
θC -0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.615




rB 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.978
rT 0.168 0.169 0.167 0.952
θC 0.134 0.130 0.138 0.658





B,rT ) 0.922 0.953 0.890 0.065
(rB,θC) -0.239 -0.258 -0.220 0.624
(rB,θS) -0.341 -0.401 -0.277 0.104
#OBS 45 23 22
Note: This table reports the time-mean of the cross-sectional mean, the standard deviation and the correlation with out-
put and the bank interest rate of the log-change of the following variables: output (qk), labor (`k), the intermediate input
composite (qXk ), the interest rate on bank (r
B
k ) and trade credit (r
T







The rst column reports the business cycle statistics for the entire sample. The second and third column report the same
statistics for a subgroup of sectors based on the net-lending position Denition 2.1. The p-values for the dierences in
means between the two groups are reported in the last column.
In the previous paragraphs, I have focused on the mapping of the model to the data
and their business cycle properties. Before moving on to the main quantitative application
of the model, I will elaborate further on the data-counterpart of sectoral credit distortions
in the model and on the trade credit usage of sectors. In particular, the discussion in next
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section will be informative for the set-up of the counterfactual exercises conducted in
Section 4.2, in order to quantitatively assess the role of trade credit linkages for the
propagation of nancial shocks using the model framework introduced in Chapter 3.
4.1.4 Credit Distortions and Sector Heterogeneity
Chapter 2 highlighted that trade credit plays an important role in an economy by aecting
the propagation of nancial shocks and subsequently aggregate and sectoral outcomes. In
particular, the data suggests that the heterogeneity in the usage of trade credit across
sectors had dierent implications for sectoral output growth in the recent 2008-2009 re-
cession: Sectors who were more exposed to and/or experienced a greater decline in their
net-lending position experienced a greater drop in output during the crisis as discussed in
Chapter 2. While these statements are based on bivariate correlations patterns observed
in the data, they also raise the following two questions: (1) What other sectoral charac-
teristics contributed to the sharp decline in output in 2009 and (2) How do they relate to
the heterogeneous usage of trade credit across rms?
In order to address these question, I discuss the eect of dierences in productivity
levels, and in the structure of trade and credit linkages on sectoral distortions, changes
in credit spreads and output growth during the crisis. While real output data is readily
available, I rely on the mapping of the model to the data discussed in Section 4.1, to obtain
time series of sectoral productivity (zqk) and nancial shocks to the bank risk premium
(zbk). The level of sectoral distortions is measured by the combined credit wedge of the
marginal cost of production (φVk ), dened in Equation (3.19). Furthermore, I calculate
the Bonacich centrality (bSΩ) of a sector as described above and the net-lending position
(θτk) to capture the systemic importance of a sector as a supplier of inputs and credit,
respectively. The inspection of the bivariate correlation coecient between the average
pre-crisis level and the change of the respective variables of interest during the 2008-2009
Financial Crisis presented in Table 4.4, suggests the following.
Table 4.4: Credit Distortions and Sector Heterogeneity
VAR φVk ∆log(z
b
k)09 ∆ log(qk)09 z
q
k VAR ∆ log(qk)09
zqk 0.33 -0.10 0.29 1.00 z
q 0.29
θτk 0.21 0.31 -0.36 -0.16 ∆ log(z
b
k)09 -0.56
bSΩ,k 0.03 0.07 -0.26 0.18 ∆ log(θ
τ
k)09 0.55
Note: This table reports the cross-sectional correlations between the following variables: (q) real output, (zq) produc-
tivity, (θτ ) net-lending position, (bSΩ) Bonacich-Supply centrality, (φ
V ) credit wedge of marginal cost of production.
The level of a variable is calculated as the pre-crisis average (2004-2007), while the log-change refers to the growth
rate of the variable in 2009.
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More productive sectors seem to be more distorted but experienced a smaller decline
in their output during the crisis than less productive sectors, which may be partially due
to smaller shocks to their bank risk premium. While there is only weak evidence that
sectors who extend more trade credit relative to their upfront nancing-needs exhibit
lower productivity levels, they face higher distortions, experienced a higher shock to their
cost of bank credit and subsequently a stronger decline in output during the crisis. The
positive correlation between the net-lending position of a sector and shocks to its bank
risk premium is in line with the ndings on the positive relationship between the interest
rate on bank credit and the share of total sales extended on trade credit in Chapter 2.
Dierences in the production structure as measured by the supply centrality of the sector
seem to play only a minor role for the level of distortions or the size of the shock to the
bank risk premium. However, the correlation coecient in Table 4.4 indicates that more
central sectors also experienced a greater decline in output in 2009.
Following up on the previous concern raised in Section 4.1.2 regarding the comple-
mentarity of the production and credit network between rms, the correlation patterns
presented in Table 4.4 do suggest that credit linkages indeed may have a stronger im-
pact on distortions and changes in output in response to nancial shocks than dierences
in the production structure. However, they also raise the question to what extend the
observed changes in output can be attributed to (changes) in the credit network since net-
lenders have also been more aected during the crisis according to the correlation patterns
recorded in Table 4.4. In order to quantify the role of credit linkages for the propagation
of nancial shocks and disentangle the eect of the trade credit channel from any eects
induced by dierences productivity levels or nancial shocks, I simulate the model while
abstracting from any changes in productivity and conduct a variety of counterfactual
exercises, which I will now discuss in greater detail.
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4.2 Quantitative Application
In view of the facts presented on trade credit in the US economy in Chapter 2, the rst
question I address quantitatively through the lens of the model introduced in Chapter 3 is,
to what extend does the interdependency of distortions created by trade credit linkages
aect business cycle comovement, aggregate uctuations and economic outcomes. For
this purpose, the model-implied time series are obtained by feeding in the nancial shock
series imputed from the GZ-credit spreads and solving numerically for the equilibrium of
the static economy. Any additional variation originating from changes in (1) production
and nancial parameters, (2) capital and (3) productivity and foreign trade shocks is
excluded by keeping the respective variables at their four-year-average (2004-2007) prior
to the crisis as reported in Table 4.1. The data-counterparts of the variables of interest
are obtained via direct period-by-period mapping of the equilibrium of the static economy
presented in Chapter 3 to the data as described in Section 4.1.
In the second part of this application, I focus on the assessment of the role of trade
credit linkages for the propagation of nancial shocks during the 2008-2009 Financial
Crisis. Keeping in mind the propagation mechanism introduced by endogenous trade
credit linkages as discussed in Chapter 3, Section 4.2.2 addresses the following questions
using simulations of the model: (a) To what extent do credit linkages amplify or dampen
the response of output relative to an economy with bank nance only. (b) Does the
endogenous adjustment of credit costs and portfolios reduce or amplify volatility in an
economy? (c) In view of the results of Proposition 4, what is the quantitative role of
net-lenders for the propagation of nancial shocks.
Section 4.2.1 now examines the model performance based on its ability to re-produce
uctuation patterns of the variables of interest observed in the data for the sample period
(1997-2016) discussed in Chapter 2.
4.2.1 Business Cycle Properties Through the Lens of the Model
In order to provide a rst assessment of the ability of the model to generate business
cycle patterns of both real and nancial variables as shown in Chapter 2, I rst reproduce
Figure 2.1 using the model-implied series only. As evident from Figure 4.3, the model
indeed reproduces qualitatively the business cycle features of trade credit and the changes
in the short-term borrowing portfolio observed in the data when accounting for the timing
restrictions discussed in Chapter 2. First and foremost, the model replicates a key feature
of the recent nancial crisis: (M5) As credit spreads rose during the nancial crisis, the
supplier credit market contracted immediately and rms drew down their bank credit lines
substituting supplier with bank credit. In addition, the model-simulated series also imply
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that in response to nancial shocks to the bank risk premium only: (M1) The growth rate
of the volume of trade nance is pro-cyclical with the growth rate of current real GDP;
Trade credit is more volatile than the growth rate of (M2) total value added and (M3)
rms' liabilities. The model also predicts that (M4) the share of accounts payable and
receivable in total costs of production and sales are negatively correlated with aggregate
credit spreads in the economy.
Figure 4.3: Model-Implied Business Cycle Properties of Trade Credit
(a) Model Prediction 1-2 (b) Model Prediction 3
(c) Model Prediction 4 (d) Model Prediction 5
Note: The panels in this gure replicate the graphs presented in Figure 2.1 and plot the evolution of the log-change
in percent of the simulated time series of aggregate US GDP (Y ), Accounts Payable (AP ), Accounts Receivable (AR),
Current (LC) Liabilities, the share of AP in Current Liabilities (θT ), the aggregate GZ-spread (GZ), the share of AP
in Total Costs of Goods Sold (θP ) and the share of AR in Total Sales (θR). All variables are reported in real terms
using the aggregate price-index. The model-simulations are based on nancial shocks only. The gures also report the
standard deviation of the respective series in percent.
Quantitatively, the average simulated IO-adjusted risk premium features 19.8% of
the volatility of the aggregate GZ-spread. The model simulations based on the imputed
nancial shock series demonstrate that the model is able to account for 25.5% of the
variation in output, 7.6(5.0)% of the variation in total (current) liabilities and 25.6%
of the variation in supplier credit. Taking a closer look at the credit composition, the
model also reproduces 37.6% of the uctuations in the credit composition of short-term
borrowing and approximately 18.9(23.3)% of the variation in the share of trade credit in
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total costs and sales, respectively. I thus conclude that the model is a reasonable tool
for the analysis of trade credit linkages and the eect on business cycle comovements and
aggregate uctuations.
Table 4.5 presents the time series correlation for selected aggregate real and sector-
level nancial variables with their counterpart in the data across time, using a 10-year-
rolling window. The correlation between the model-implied growth rate of aggregate GDP
(labor) and the actual rate observed in the data is approximately 63(59)% on average
across time. The model ts particularly well during later years in the sample.
Table 4.5: Model-Fit - Time-Series Correlation
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Mean Std Min Max
Crisis 0.22 0.40 0.50 0.40 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.34 0.08 2008 2010
∆ log(Y ) 0.42 0.39 0.39 0.72 0.75 0.73 0.73 0.77 0.73 0.63 0.17 2010 2015
∆ log(C) 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.64 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.78 0.75 0.57 0.24 2009 2015
∆ log(L) 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.66 0.73 0.77 0.74 0.72 0.74 0.59 0.21 2009 2013
∆ log(ΦZ) 0.62 0.62 0.75 0.76 0.66 0.57 0.58 0.63 0.52 0.63 0.08 2016 2011
∆ log(ΦL) 0.37 0.34 0.43 0.53 0.41 0.43 0.50 0.49 0.41 0.43 0.06 2009 2011
∆ log(AR) 0.67 0.66 0.72 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.80 0.09 2009 2016
∆ log(AP ) 0.52 0.50 0.61 0.80 0.85 0.84 0.87 0.88 0.90 0.75 0.16 2009 2016
∆ log(rT ) 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 2009 2016
∆ log(θ) 0.47 0.46 0.53 0.75 0.78 0.76 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.68 0.14 2009 2015
∆ log(θC) 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.69 0.14 2009 2014
∆ log(φX) 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.00 2012 2008
Note: This table presents the time series correlation for selected aggregate real and sector-level nancial variables
with their counterpart in the data across time, a using a 10-year-rolling window. The indicated years represent
the end-dates of a 10-year-rolling window used to calculate the time-series correlation. The variable crisis shows
the frequency the US-economy spent in crisis based on NBER-recession dates during the 10-year-period.
At a sector level, panel (a) of Figure 4.5 shows the cross-sectional correlation between
output growth during crisis as observed in the data and output-growth generated by the
simulation of the model in response to nancial shocks only. As evident from panel (a)
the model is also able to capture output dynamics at a sector level as observed in the
data.
4.2.2 The Role of the Credit Network during the Great Recession
In the previous paragraphs, I have shown that the model is able to reproduce business cycle
patterns of trade credit similar to those observed in the data. I now evaluate the eects
of trade credit linkages on aggregate distortions and business cycle uctuations in the US
economy during the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis in order to provide answers to the questions
posed at the beginning of the section: (1) Did the interrm credit network amplify or
smooth nancial shocks during the Great Recession in comparison to an economy without
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trade credit?, and (2) To what extent does the trade credit channel contribute to aggregate
uctuations?
Financial Frictions and The Business Cycle. The existence of a working capital
constraint for rms generates demand for ex-ante liquidity which is met by obtaining credit
from both banks and suppliers. The cost of drawing credit lines from either diverts funds
from productive inputs which manifests itself as an aggregate eciency and labor wedge as
shown in Chapter 3. Panel (a) and (b) of Figure 4.4 plot the predicted percentage changes
in the aggregate TFP and the aggregate labor wedge in response to a shock to the cost of
bank credit as well as the log-changes in observed aggregate output and labor measured
against the right axis. As can be seen in the gures, the changes in either wedge co-move
strongly with aggregate output and labor in the data. Panel (c) and (d) of Figure 4.4
present the model-predicted percentage changes of aggregate output and labor on the left
axis against those observed in the data. The model predicts that changes in the nancial
frictions alone account for approximately 34.2% of the actual drop in output reported in
Chapter 2 and 9.7% of the drop in labor during the 2008-2009 Great Recession.
Figure 4.4: Model-Fit - Aggregate Outcomes
(a) Aggregate TFP-Wedge Φ(Z) (b) Aggregate Labor Φ(L)
(c) Output (d) Labor
Note: Panel (a) and (b) in this gure plot the model-implied log-changes in the aggregate TFP and the aggregate labor
wedge in response to shocks to the cost of bank credit only. The log-changes of observed aggregate output and labor are
measured against the right axis. Panel (c) and (d) plot both the log-changes of aggregate output and labor as implied
by the model simulations in response to shocks to the cost of bank credit on the left axis against those observed in the
data. All log-changes are reported in percent.
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At a sector level panel (b) of Figure 4.5 depicts the cross-sectional correlation between
output growth during crisis as observed in the data and the log-change of sectoral credit
wedges, φVk , distorting the marginal cost of production in 2009 as dened in Equation
(3.19). It follows that sectors who experienced a stronger increase in distortions also
exhibit a greater drop in output during the crisis, which is in line with the predictions of
the model.
Figure 4.5: Model-Fit - Sectoral Output Growth in 2009
(a) Output Growth (b) Credit Distortions
Note: This gure depicts the correlation between sectoral output growth observed in the data and (a) sectoral output
growth generated by the simulation of the model using nancial shocks to the cost of bank credit only; (b) the log-change
of sectoral credit wedges, φVk , distorting the marginal cost of production dened in Equation (3.19) during the nancial
crisis in 2009. The percentage changes are reported in percent. The calculation of the cross-sectional correlations are
based on the full sample in panel (a) and based on a reduced sample by exclusion of one outlier in panel (b). The size
of one observation represents the relative importance of the sector in the economy measured by the share of a sector's
average pre-crisis (2004-2007) value added in total value added.
As emphasized in BL(2017) and further discussed in the theoretical section, the cost
of credit aect aggregate output through two channels: changes in the aggregate TFP
and the labor wedge. A decomposition of the log-changes in aggregate output and labor
into contributions of either channel suggests that most of the changes are attributed to
changes in the eciency rather than the labor wedge. This result contrasts the ndings in
BL(2017) for two reasons. First, dierences in the calibration strategy of aggregate prices
and nancial shocks may aect the relative importance either channel. Second, and more
importantly, wedges are interdependent.
Having established that nancial frictions are able to account for a non-negligible
fraction of movements in aggregate variables, I now focus on the quantication of the role
played by interlinked distortions in the form of trade credit linkages among rms during
the nancial crisis. In order to address the questions posed at the beginning of this section,
I conduct the following exercises: (a) The rst simulation evaluates the contribution of
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the existence of trade credit linkages to the drop in output during the recent recession
by comparing the response of the variable of interest in the model economy introduced
in Chapter 3 to that generated in a counterfactual economy with bank credit only. (b)
Second, I decompose the general equilibrium response of the variables into their partial
equilibrium counterpart derived by keeping both trade credit interest rates and shares
at their steady state level. The dierence between the general and partial equilibrium
response can be attributed to the trade credit channel, highlighting the eect of the
endogenous adjustment of the volume and cost of trade credit on the aggregate economy.
(c) The third and fourth exercises seek to address the concerns raised in Section 4.1.4 by
comparing the response of the benchmark economy with those of an economy featuring
symmetric credit linkages and symmetric shocks to the bank risk premium, in order to
disentangle the role played trade credit from other sources of heterogeneity. (d) In a
last exercise, idiosyncratic shocks to dierent groups of sectors are considered in order to
quantify Proposition 4 introduced in Chapter 3.
(a) TC-Multiplier. Since the model nests the economy presented in BL(2017) if
no trade credit linkages are considered, the comparison of the predictions produced by
a model with trade credit to the otherwise equivalent model without any credit linkages
provides a clear way to disentangle the eects of the credit network from those of the
inter-sectoral trade network alone. For this purpose, similar to BL(2017), I rst dene an
equivalent economy, E(0), and the Trade Credit Multiplier as follows
Denition 4.1 (Equivalent Economies). Let E(0) be an equivalent economy to an econ-
omy with both production and credit linkages, E(θ), with production linkages only. Then
E(0) features the same observed input prices net of any credit costs and the same observed
nominal sales, input expenditures and value added as in E(θ).
Denition 4.2 (Trade Credit Multiplier). Let E(θ) be an economy in which rms nance
their working capital requirements with both trade and bank nance and let E(0) be the
corresponding equivalent economy. Consider the same sector-specic shocks across both
economies. The "trade credit multiplier" is the ratio between the percentage drop in a
variable of interest, e.g. aggregate output, generated by an economy with both trade and
bank nance and an equivalent economy with bank nance only.
I then simulate both economies, an economy with bank and supplier credit, E(θ), and
an equivalent economy where rms nance their working capital requirements with bank
credit only, E(0), using the same nancial shocks to the sector-specic bank risk premium.
The rst two rows of Table 4.7 report the percentage change in aggregate output, labor
and both the eciency and labor wedge in 2009 for the economy introduced in Section
3 and its equivalent counterpart. In addition, column (5) to (7) also report the average
percentage change in sectoral output, labor and credit wedges.
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The resulting trade credit multiplierM ranges from 1.63 for aggregate labor to 2.19
for the aggregate eciency wedge, and from 2.11 to 4.19 for the average sectoral labor
and output response, implying that the credit network itself generates a considerable
amplication of distortions. Since the model including both production and credit link-
ages captures approximately one third for the drop in aggregate real GDP, I conclude
that about 16 percent of the drop in aggregate output can therefore be attributed to the
existence of trade credit per se. In addition, I have also simulated an equivalent econ-
omy without any credit management costs which represents the economy introduced in
BL(2017). The comparison of the response of the respective variables and the resulting
trade credit multipliers are reported in Table F.2 in Appendix F. The trade credit multi-
plier of all variables are of similar magnitudes, with the multiplier of output being only
slightly lower as any changes in distortions will have stronger eects on labor markets due
to the absence of a xed labor demand for non-productive labor.
The intuition of this result in either counterfactual is as follows: In an economy with
bank nance only, a shock to the cost of external funds overall increases the cost pro-
duction. Subsequently, prices increase and sectoral and aggregate output decrease. As
discussed in detail in Section 3.2, in an economy where rms nance their production us-
ing both bank and supplier credit, an increase in sectoral bank risk premia also translates
into an increase in the cost of trade credit as shown in Lemma E.5. Consequently, total
credit cost of production increase by more relative to an economy with bank credit only.
As predicted by the model and observed in the data, rms adjust their credit portfolio
by moving towards bank nance during the crisis since the interest rate on trade credit
exhibits a stronger increase than the interest rate on bank credit. However, these adjust-
ments are not enough to undo the exacerbating eecting of credit linkages on the drop
in output relative to an economy without credit relations among rms. This observation
therefore translates into a trade credit multiplier greater than one as recorded in Table
4.7. Interestingly, the credit linkages reduce the eect of nancial shocks on the aggregate
labor wedge. This suggests that the credit network does not only increase the volatil-
ity of both the marginal product of labor and the real wage rate, it also increases their
comovement, thereby reducing the volatility of the aggregate labor wedge.
(b) TC-Mechanism. Having established that the credit network itself considerably
amplies the propagation of nancial shocks, the question remains whether in an economy
with both bank and trade credit the smoothing or the amplication mechanism of the
trade credit channel introduced in Chapter 3 dominates: An increase in the cost of bank
credit of sector k leads to the following adjustments of trade credit costs and volumes:
First, the interest rate on trade credit charged by sector k increases which, in addition
to any shocks to the bank risk premium of k's customers, will further increase the cost
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of production of all customers of sector k. (see Lemma E.5 and 3.6) As such, for given
credit shares the increase in the cost of supplier credit amplies idiosyncratic shocks to the
interest rate on bank credit. Second, since the model generates a more volatile response
of the cost of trade than the cost of bank credit, rms shifted their borrowing portfolio
towards bank nance (see Lemma E.4 and Figure 4.3d), thereby dampening the eect of
the increase in the cost supplier nance.
In order to quantify the actual trade credit channel and its eect on the volatility and
response of output during the crisis, I rst calculate the partial equilibrium response of the
variables of interest by keeping both the interest rate on trade credit as well as the trade
credit shares at their steady state level (PER). The dierence between the general and
partial equilibrium response can thus be attributed to the trade credit channel overall. The
eect of an endogenous adjustment of the credit portfolio on the volatility and response
of output is further isolated by comparing the respective statistic in general equilibrium
to its counterpart in partial equilibrium where only the credit portfolio remained at its
equilibrium value (PET ).
Table 4.6 reports the results of both partial equilibrium exercises for aggregate output
and average sectoral output: The rst observation is that, overall, the eect of the trade
credit channel on aggregate and sectoral volatility and output are rather small. The
total eect of the trade credit channel on both the volatility of output across sectors
and sectoral output growth during the crisis is negative. With reference to the results
reported in Table 4.6, the endogenous adjustment of the interest rates charged on trade
credit and of credit portfolio increases sectoral output volatility by 2.30% in 1997-2016
and increased the drop in sectoral output by 1.74% on average. This is due to the fact
that the amplication channel of an adjustment of the cost of trade credit dominates and
is only partially o-set by the adjustment of credit shares, which reduces volatility and
the decline in output by 1.32 and 1.50%, respectively.
Table 4.6: Decomposition of Trade Credit Mechanism
(a) Output Volatility
σ,% GE PE TC
Y
PER 0.4271 0.4332 =1.41
PET 0.4271 0.4321 =1.18
Q
PER 0.3547 0.3486 +2.30
PET 0.3547 0.3595 =1.32
(b) Output Growth, 2009
∆09,% GE PE TC
Y
PER -0.8798 -0.8952 =1.75
PET -0.8798 -0.8917 =1.35
Q
PER -0.7183 -0.7058 +1.74
PET -0.7183 -0.7291 =1.50
Note: This table presents the decomposition of (a) the volatility, σ, and (b) the drop in output during the 2008-2009
Financial Crisis, ∆09, into general and partial equilibrium eects for aggregate output (Y) and of the mean response of
sectoral output (q). The row (PER) reports the general equilibrium eect in column (GE) and the partial equilibrium
eect from holding both interest rates on trade credit and trade credit shares constant (PE). Similarly, the row (PET )
also reports the general equilibrium eect in column (GE) and the partial equilibrium eect from holding trade credit
shares constant (PE). The column entries of (TC) are calculated as (1-PE/GE) and therefore summarize the eect of
the adjusting variable(s) on the general equilibrium. All numbers are reported in percent.
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However, in case of aggregate output, the model predicts that the trade credit channel
introduced in Section 3.2 reduces aggregate volatility by 1.41% and decreased the drop
in GDP by 1.75%. The endogenous adjustment of the interest on trade credit led to
a reduction in the volatility of output and the decline in output during the crisis by
1.18% and 1.35%, respectively. Consequently, the adjustment in the cost of trade credit
contributed between 83% (1.18:1.41) and 77% (1.35:1.75) to the smoothing eect of the
trade credit channel. The remaining 17-23% of the total eect can be attributed to changes
in credit linkages. This result is complementary to the trade credit channel dened in
3.3, which highlights the propagation pattern of changes in credit costs and shares from
the perspective of an individual rm. At the aggregate level, an increase in the interest
rate on trade credit reduces the demand for trade credit and subsequently decreases the
share of revenues extended on trade credit. The latter eect counteracts the increase in
risk premia on bank credit due to the nancial shock. Therefore, at the aggregate level,
the overall ability of rms to adjust both its price of trade credit and its credit portfolio
dampens the eect of shocks to the cost of bank credit.
(c) Credit Network and Shock Heterogeneity. In the last part of this quan-
titative exercise, I examine the role of heterogeneity of trade credit linkages and shocks
on the trade credit multiplier dened in 4.2 by conducting two additional counterfactual
exercises: (1) I rst evaluate the importance of the asymmetry of credit linkages for the
propagation of liquidity shocks by comparing the model's response against the response of
an equivalent economy with symmetric trade credit shares in equilibrium. (2) The second
counterfactual considers the role of asymmetric shocks by comparing the dynamics of the
model when all sectors are aected by the same12 shock to the cost of bank credit. Both
exercises address the concerns raised in Section 4.2.1 regarding the disentanglement of the
role of the trade credit mechanism from any eects induced by dierences in the trade
credit network or the size of shocks. The second and third row of Table 4.7 highlight
that the implied trade credit multiplier is close to one which suggests that the asymmetry
in both the credit link intensity and the nancial shock only plays a minor role in the
propagation of liquidity shocks.
(d) Heterogeneity in Net-Lending Position. As highlighted in Chapter 2, there
is heterogeneity in the net-lending position of sectors dened as the ratio of accounts
receivable to bank credit. Chapter 3 then introduced a model framework featuring en-
dogenous trade credit linkages and costs which allowed to investigate the implications
thereof for the propagation of nancial shocks. In particular, Proposition 4 suggests that
in an economy featuring both production and credit linkages, sectors who extend relatively
12The symmetric shock aecting all sectors equally is calculated as the average of sectoral shocks
derived in Section 4.1.
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more trade credit will generate more spillovers in the propagation of nancial shocks. The
intuition of this result is as follows: First, note that the interest rate of trade credit is
more sensitive to nancial shocks for sectors who extend relatively more trade credit to
customers. Consequently, the amplication of the cost eect and therefore the reduction
in output generated by an increase in the interest rate charged on trade credit will be
more pronounced for sectors engaging more in inter-rm nancial intermediation.
Taking the model to the data, the following exercise quantitatively evaluates the
relevance of asymmetries in the trade credit usage of sectors for the propagation of liquidity
shocks: For this purpose, I rst identify the top ve net-borrowers and the top ve net-
lenders based on the net-lending position (see Denition 2.1) of sectors calculated based
on the mapping of the model to the data described in Section 4.1. This yields the following
set of sectors: The sector IDs of the top net-lenders are { 211, 514, 331, 486, 11 } and
the top net-borrowers { 445, 452, 62, GOV, 441 }. Notably, as discussed in Chapter 2,
the set of net-lenders is characterised by being more upstream in the supply chain of the
US economy while the top net-borrowers are closer to the end consumer. I then feed in a
symmetric shock series calculated as the average shock to sectoral risk premia that aects
only one group of sectors at a time. The results of this exercise are reported in the last
two rows of Table 4.7 and highlight that the aggregate trade credit multiplier is higher
if sectors that extend relatively more trade credit than their upfront nancing needs face
an increase in their bank risk premium: Sectors which extend a lot of supplier credit in
the US economy play a more central role in the propagation of liquidity shocks through
inter-sectoral credit linkages relative to an economy with bank nance only.
This result relates to the predictions of Proposition 4 which I will now formally
quantify: Consider the output response of those sectors, who were not directly aected
by the same nancial shock to the top ve (a) net-lenders and (b) net-borrowers. The
total eect of the trade credit channel - the endogenous adjustment of trade credit costs
and shares - on output is measured by the dierence between the general equilibrium and
the partial equilibrium response of output, where the latter is obtained for the case in
which both the interest rate on trade credit and the composition of the credit portfolio
remain at their pre-crisis level. Due to the dierences in the proximity of either group of
sectors to the end consumer, I normalize the general and partial equilibrium responses of
sectoral output by the log-change of aggregate labor in both exercises in order to control
for equilibrium demand eects. While the average eect of trade credit on output is
negative in both scenarios, a dierence in means test conrms that the negative output
eect of the sectoral trade credit channel generated by shocks to net-lenders is stronger
and signicantly diers from that generated by shocks to net-borrowers. This observation
corroborates the predictions of Proposition 4: The adjustment of trade credit costs and
credit shares in response to shocks to sectors classied as net-lenders will amplify the
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negative eect of an increase in the bank rate aecting output of sector k.
While the previous exercise investigated the output response of sectors to the same
nancial shock to a selected group of sectors, I generalize this analysis by considering
now a 10% increase in the shock to the bank risk premium of sector k for k ∈ {1, ...,M}.
The response of (a) real GDP and (b) the average sectoral output response of unaected
sectors normalized by the response of aggregate labor are then plotted against the net-
lending position of the aected sector k in Figure 4.6. Figure 4.6 graphically depicts the
quantitative implications of Proposition 4: The decline in (aggregate) output of unaected
sectors will be stronger in case of nancial shocks aecting sectors who are relatively more
engage in inter-rm nancial intermediation.
Figure 4.6: Quantitative Illustration of Proposition 4
(a) GDP (b) Sectoral Output
Note: This gure plots the response of (a) real GDP and of (b) average sectoral output of directly unaected
sectors (−k) to a 10% increase in the shock to the bank risk premium of sector k for k ∈ {1, ...,M} against
the net-lending position of the aected sector k for k ∈ {1, ...,M}. All response are normalized by the response
of aggregate labor. The size of one observation represents the relative importance of the aected sector in the
economy measured by the share of a sector's average pre-crisis (2004-2007) value added in total value added.
The discussion so far has focused on the total eect of the trade credit channel on ag-
gregate and sectoral outcomes. However, an interesting question remains, whether sectors
who experienced a stronger decline in trade credit during the crisis also exhibit a stronger
decrease in output. In order to address this question, I conclude this section by plotting
the log-change in sectoral output during the crisis in 2009 against the log-change of a
sector's net-lending position during the crisis. The inspection of the correlation patterns
presented in Figure 4.7 suggests that the model simulations reproduce the predictions
of Chapter 2: Sectors who experienced a higher decrease in their net-lending position
during the crisis also experienced a stronger decrease in output. A stronger decline in the
net-lending position implies that a sector was more aected by decrease in the liquidity
of the market for trade credit - either through a decrease in trade credit extended to cus-
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tomers or trade credit obtained from supplier or both. This positive correlation is more
pronounced for sectors with a relative higher share of intermediate inputs in production.
Figure 4.7: Model-Implied Change in Trade Credit and Output Growth in 2009
Note: This gure plots the log-change in sectoral output during the crisis in 2009 against
the log-change of a sector's net-lending position (θτk) during the crisis implied by the model-
simulations. The sectors are split according to the median value added share. The value
added share is dened as the share of sector k's value added in total value added and is
calculated using the four-year (2004-2007) pre-crisis values observed in the data. The same
measure is used to represent the size of a sector in this gure. The set of sectors with a value
added share below the median are represented using blue dots (B), while those with a value
added share above the median are represented by green dots (G).
74
TC-Multipliers
Table 4.7: Trade Credit Multipliers of Counterfactual Simulations
Aggregate Sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)





E(θ) -0.880 -0.548 -0.525 -0.037 -0.718 -0.786 0.556
E(0) -0.457 -0.336 -0.239 -0.105 -0.172 -0.373 0.174





E(θ) -0.880 -0.548 -0.525 -0.037 -0.718 -0.786 0.556
E(θ) -0.877 -0.551 -0.521 -0.043 -0.705 -0.803 0.542





E(θ) -0.880 -0.548 -0.525 -0.037 -0.718 -0.786 0.556
E(z) -0.883 -0.532 -0.539 -0.008 -0.736 -0.726 0.514
M 0.996 1.030 0.974 4.635 0.976 1.083 1.083
(d) N
L
E(θ) -0.045 -0.022 -0.031 0.008 -0.096 -0.093 0.068
E(0) -0.010 -0.007 -0.005 -0.003 -0.013 -0.046 0.012
M 4.695 3.030 6.318 -2.871 7.352 2.040 5.825
(d) N
B
E(θ) -0.236 -0.162 -0.131 -0.034 -0.046 -0.077 0.049
E(0) -0.170 -0.127 -0.088 -0.042 -0.015 -0.030 0.030
M 1.386 1.276 1.491 0.818 3.069 2.605 1.659
Note: This table documents the model simulated log-change of the following variables to shocks to sector-specic
bank risk premia in an economy with bank and supplier credit, E(θ), an equivalent economy with bank credit only,
E(0), with symmetric trade credit shares (TCA), E(θ), and an economy featuring symmetric shocks (TCS), E(z):
aggregate output (Y ), labor (L), the aggregate eciency (ΦZφ ) and labor wedge (Φ
L
φ ), the average sectoral output
(q), labor (`) and credit cost wedge (φV ). The trade credit multipliers (M) are calculated as the ratio of responses
of the variable in E(θ) to their counterparts in E(0), E(θ) and E(z), respectively. The equivalent economies of the
ve counterfactual exercises considered are an economy with bank nance only (TC0); with symmetric trade credit
shares (TCA); symmetric shocks (TCS); (NL/NB) in which only net-lenders (net-borrowers) experience an increase
in their bank interest rates using Denition 2.1. All log-changes are reported in percent.
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4.3 Concluding Remarks
Empirical and anecdotal evidence in the literature shows that trade credit in the form of
delayed input payments plays a central role in day-to-day business operations and gen-
erates further interdependencies between rms, beyond the pure exchange of goods and
services. During the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis the market for trade credit contracted
sharply as documented in previous work by Costello (2017). Chapter 2 presented facts
on correlations patterns between the trade credit usage of US rms and macroeconomic
dynamics. It is shown that trade credit comoves strongly with GDP and was severely
aected at the onset of the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis, as captured by the compositional
shift of short-term borrowing towards bank credit. Furthermore, rms dier in their
usage of trade credit and tend to extend less trade credit to customers than their own
cost of production. The investigation of simple correlation patterns suggests that sectors
who were more exposed to suppliers engaging relatively more in inter-rm nancial in-
termediation, also experienced a sharper drop in output during the crisis. Motivated by
these observations, this thesis studied the role of endogenous trade credit linkages in an
inter-sectoral production network for the propagation of liquidity shocks.
In particular the research objectives and contributions to the literature of this thesis
are twofold: (1) To build a model that captures the features of trade credit as a smooth-
ing and as an amplication device and subsequently allows to study the implications of
interdependent distortions for the propagation of nancial shocks. (2) To quantitatively
assess the role of trade credit for the propagation of nancial shocks relative to an econ-
omy with bank nance only on the one hand, and the relative strength of the trade credit
mechanism for economic outcomes on the other.
For this purpose, Chapter 3 introduced a static quantitative multisector model in
which rms nance their working capital requirements using both bank and supplier
credit. Prot-maximizing rms (a) choose the composition of their borrowing portfolio
to minimize their cost of production and (b) optimally set both the price of the good
and the interest rate on trade credit. The model introduces the two features of trade
credit as follows: On the one hand, the existence of two external nancing sources allows
rms to smooth any interest rate shocks via an adjustment of their borrowing portfolio
by optimally trading-o credit costs. On the other hand, an increase in the external
nancing conditions of a rm directly translates into an increase in the cost of trade credit,
thereby tightening the nancing terms for its customers. It is shown that the net-lending
position of a rm, capturing the extent to which rms are involved in inter-rm nancial
intermediation relative to their own credit needs, determines its systemic importance in
the transmission of liquidity shocks. In a quantitative application of my model to the US
economy during the crisis, simulations featuring only nancial shocks show that the model
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captures approximately a third of the drop in output, half of which can be attributed to
the existence of trade credit linkages alone. This suggests that relative to an economy
with bank nance only, the introduction of trade credit linkages generate considerable
spillovers. A complementary exercise investigates the eect of the trade credit channel
- the endogenous adjustment of trade credit cost and shares - on aggregate volatility.
While the ability of rms to adjust their borrowing portfolio overall decreases aggregate
volatility by 1.4%, the eect is rather small but implies that the smoothing mechanism
of trade credit was operative. In a last application, I conrm the predictions derived
in the theoretical section of this thesis on the relevance of the net-lending position of a
rm for aggregate uctuations: A nancial shock to a sector extending more supplier
credit relative to its upfront working capital requirements implies that the amplication
mechanism of trade credit is more pronounced relative to a bank nance only economy.
Overall, this thesis contributes to the literature by emphasising interdependent and
endogenous distortions and their implications for macroeconomic outcomes. While other
sources of interdependencies such as production linkages have been more extensively in-
vestigated in the literature, this thesis has focused on the role of nancial linkages between
rms and analysed their quantitative relevance for the macroeconomy. As the literature
on the macroeconomic implications of inter-rm credit networks and interdependent dis-
tortions is a growing eld, this thesis also suggests interesting paths for future research. In
particular, even though this thesis features endogenous credit linkages, rms are only able
to adjust their credit links along the intensive margin rather than the extensive margin.
A new growing literature investigates the endogenous link formation between eco-
nomic agents (see Obereld, 2018) and is therefore an appealing concept and line of
research as trade credit is also used by rms to build up their customer base and attract
new customers. (see Gourio and Rudanko, 2014; Giannetti et al., 2018) In other words,
rather than taking the existence of nancial linkages among rms as given, the ability
of rms to access other credit markets and obtain trade credit can aect the formation
of customer-supplier relationship between rms. (see e.g. Giovannetti, 2016) Based on
the observations presented in Chapter 2, the relationship between trade credit and other
credit markets such as bank credit and the implications of their joint existence for the
transmission of monetary policy shocks is another interesting line for future research (e.g.
Nilsen, 2002; Mateut et al., 2006). To conclude, this thesis emphasises the importance of
trade credit as a transmission mechanism of nancial shocks and for macroeconomic uc-
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A. Matrix and Variable Notation
In this appendix, I rst provide an overview of the matrix notation and operations as well
as graph theoretical concepts applied in this thesis.
Matrix and Variable Notation. Matrices are denoted as bold capital letters (e.g. X)
and vectors as bold small letters (e.g. x). Since the economy consists of M sectors,
matrices in the following are of size [M × M ] and vectors are of size [M × 1], unless
otherwise stated.
Auxiliary Matrix Operations
inv(.) ... inverse of a matrix
diag(.) ... extracts diagonal entries of matrix X; generates
diagonal matrix using vector x
vec(.) ... vectorizes matrix X by stacking each column
◦ ... denotes the Hadamard product
⊗ ... denotes the Kronecker product
ι ... vector of ones
J ... = ιι′.
Production and Credit Network. The matrices ΩX and Θ denote the intermediate
production structure and credit network, respectively. To simplify notation let Ω = ΩX
below. Both the production and credit network can be mapped into standard graph
theoretical notation. Following Carvalho (2010), dene the set of M sectors as the vertex
set V = {v1, ..., vM} and let E(Ω) and E(Θ) be subsets of all ordered pairs of vertices
{vk, vs}, with vk, vs ∈ V dened as
E(Ω) = {{vk, vs} ∈ V2 : {vk, vs} ∈ E(Ω) if Sector s supplies inputs to Sector k } (A.1a)
E(Θ) = {{vk, vs} ∈ V2 : {vk, vs} ∈ E(Θ) if Sector s extends credit to Sector k } (A.1b)
Therefore, the Cobb-Douglas technology implies that the entry [Ω]ks = ωks denotes the
share of good s in the total intermediate input use of sector k and it is assumed that∑M
s=1 ω
X
ks = 1 ∀k ∈ {1, ...,M}. The production parameters are xed and calibrated
using the IO-Tables provided by the BEA as described in Section 4.1. Similarly, [Θ]ks =
θks denotes the share of intermediate good expenditures of sector k obtained on trade
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credit from supplier s, which is endogenously determined in the model. Due to the
complementary of the production and the credit network, it follows that E(Θ) ⊆ E(Ω).
In other words, a credit link between sector k and s only exists if both sectors also engage
in input trade. The production as well as the credit network can be described as directed
graphs G(Ω) and G(Θ) applying Denition 1 in Carvalho (2010)
Denition A.1. G(Ω) = G(V , E(Ω)) is a directed sectoral trade linkages graph with
vertex set V and edge set E(Ω), where each element of E(Ω) is a directed arc from element
i to j. Similarly, G(Θ) = G(V , E(Θ)) denes the credit linkages graph.
Standard network descriptive statistics dened below (see e.g. Jackson, 2008; Car-
valho, 2010) are used to characterize the production and credit network in Chapter 4. Let
N ∈ {Ω,Θ} and dene the adjacency matrix of N as AN . The in- and out-degree of
sectors measure the heterogeneity of sectors along the extensive margins of input(credit)
demand and input(credit) supply.
Denition A.2. The in-degree, dIk(N ), of a vertex vk ∈ V is dened as the cardinality
of the set {vs : vs → vk}. The out-degree, dOk (N ), of a vertex vk ∈ V is dened as the
cardinality of the set {vc : vk → vc}.
In other words, the in(out)-degree is calculated as the number of all non-zero entries in
the respective row(column) of matrixN and represent the number of suppliers(customers)
of sector k. Due to the complementarity of the trade and the credit network, the in-
and out-degree of either network as dened above will exhibit an almost positive perfect
correlation. Therefore, I also calculate the weighted in- and out-degree as follows
Denition A.3. The weighted in-degree, dIk(N ), of a vertex vk ∈ V is dened as the row
sum of N divided by the in-degree of vk. The weighted out-degree, dOk (N ), of a vertex
vk ∈ V is dened as the column sum of N divided by the out-degree of vk.
In other words, the weighted in-degree equals a sector's average input- and credit-
demand-share, respectively, and the weighted out-degree represents the average sales-
and credit-supply-share. The last network measure applied in this thesis is the weighted
Bonacich centrality, which describes the systemic importance of a sector based on the
total weighted number of walks between two sectors and is similar to the concept of the
Leontief-Inverse common to any input-output model.
Denition A.4. The Demand and Supply Bonacich-Centrality vector is dened as
bd(N ) = (I − Ñ )−1 · ι and bs(N ) = [(I − Ñ )−1]′ · ι (A.2)
where Ñ = diag(n(N ))N are the normalized production and credit networks, with n(Ω) =
diag(η) and n(Θ) = (ι′Θι)−1ι.
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B. Appendix to Chapter 2
In this appendix, I describe the data sources and variables used to derive the results in
Chapter 2 and to calibrate the model presented in Chapter 3.
B.1 Data Sources and Sample Description
GDP and Sectoral Output. Data on nominal and real aggregate US GDP, aggregate Im-
ports and Exports, Gross Output and the corresponding GDP-Deator are obtained from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Sectoral data are obtained from the summary
tables on "Use of Commodities by Industries After Redenitions" provided by the BEA.
Prices and Wages. Data on total hours worked and sectoral prices are obtained from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). In particular, I combine the respective variables from
the MFP- and the LPC-Database in order to deal with missing data when required.
Lending Standards. The Senior Loan Ocer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices
- conducted by the Federal Reserve - reports the tightening in lending standards (LS)
by banking institutions dened as the net percentage of domestic respondents tightening
their standards for commercial and industrial (C&I) loans.
Sectoral Credit Spreads and Federal Funds Rate. The sectoral credit spreads (rZkt) are
derived in Gilchrist and Zakraj²ek (2012) and provided to me by the authors. The federal
funds rate (rB0t) is obtained from the FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis database.
Balance Sheet and Income Statement Data of US Firms. The Compustat database is
used to infer sectoral trade credit (shares) based on the balance sheet data on accounts
receivable and payable of US rms. A rm is included in the sample if all of the following
criteria hold
(1) non-missing NAICS-classication
(2) headquarter in the US
(3) non-missing and non-negative data on balance sheet and income statement items(a)
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(4) accounts receivable do not exceed sales
(5) accounts payable and the sum of accounts payable and cash do not exceed total
production costs
(6) non-missing consecutive observations over the time period 2005-2010
Furthermore, rms are excluded who either enter or exit the Compustat database during
the period 2005-2010. In total, 2,686 rms are included in the initial sample per year
on average. The average number of rms in each sector and the representativeness of
the rms for each industry are presented in Table B.1 across all years 1997-2016. The
reduced sample used to construct Figure 2.1 and 2.2 only contains rms with non-missing
values over the sample period 1997-2016. Furthermore, in order to align nancial and
macroeconomic variables, a rm's observation is assigned to the previous calendar year
if its scal year ends in the months January through May and assigned to the current
calendar year if its scal year ends in the months June through December.
(a) The following balance sheet and income statement items(a) are obtained to construct
the variables discussed in Section 2.1 and to calibrate the model as shown in Section 4.1.
A short description based on the denition given in the Compustat database is included.
 Accounts Payable (ap) are trade obligations due within one year and are included in
current liabilities (lc).
 Accounts Receivable (ar) represent amounts on open account owed by customers for
goods and services sold.
 Cost of Goods Sold (cogs) are all expenses directly related to the production of goods
and services sold to customers.
 Total Sales (R) represent all realised revenues during the scal period.
 Total Assets (at) of a company.
 Total (lt) and Current Liabilities (lc). Total Liabilities (lt) are the sum of current
liabilities (lc), long-term debt and other non-current liabilities. Current Liabilities
include debt in current liabilities (dlc), accounts payable (AP ) and other liabilities
due within one year.
 Total Long-Term (dlt) and Current Debt (dlc). Long-Term Debt (dlt) is dened
as all debt obligations due in more than one year. Current Debt (dlc) denotes all
interest-bearing obligations due after the current year including long-term debt due
in one year and short-term borrowings/notes payable (np).
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(b) In addition, the following variables are obtained:
 Interest Expenditures (xint) of the company of securing short- and long-term debt.
 (Cash) Dividends (dv) representing the total amount of cash dividends paid for cap-
ital.
 Net Income (ni) dened as the scal period income or loss after subtracting expenses
and losses from all revenues and gains.
 Interest Income (idit) dened as revenues received from interest-bearing obligations
held by the company.
 Depreciation (dp) associated with spreading the actual cost of tangible capital assets
over their useful life.
 Cash (ch) holdings of a company.
 Notes Payable (np) denoting the total amount of short-term notes including i.a. bank
acceptances and overdraft, commercial paper.
 R&D Expenditures (xrd) associated with the development of new products or services.
Any missing values are assigned the value of zero and a rm-year observation is excluded
if the sum of net income (ni), dividends (dv) and interest expenditures (xint) is zero. The
composition and representativeness of both samples of US rms obtained from Compustat
- (a) restricted and (b) unrestricted with respect to the time coverage and missing values
of rms - is presented in Table B.1 at a sector level. The less restrictive sample (b) is used
to calibrate the sector-to-sector equilibrium trade credit shares in model as described in
Section 4.1.
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Table B.1: Sample Description
(a) Stylised Facts (b) Calibration
ID Sector Description #Firms RP(Y) RP(R)) #Firms RP(Y) RP(R)) NL
1 11 Agriculture 4 0.03 0.01 13 0.15 0.06 0.17
2 211 Oil and Gas 6 0.88 0.55 57 1.88 1.13 0.57
3 212 Mining, except 211 7 0.54 0.27 26 1.03 0.52 0.10
4 213 Support for 212 6 0.68 0.51 20 0.82 0.60 0.03
5 22 Utilities 55 0.81 0.48 175 2.47 1.47 0.11
6 23 Construction 11 0.06 0.04 30 0.08 0.04 0.01
7 311T2 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 38 1.04 0.29 92 1.63 0.45 0.04
8 313T6 Textile, Apparel and Leather 24 1.94 0.61 69 3.04 0.95 0.08
9 321 Wood Products 6 0.22 0.06 14 0.48 0.14 0.07
10 322T3 Paper Products and Printing 18 0.85 0.31 46 1.30 0.48 0.11
11 324 Petroleum and Coal Products 8 4.52 1.17 21 6.22 1.63 0.06
12 325 Chemical Products 52 1.10 0.45 185 1.72 0.70 0.13
13 326 Plastics and Rubber Products 12 0.50 0.17 33 0.73 0.24 0.14
14 327 Nonmetallic Mineral Products 9 0.43 0.18 21 0.61 0.25 0.15
15 331 Primary Metals 19 1.15 0.28 40 1.66 0.42 0.16
16 332 Fabricated Metal Products 27 0.42 0.17 59 0.61 0.25 0.15
17 333 Machinery 51 1.05 0.38 131 1.50 0.55 0.07
18 334 Computer and electronic Products 65 1.13 0.62 274 2.42 1.34 0.10
19 335 Electrical Equipment and Components 19 0.41 0.17 49 1.16 0.48 0.13
20 3361MV Motor Vehicles, Bodies and Parts 23 0.46 0.10 52 0.98 0.23 0.06
21 3364OT Other Transportation Equipment 18 2.42 0.97 34 2.99 1.20 0.04
22 337 Furniture and Related Products 12 0.47 0.18 24 0.82 0.31 0.04
23 339 Misc Manufacturing 17 0.48 0.23 81 0.79 0.38 0.09
24 42 Wholesale Trade 56 0.41 0.29 145 0.76 0.53 0.06
25 441 Motor Vehicle and Parts Dealers 7 0.30 0.21 17 0.76 0.53 0.01
26 445 Food and Beverage Stores 6 0.93 0.64 16 1.53 1.06 0.00
27 452 General Merchandise Stores 11 4.63 3.15 22 5.11 3.49 0.00
28 4A0 Other Retail 6 1.63 0.76 19 2.24 1.04 0.01
29 481 Air Transport 6 2.09 1.13 8 2.31 1.25 0.02
30 482 Rail Transport 14 0.23 0.10 25 0.30 0.14 0.07
31 484 Truck Transport 4 1.28 0.83 26 6.13 3.67 0.07
32 486 Pipeline Transport 5 0.83 0.41 26 0.88 0.46 0.19
33 48A9 Other Transport and Warehousing 41 0.85 0.54 135 1.31 0.84 0.10
34 511 Publishing Industries 5 0.03 0.02 71 0.23 0.13 0.04
35 512 Motion Picture and Sound 1 0.37 0.22 13 0.52 0.31 0.13
36 513 Broadcasting & Telecommunications 13 0.53 0.27 93 1.55 0.79 0.10
37 514 Information Services 4 1.77 0.99 59 2.33 1.28 0.22
38 54 Professional & Technical Services 20 0.04 0.02 135 0.10 0.06 0.17
39 55 Management of Companies - - - - - - 0.00
40 56 Administrative & Waste services 31 0.17 0.11 85 0.27 0.17 0.10
41 62 Health Care & Social Assistance 21 0.10 0.08 83 0.17 0.13 0.00
42 71 Arts, Entertainment, Recreation 8 0.04 0.02 32 0.13 0.08 0.02
43 72 Accommodation & Food Services 20 0.19 0.10 79 0.30 0.17 0.01
44 81 Other Services except GOV 5 0.01 0.01 14 0.02 0.01 0.04
45 GOV Government and Education 5 0.01 0.04 37 0.01 0.09 0.00
Mean 18 0.86 0.41 61 1.41 0.68 0.09
Stdv 16 1.01 0.53 56 1.47 0.78 0.09
Min 1 0.01 0.01 8 0.01 0.01 0.00
ID (35) (44) (44) (29) (45) (44) (39)
Max 65 4.63 3.15 274 6.22 3.67 0.57
ID (18) (27) (27) (18) (11) (31) (2)
Note: This table presents the NAICS (2007) IDs and descriptions of the sectors included in the
calibration of the model. In addition, the table reports the average number of rms (#Firms) in
each industry included in the sample from Compustat over the entire sample period 1997-2016 used
(a) to calculate aggregate statistics for the respective nancial variables presented in Figure 2.1
Section 2.1 and (b) in the calibration of the model discussed in Section 4.1. The representativeness
of the sample for each sector is calculated as the share of total sales of rms in industry value added
(RP(Y)) and in gross industry output (RP(R)) as reported by the BEA. The last column reports the
average net-lending position of each sector based on Denition 2.1.
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B.2 Variable Description
In the following, I provide a description of the variables included in the regressions pre-
sented in Table 2.2 in Section 2.1. Sectoral aggregates are obtained by summing the
respective balance sheet item or income variable over all rms assigned to the sector in a
given year. The variables are calculated as follows
 Trade Credit Shares. The variable θPkt denes share of accounts payable (ap) in total
cost of production (cogs) and θRkt denotes the share of accounts receivable (ar) in
total sales (sales).
 Financial Shares. The variable θFkt is calculated as the ratio of current (dlc) to long
term debt (dlt). The share of cash (ch) in total production cost (cogs) is denoted by
θEkt.
 Size. The relative size of a sector is measured by the share of a sector's assets (at)
in total assets in the economy.
 Leverage. The leverage ratio (LV Skt) is calculated as the share of total debt (dlt+dlc)
in sales (R). Note that I use sales in the denominator rather than total assets (at)
as accounts receivable are also included as a share of total sales.
 Detrended Cost of Production (CXkt) are obtained by detrending total sectoral cost of
production (cogs) using an hp-lter with a smoothing constant of 6.25 as suggested
for annual data by Ravn and Uhlig (2002).
 Exposure to Trade Credit. Similar to Equation (2.2) in the main text, Equation (B.1)















From the perspective of sector k, the exposure measure presented in Equation (B.1) is
calculated as the weighted sum of its customers' share of accounts payable in total cost of
production. Similar to the exposure measure to k's suppliers, the accounts payable shares
capture the extend to which customers of sector k rely on trade credit and are therefore
more exposed to changes in the cost and supply of trade credit. The weights (wPkm) are a
combination of sector k's share of revenues generated by selling its output to sector m and
sector k's overall share of revenues extended on trade credit to customers. The weights
capture the importance of sector m as a customer of sector k. Figure B.1 plots sectoral
output growth during the crisis against the four-year (2004-2007) pre-crisis average of the
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each sector's exposure to trade credit obtained by its customers. The correlation patterns
shown in Figure B.1 suggest that sectors who are more exposed to customers with a larger
accounts payable share in their production costs exhibit a larger decrease in output after
the shock. A similar pattern is observed for the exposure to the net-lending position of
customers.
Figure B.1: Output Growth and Exposure to Trade Credit of Customers
(a) Accounts Payable (b) Net-Lending Position
Note: This gure plots sectoral output growth in 2009 against a sector's average pre-crisis (2004-2007) exposure to
(a) the accounts payable shares of its customers (ePk ) dened in Equation (B.1) and (b) the net-lending position of
its customers. The tted line of an OLS-regression and corresponding coecient and T-statistic are also reported.
If applicable, outliers excluded from the regression are represented by a green triangle. The size of one observation
represents the relative importance of the sector in the economy measured by the share of a sector's average pre-crisis
(2004-2007) value added in total value added.
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C. Appendix to Chapter 3:
Model-Derivations
This appendix discusses the derivation of the rst order conditions of the model introduced
in Chapter 3 and contains the proofs of the respective lemmata. Appendix C.1 discusses
the properties of the interest rate on bank credit and the credit management cost function.
Appendix C.2 presents the household's utility maximization problem and Appendix C.3
discusses the prot maximization problem of the nal and intermediate good producing
rm. A summary of the equilibrium condition of the model is presented in Appendix C.5.
Appendix C.4 provides the proofs to the lemmata introduced in Section 3.2.1.
C.1 Credit Costs
Interest Rate on Bank Credit. As proposed in the main text, the interest rate





















In other words, sector k is charged a mark-up over the federal funds rate when obtaining
bank credit. This mark-up - or risk premium - is subject to sector-specic shocks, ABk =
exp(zbk), and is increasing and convex in the share of accounts receivable,
∑M
c=1 θckpkxck,

















The convexity of rBk in θ
C
k follows from the assumption that µ > 1.
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Credit Management Costs. CTk denotes the combination of linear and quadratic
adjustment costs and is dened as




























which follows from 0 < κT1,ks ∀k, s.
C.2 The Household's Optimization Problem






βtU (C,L) (t) (C.1)
subject to the period-by-period budget constraint
P (t)C(t) = w(t)L(t) + Π(t) + T (t) (C.2)
The representative household owns all rms, such that in addition to total labor income,
wL, she receives total prots (dividends) of rms, Π =
∑M
m=0 πm. If the household also
owns the nancial sector, she will receive the interest payments on bank credit in the form
of additional transfers, T (t), which will be further discussed in Section D.1. As there is
no uncertainty in the model and the household does not face an intertemporal decision,
I can drop both the expectations operator as well as the time subscript for notational
convenience. Let the utility function be given by Equation (C.3) such that the FOCs















C.3 The Firms' Optimization Problem
Both intermediate and nal goods are produced by a representative, price-taking rm in
the respective sector. While nal good producing rms only face their prot maximization
problem, the intermediate good producing rm faces two maximisation problems each
period: (1) Prot Maximization Problem, and (2) Credit Decision Problem. Sections
C.3.1 and C.3.2 derive and discuss the prot maximization problem of the nal and
intermediate good rm, respectively. The credit decision problem of a representative
intermediate good producing rm is discussed separately in Appendix C.3.3.
C.3.1 Final Good Producer's Optimal Input Decisions
Final good producing rms operate in a perfectly competitive market and do not face any
working capital constraints. The representative rm's dual problem is to (1) choose the
optimal amount of the sectoral inputs {x0m}m to minimize the cost of producing F = 1
and (2) maximize prots by choosing the optimal amount F produced. (1) First, let












where P is the price index of the input composite, V0 = {x0m}Mm=1 denotes the set of choice
variables and A0 = exp(z
q
0)A0, as outlined in the main text. The normalization constant is





)ωFm and the productivity shock zq0 is normally distributed
as N (0, σ2q,0) such that A0 = A0 in equilibrium. The FOCs of the cost-minimization
problem imply that P = ∏Mm=1 pωFmm . (2) The FOCs of the nal good producing rm's
prot maximization problem yield P = P . The optimal nal demand for sector m's out-
put is therefore given by Equation (C.5) and the optimal price charged for the nal good













C.3.2 Intermediate Good Producer's Optimal Input Decisions












The composite of (productive) labor and intermediate inputs, Vk, as well as the composite





















and 1− υk =
(1− ηk)
1− αkηk
such that both Vk and Xk exhibit CRS. Therefore, the production function (3.1) can














































Consequently, the normalization constant of the sector-specic productivity level, Ak =














The productivity shocks zqk are normally distributed as N (0, σ2q,k) such that Ak = Ak in
equilibrium.
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Derivation of Optimization Problem. Total revenues of rm k from selling its













where the last line substitutes the constraints of sector k for production (3.13) and trade
credit extended (3.14), which are binding in equilibrium. Consequently, the revenue
wedge, φRk , and the average of trade credit share extended to rm k's customers, θ
C
k , are













with θ0k = 0. The binding working capital constraint implies that total costs of production
including interest payments are
(1 + rBk )BCk +
M∑
s=1












where the respective credit wedges are
φLk = 1 + r
B
k (C.14) and φ
X
ks = 1 + (1− θks)rBk + rTs θks (C.15)
Note that the intermediate goods credit wedge equals a weighted average of the interest
rates on bank and trade credit. Substituting for the binding working capital constraint
implies that prots can be written as
πk = φ
R










such that the intermediate goods rm's problem prot maximization problem implies that





subject to the production function (3.1), the credit management cost function (3.7), the
interest rate on bank credit (3.8), feasibility constraints on trade credit shares θCk , θks ∈
[0, 1] and non-negativity constraints for all variables.
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Prot Maximization Problem. The rm's prot maximization problem is solved
as a dual problem in two steps: (1) Given interest rates, r, trade credit shares, Θ, the
input composite, Vk, and average trade credit share demanded by customers, θCk , rm k
rst chooses production inputs to minimize total costs of production. Having derived the
cost-minimizing input expenditures, rm k then solves for the (2a) optimal level of output
choosing, Vk, the optimal trade credit shares (2b) demanded from suppliers, {θks}Ms=1 and
(2c) extended to customers, θCk . Each step will be discussed in detail in the following
sections.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. (1) Cost-Minimzation. For given credit links, the optimal input
demand is derived in two steps: given total input expenditures, the rm minimizes ex-
penditures on (a) composite inputs and (b) individual inputs.
(a) Let pVk Vk be the cost-minimizing total expenditures on inputs solving














where pVk is a composite of input costs and p
X
k is the price of the intermediate composite,
Xk. The FOCs with respect to this problem imply that the minimum expenditures pVk Vk




)υk (pXk )(1−υk) . (C.17)
















(b) Similarly, let pXk Xk be the cost-minimizing total expenditures on intermediate goods
such that
pXk Xk ≡ min{xks}s
M∑
s=1



















































Exploiting the result of Lemma 3.2 implies that optimal input demand for productive

















This completes the derivation of the optimal input expenditures and therefore the proof
of Lemma 3.1.
Proof of Corollary 3.1. For given credit costs, r, and shares, Θ, the marginal cost of
production including interest-cost equals the price of the labor and intermediate composite.





















where φVk denotes the composite credit wedge which is a function of the credit links

































for v = rBk
0 < +(1− υk)ωXks θksφXks for v = r
T
s





for v = θks
Corollary 3.1 therefore follows directly from Lemma 3.1.
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Proof of Lemma 3.2. (2a) Prot Maximization. Using the results of Lemma 3.1 and
Corollary 3.1, prots of rm k in Equation (C.16) can also be written as
πk = φ
R
k pkqk − pVk Vk − (1 + rBk )w`Tk . (C.27)
The FOC with respect to Vk is given by
∂πk
∂Vk
: pVk Vk = (1− αkηk)χkφRk pkqk. (C.28)
Equation (C.28) implies that total input expenditures (including interest rate costs) are










and the eective mark-up over marginal costs of production, φVk (φ
R
k )
−1, is a combination
of credit and revenue wedges. This completes the derivation of the optimal price charged
on sector k's output and therefore the proof of Lemma 3.2.
Denition C.1 (Denition of MC-Wedge Elasticities). Dene εBV,k as the elasticity of
the marginal cost wedge with respect to the interest rate on bank credit, and εBε,k as the








































Assumption C.5 (Credit Cost Parameter µ). The interest rate on bank credit, rBk , is an
increasing and convex function in θCk , where




































the rst and second order derivative of marginal costs, pVk , with respect to the average








































































where wvs ∈ {υk, {(1−υk)ωXks}Ms=1} and φvks ∈ {(φLk )−1, {(1−θks)(φXks)−1}Ms=1}, it holds that
E1,k > E
2




V,k. Then 0 <
∂2pVk
∂(θCk )
2 ∀k if µ > µ dened in
Equation (C.31).
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C.3.3 Optimal Credit Decisions
Proof of Lemma 3.3. (2b) Prot Maximization. Having derived the cost-minimizing
input expenditures for given trade credit shares, Θ, the input composite, Vk, and average




φRk pkqk − pVk Vk − (1 + rBk )w`Tk
subject to the production function (3.1), credit management cost function (3.7), the in-
terest rate on bank credit (3.8), and the feasibility constraint θCk , {θks}Ms=1 ∈ [0, 1] .













− λ1 = 0 (C.33)
where λ1 is the Kuhn-Tucker Lagrange multiplier associated with the feasibility con-
straints. In other words, rm k chooses {θks}Ms=1 in order to minimize total costs of
production such that the combined change in the cost of production and managing credit
lines associated with changing the share of trade credit obtained from k's supplier is zero
at the optimum. Applying the results of Section C.3.2 and assuming that the optimal


















and Equation (3.22) in the main text follows. Note that if rm k can adjust its credit
portfolio frictionless such that κT1,ks = 0∀ks, then the optimal demand for trade credit is
simply given by
θks =
1 if psxks∆ks − (1 + rBk )κT0,ks > 0 for ∆ks > 00 if psxks∆ks − (1 + rBk )κT0,ks < 0 for ∆ks < 0 (C.35)
Thus, the introduction of non-linear management costs of credit lines and respective pa-
rameter choices ensures that the demand for trade credit will have an interior solution.
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can be interpreted as the net-interest rate costs associ-
ated with choosing an optimal credit-portfolio share above or below the trade credit share
determined solely by the parameters of the model, θκks. The condition for a maximum as
given by Equation (C.37) therefore implies an upper bound for the share of net-interest




, in gross credit costs, φXks, re-
lated to nancing k's input expenditures on output from supplier s. While the LHS is
∈ [0, 1), the RHS of condition is greater than one such that the optimal trade credit share
θks maximizes prots.



































for ∆ks > (<) 0
Taking intermediate expenditures and credit costs as given, the properties of the optimal
trade credit share follow from straight forward calculations. This completes the derivation
of the optimal trade credit share and thus portfolio choice between bank and trade credit
to nance input expenditures from sector s and therefore concludes the proof of Lemma
3.3.
Total Credit Management Costs. The optimal trade credit share as given by






























Proof of Lemma 3.4. (2c) Prot Maximization. Having derived the cost-minimizing
input expenditures for given trade credit shares, Θ, the input composite, Vk, and average
trade credit share demanded by customers, θCk , rm k now chooses Vk = {{θks}Ms=1, Vk, θCk }
to maximise prots while taking the demand for trade credit from their customers,
{θck}Mc=1, as given due to perfect competition.
max
Vk
φRk pkqk − pVk Vk − (1 + rBk )w`Tk
subject to the production function (3.1), credit management cost function (3.7), the in-
terest rate on bank credit (3.8), and the feasibility constraint θCk , {θks}Ms=1 ∈ [0, 1] .













where the feasibility constraint is non-binding. The interest rate on trade credit charged
is the solution to Equation (C.39). In other words, rm k sets rTk in order to equalize the
marginal revenue to marginal costs of extending trade credit to customers. The change
in the cost of production associated with extending trade credit equals the total eect
of trade credit demand on external borrowing costs internalized by rm k. Using the


















(C.41a) and rTk =
rZk BCk









−1 with rZk = r
B
k − rB0 and θZk = θD0 + θCk . Equation
(C.41b) follows from rewriting Equation (C.41a) in terms of total revenues of rm k and
rearranging. In other words, Equation (C.41a) implies that the optimal interest rate on
trade credit charged equals the share of changes in total interest rate payments on bank
loans due to changes in the average trade credit share extended to customers in total
revenues net of revenues from nancial intermediation.
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(b) Assuming that Assumption C.5 holds such that 0 < ∂
2pVk
∂(θCk )
2 , the second order derivative
















Given demand for trade credit from rm k's customers, rTs maximizes rm k's prots.
(c) The properties of the equilibrium condition for interest rate on trade credit discussed
in the main text follow from straight forward calculations.
C.4 Propagation
The proofs of Corollary 3.2 to 3.4 in Section 3.2 follow from the previous sections and
are described below. Let the demand structure be given by GL(Ω). Consider a nancial
shock to the bank risk premium of the representative rm in sector k, εbk > 0, such that
k's risk premium (rZk ) and interest rate on bank credit (r
B
k ) dened in Equation (3.8)
increase.
Proof of Corollary 3.2. The proof follows directly from the properties of the marginal
cost of production derived in Corollary 3.1, the optimal input demand derived in Lemma
3.1 and the prot maximizing price derived in Lemma 3.2.
Proof of Corollary 3.3. The proof follows from the properties of the optimal interest
rate charged on trade credit as shown in Lemma 3.4, the marginal cost of production
derived in Corollary 3.1 and the optimal input demand derived in Lemma 3.1.
Proof of Corollary 3.4. The optimal share of intermediate inputs obtained on trade
credit from supplier s by sector k is derived in Lemma 3.4. Given intermediate expen-
ditures and its supplier's interest rate charged on trade credit, the optimal trade credit
share is increasing in the interest rate on bank loans as evident from Equation 3.22. The






























This completes the proof of Corollary 3.4.
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C.5 Summary
Equilibrium Demand. Summarizing the results of Section C.1 to Section C.3.3, rm
k's cost-minimizing demand for inputs and the optimal share of intermediate input ex-
penditures nanced using trade credit are























 Demand for Composite Factor (pVk , #M)






 Demand for Composite Intermediate Good (pXk , #M)















 Demand for Productive Labour (`Qk , #M)


































(1 + rBk )
(M.9)
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The respective credit wedges are dened below and sector k's total bank loans are given
by BCk = w`k +
∑M





Production and Interest Rates on Credit. The production and thus supply of
intermediate, nal and composite goods as well as the cost of credit implied by the optimal
share of goods supplied on trade credit to customers are given by



























































Factor and Credit Market Clearing Conditions. The respective market clearing
conditions are as follows





 Final Goods Market - National Accounting (P , #1)
F = C (M.17)
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These equations represent a (5 + 12M + 2M2) system of equations (minus one after
accounting for the numeraire) in the same number of unknowns:
(a) Aggregate Quantities (3): {C,F, L}
(b) Sectoral Quantities (6M +M2): {`Qk , `Tk , qk, Vk, Xk, {xks}Ms=1, x0k}Mk=1
(c) Prices (2 + 3M): {w,P, {pVk , pXk , pk}Mk=1}
(d) Credit Costs and Shares (3M +M2): {rBk , rTk , θCk , {θks}Ms=1}Mk=1
When mapping the model to the data in Chapter 4, total nominal (Mk) and real (xMk)
imports as well as capital (kk) are treated as constants. Accounting for the numeraire (w)
and substituting allows to reduce the number of equations to (3 + 4M) with the following
set of unknowns: {C,F, {Vk, θCk }Mk=1, P, {pk, rTk }Mk=1}, which are used to simulate and solve
for the equilibrium of the model directly in Chapter 4. In addition, the law of motion of
the productivity and the bank risk premium {zqk, zbk}Mk=1, respectively is zvkt = ρvzvkt−1 + εvkt
for v ∈ {q, b}. Equilibrium credit wedges {φRk , φVk , φXk , φLk , {φXks}Ms=1}Mk=1 and prices are
summarized in the following:
Credit Wedges are given by the following (4M +M2) equations




)υk (φXk )(1−υk) (M.20)
 Labour Credit Cost Wedge (#M)











φXks = 1 + r
B
k − (rBk − rTs )θks (M.23)
 Revenue Wedge (#M)





Note that if the nancial distortions are exogenous like in an economy with bank-nance
only, then φVk = φk for V ∈ {V,X, L} and φRk = 1.
Equilibrium Price Indices. Using the results of Sections C.3.1 and C.3.2, prices full
the following equations in equilibrium










)υk (pXk )(1−υk) (M.26)
























D. Appendix to Chapter 3:
Equilibrium
In this appendix, I derive the partial equilibrium of the model economy introduced in
Chapter 3. For this purpose, Appendix D.1 rst comments on the equilibrium level of
capital and the national accounting in this economy. Appendix D.2 derives the partial
equilibrium expressions of revenues, sales, output, aggregate GDP, labor, the aggregate
eciency and labor wedge following the same steps as in BL(2017) for given credit shares,
Θ, and credit costs, r. It should be noted that the partial equilibrium of this economy
maps into similar expressions as derived in BL(2017). This should not come as a surprise
since the model economy introduced in this thesis nests the economy in BL(2017) for v =
0,∀v ∈ {Θ, `T}. However, endogenous trade credit linkages will distort the propagation
of shocks as discussed in more detail in Section 3.2 and Appendix E. The results of this
section will be used in the calibration of the model to the US economy, in order to be
consistent with the national accounting in the input-output tables provided by the BEA
and further discussed in Chapter 4.
D.1 National Accounting
Capital and Investment. The model presented in Chapter 3 is static, where
capital is treated as a constant in the production function (3.1) and is equal to its steady
state level. In order to derive the equilibrium level of capital used in the calibration of
the model in Section 4.1, I now discuss the optimization problem of rm k for the case in
which rms own and invest in their capital stock. As rm k now also purchases the nal
good for investment, ik, prots of rm k are given by
πk = φ
R









φXkspsxks − Pik. (D.1)
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k]. The intermediate good rm k's prot maximization problem can
be formulated recursively as
V(zk, k) = max
V,k′
πk + Etm′V(z′k, k′)
subject to the production function (3.1), the credit management cost function (3.7), the
interest rate on bank credit (3.8), feasibility constraints on trade credit shares θCk , θks ∈
[0, 1] and non-negativity constraints for all variables. The rm also faces the law of motion
for capital, k′k = ik + (1− δ)kk. In addition to the set of choice variables from the static
optimization problem, V , rm k now also chooses its capital stock for next period, k′k.











−1 + P ′(1− δ)
)]
(D.2)
since the rm applies the stochastic discount factor of the household: m = βtλ =
βt(Ct)
−εC and m′ = βt+1(Ct+1)−εC . In equilibrium all variables are constant such that







kk = αkηkχkRk (D.3)
where 1 = β(1+rKk −δ). The law of motion of capital implies that equilibrium investment
is given by ik = δkk ∀k. Given the static nature of the model and for the derivation of
the equilibrium of the model, I assume that capital never depreciates, δ = 0, such that
investment for each rm, ik = 0∀k, and therefore total investment equals I =
∑M
m im = 0.
Revenue Decomposition. In equilibrium, revenues of the intermediate good pro-











k kk + Πk =
{[
(1− ηk) + ((1− αk) + αk) ηk
]
χk + (1− χk)
}
Rk.
Since rms are the owners of capital in this model, Πk denotes the sum of total expen-
ditures on non-productive labour including interest rate costs, φLkw`
T
k , and dividends net
of rm k's capital income, dk. Dene sπk = (1 − χk) and denote sdk as the share of Πk
spent on net dividend payments and (1− sdk) as the share spent on non-productive labour









k Vk + (1− sdk)sπkRk = sCk Rk (D.4)
112
where sCk = (1− αkηk)χk + (1− sdk)sπk denotes the total cost share in revenues. Similarly,
the share of revenues spent on dividends payments net of capital income, is simply given
by (1− sCk ).
Expenditure Decomposition. Total cost of production, Ck, can be decomposed
into a share, (1 − θBk ), that is spent on actual input expenditures, and a share, θBk , that
is spent on bank interest payments. The equilibrium expenditures of sector k on bank
interest payments, rBk
∑M

















where sXks = r
B
k (1 − θks)/φXks, sLk = rBk /φLk denote the shares of interest rate payments
in the respective input expenditures. Furthermore, note that the share of interest rate




k . Then, total cost of production
and credit management excluding bank interest rate costs are given by (1 − θBk )Ck =
(sCk − sBk )Rk.
Total Value Added and Foreign Trade Adjustments. In anticipation of the
adjustments of the IO-tables provided by the BEA required to ensure an appropriate map-
ping of the equilibrium of the model to the data, I also include equilibrium imports treated
as constants since foreign trade relations are not modelled explicitly. A detailed descrip-
tion of the adjustments made to the IO-tables and their mapping to the model equations
is provided in Appendix F.1. In particular, I assume that (1) total nal demand faced by
intermediate good producing rms also includes foreign demand (MQk ) and (2) total addi-
tional capital services (MKk ) are imported and therefore not part of total domestic income.
In order to obtain analytical expressions of the partial equilibrium of this economy
described in Appendix D.2, I account for the respective nominal imports as follows: Both











0 wL) are written as a share of total labor income. Sector
specic imported capital services are expressed as a share of sectoral domestic revenues
MKk = s
K
k Rk. Total nominal imports, M, thus equal the sum of foreign demand and













Total nominal value added, PY = PF − M, of this economy is then derived by










(1− sCk − sKk )Rk (D.6)
where the last equality uses the total cost share derived in the previous paragraphs.
Similarly, total nominal nal demand, PF = PY +M, can be written as










where sRk = 1 − (sCk − sBk ). Note that the market clearing condition of the nal good
sector is given by PF = PC. In other words, the nal good is consumed by the domestic
household only, who spends total domestic income (GDP) and imports on consumption
expenditures. Note that the total income of households including imports and therefore










where the market clearing condition for aggregate trade credit has been applied.
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D.2 Partial Equilibrium
Lemma D.1 (Revenues in PE). Let the wage rate be the numeraire. Dene sM0 and s
R
k as
shown in Appendix D.1. Then (a) the vector of revenues of intermediate good producers
is given by













and the wedge-matrices ΦR and ΦX are dened as
ΦR = I + diag(rT )diag(ι′ (W ◦Θ)) (D.11)
ΦX = J + diag(rB) (AΘ −Θ) + Θdiag(rT ) (D.12)
(b) and the revenues of the nal good producer are
R0 =
(




Proof of Lemma D.1. (a) The revenues of the Intermediate Goods Firm k are
Rk = φ
R









The left-hand side of Equation (D.14) represents the revenues generated by selling the
domestically produced output, qk, and the right hand side denotes revenues generated by
total demand net of quantity-imports. Note that total domestic demand,
∑M
c=0 xck, can
exceed domestic production, qk, in the calibration of the model using actual data (e.g.
Oil-Sector). Therefore, the revenues generated from selling imported output are deducted
from sales based on total domestic demand. Consequently, Rk represents the revenues
generated by domestically produced output only. Using the optimal demand for sector
k's output from both intermediate and nal good producing rms as given by Equation























ωXck(1− ηc)χcRc + φRk ωFk
[





where the last line uses the denitions of Appendix D.1. Dene the vector of revenues of
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R+ ΦRΩF (ι(1 + sM0 )− sM ) (wL)
where the entries of matrices ΦR and ΦX are dened in Lemma D.1. Rearranging yields






= 1|c=k − (1 + rTk θCk )
[
ωXck(1− ηc)χc





(b) The revenues of the Final Good Firm equal nal consumption sales, R0 = PF = PC.
Using the results of Appendix D.1 and Equation (D.9), Equation (D.13) depicting the
revenues of the nal good producer follows from direct calculations.
Lemma D.2 (Prices in PE). (a) Let the wage rate w be the numeraire. Then the vector
of partial equilibrium sectoral prices is
log (p) = CP
[




(ι− χ) ◦ log(κRφ ) + (ι− χ) log(L) + (χ ◦α ◦ η) ◦ log(rK)
]
(D.15)














and the vector of price wedges is given by
log(φP ) = χ ◦ (ι−α ◦ η) ◦ log(φV )− log(φR) (D.17)
(b) The aggregate price level is given by
log(P ) = ω′F log(p) (D.18)
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Proof of Lemma D.2. (a) Substituting for output of sector k in Rk = φRk pkqk using
sector k's production function as given in Equation (C.9) as well as the prot maximizing

















ωFm log(pm) = ...
log(φPk ) + (1− χk) log(Rk)− χk
[
log(zqk)− αkηk log(rKk )− (1− αk)ηk log(w)
]
(D.19)
where log(φPk ) = (1−αkηk)χk log(φVk )− log(φRk ). Stacking Equation (D.19) for all sectors
and using thatR = κRφ (wL) implies that the vector of sectoral prices is given by Equation
(D.15), where the wage rate was chosen as the numeraire.











which can be rewritten in matrix form as shown in Equation (D.28).
Lemma D.3 (Sectoral Output in PE). Let the wage rate w be the numeraire. The vector
of sectoral output is given by
log(q) = + [I − CPdiag (ι− χ)]
[
log(κRφ ) + ι log(L)
]
− φQ + CPdiag (χ)
[
log(zq)− (α ◦ η) ◦ log(rK)
]
(D.21)
where the output wedge is dened as
φQ = CP log(φP ) + log(φR). (D.22)
Proof of Lemma D.3. The vector of sectoral output is derived as follows
log(q) = log(R)− log(p)− log(φR)
= + [I − CPdiag (ι− χ)]
[
log(κRφ ) + ι log(wL)
]
− φQ + CPdiag (χ)
[
log(zq)− (α ◦ η) ◦ log(rK)− (ι−α) ◦ η log(w)
]
117
where the last line uses the results of Lemma (D.1) and (D.2) and the vector of sectoral
output wedges is dened in Equation (D.22). Taking the nominal wage rate w as the
numeraire yields Equation (D.21). Note that the production parameters are such that
[I − CPdiag (ι− χ)]x > 0 for any vector x which implies that an increase in revenues
positively inuences output.
Denition D.1 (Eciency Wedge). Dene CY = ω′FCP and let the aggregate labor share
and productivity be dened as
λ = CY (ι− χ) (D.23) and log(Zz) = CY diag(χ) log(zq) (D.24)
The eciency wedge is given by















(b) internal rental rate of equilibrium capital
log(ΦZK) = −CY diag(χ ◦α ◦ η) log(rK) (D.26b)
(c) foreign trade and capital adjustments
log(ΦZM) = log(Φ
Z
φ )− log(ΦZΦ)− log(ΦZK) (D.26c)
The aggregate share of total value added in aggregate labor supply is given by
κYφ = ι




1− sCm − sKm
]
[κRφ ]m (D.27)
where the respective cost-shares are dened in Section D.1.
Derivation of Denition D.1. Dene CY = ω′FCP . Using Equation (D.15), the log
of the aggregate price index, P = ω′F log(p), can be written as
P = + CY log(φP ) + CY diag(ι− χ) log(κRφ ) + CY diag(χ ◦α ◦ η) log(rK)





log(ΦZφ )− log(κYφ )
]
− log(Zz) + λ log(L) (D.28)
where the corresponding elements are dened in Equation (D.23) to (D.26c). The sectoral
share of total value added in aggregate labor supply is given by
κYφ = s
Y ◦ κRφ (D.29)
where the sectoral share of value added in revenues, sY , is dened in Equation (D.31).




(1− sLm)[(1− αm)ηmχm + (1− sdm)sπm][κRφ ]m
holds in equilibrium and Equation (D.29) follows.
Lemma D.4 (Value Added in PE). Let the wage rate w be the numeraire and let the








k be dened in Appendix D.1.









log(Zz) + (1− λ) log(L)
]
(D.30)









1− sCk − sKk
]
(D.31)





where Zz denotes aggregate productivity and Φ
Z
φ equals the aggregate eciency wedge
dened in Denition D.1.
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Proof of Lemma D.4. (a) Value added of sector k equals total labour expenditures and
prots net of capital imports.
Pyk = w`k + πk − sKk Rk = sYk Rk = [κYφ ]kL
Using the accounting results of Appendix D.1 as well as Lemma 3.1, the share of sectoral
value added in revenues, sYk , is dened in Equation (D.31). Substituting for revenues
using Equation (D.9) allows to rewrite sectoral value added as a share of aggregate labor
supply, [κYφ ]k, as dened in Equation (D.29). Stacking, taking logs and applying Equation
(D.28), yields the vector of log real value added for all rms as shown in Equation (D.30).







(1− sCk − sKk )Rk =
M∑
k=1
sYk Rk = ι
′κYφL
Taking logs, dening the wage rate as the numeraire and applying Equation (D.28) yields




+ log (L) = log(Zz) + log(Φ
Z
φ ) + (1− λ) log(L)
such that the aggregate production function is given in Equation (D.32).
Lemma D.5 (Aggregate Labor and Output in GE). Let the wage rate w be the numeraire.
















1 + εL − (1− εC)(1− λ)
, κLL =
1
1 + εL − (1− εC)(1− λ)
(D.34)
(b) Aggregate GDP is then dened as





















Y = (1− λ)κLL (D.36)
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Proof of Lemma D.5. From the household's problem presented in Section C.2, the log
of labor supply is
εL log(L) = log(w)− log(P )− εC log(C)
Taking the nominal wage rate as the numeraire, assuming that aggregate consumption is
a share γ of GDP, Y , and using Equation (D.28) and (D.32), aggregate labor supply is







Rearranging and collecting terms yields Equation (D.33).
(b) Substituting for equilibrium aggregate labor supply, L, in Equation (D.32) yields
aggregate GDP as shown in Equation (D.35).
Denition D.2 (Eciency Wedge). Following BL(2017) and applying the concepts in-






= ΦLφ(1− λ)Y L−1.
It denotes the wedge between the household's marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and labor and the aggregate marginal product of labor. Using the results of
Lemma D.5 the aggregate labor wedges equals
log(ΦLφ) = − log(1− λ)− log(κYφ ).
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E. Appendix to Chapter 3:
Log-Linearization
In this appendix I log-linearize the model around its steady state derived in Appendix
D, using x = x exp(x̂) ≈ x(1 + x̂) and x̂ = dlog(x) = log x/x. I rst derive the log-
linearized equilibrium responses of revenues, prices and sectoral output in terms of (1)
productivity shocks, (2) general equilibrium adjustments in the aggregate labor supply
and (3) distortions introduced as credit wedges in Appendix E.1. The credit wedges
summarize the composite eect of changes in credit costs and the composition of credit
portfolios on sectoral sales, prices and output. Appendix E.2 derives the decomposition of
credit wedges into eects attributed to changes in interest rates on bank and trade credit
and changes in trade credit shares. The log-linearized response of credit costs and shares
is discussed in Appendix E.3. Appendix E.4 and E.5 derive the rst order approximation
of the partial equilibrium structural credit and output responses discussed in the main
text.
To introduce additional notation, the eect of the log-changes of the variables of
interest are determined by the entries of the corresponding elasticity matrices E, which
are non-linear functions of the steady state of the economy. Furthermore, dene the
following variables
 Net Accounts Payable of m paid to s equal to Net Accounts Receivable of s from m
APms = θmspsxms = ARms
 Net Cash on Delivery of m paid to s equal to Net Cash on Delivery of m paid to s
AP−ms = (1− θms)psxms = AR−ms
In the subsequent derivations, the following simplifying assumptions are made: (1) I
abstract from productivity shocks and consider the partial equilibrium case only, assuming
that both productivity and aggregate labor remain at their steady state levels. (2) I treat
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the share of quantities sold to intermediate and nal good producers in total production
as constant. (3) While Appendix D discussed the introduction of imports as constants
for the purpose of ensuring a proper mapping of the model to the data, this appendix
only considers the case of a closed economy. The wage rate is taken as the numeraire and
capital is constant such that k̂k = 0.
E.1 Log-Linearized Equilibrium
Denition E.1 (Log-Linearized Equilibrium). The log-linearized equilibrium given by:





























= I − (WXR )′ −W FRJWRF . (E.3)
The intermediate, φ̂Sκ,k, and nal, φ̂
F
κ , sales wedges are dened in E.2.

















The intermediate price wedge, φ̂Pκ,k, is dened in E.2.








m − φ̂Qk + [ELQ]kkL̂ (E.5)
The intermediate output wedge, φ̂Qk , is dened in E.2.
The entries of the elasticity matrices are given by
R0E
L

























s θms)psxms − w`Qm
Rk[W
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Denition E.2 (Equilibrium Distortions). The eect of changes in credit costs and shares
on sales, prices and output are summarized in the following wedges:
(a) The intermediate sales credit wedge, φSκ,k, dened in Equation (E.7), summarizes the






ck − φ̂Rk + [W FR]kkφ̂SF . (E.7)























F ]msθ̂ms − [W ΦF ]msφ̂Xms − [W φF ]mφ̂Lm. (E.9)
(b) The price credit wedge, φPκ,k, dened in Equation (E.10), is a composite of the eect
of credit costs and trade credit shares on marginal cost of production and sales due






P,m − [WRP ]kmφ̂Sκ,m (E.10)
where





ks.− φ̂Rk . (E.11)
and dening χk = (1− αkηk)χk,
[W PP ]
−1 = I − diag (χ ◦ (ι− η)) ΩX and WRP = W PP diag(ι− χ)WRR. (E.12)
(c) The output wedge, φQk , dened in Equation (E.13), summarizes the total eect of
credit costs and linkages on sectoral output and is a combination of the sales (E.7)


















P −WRP and ∆RP = WRR −WRP . (E.14)




























Derivation of Log-Linearized Equilibrium E.1 and Wedges E.2. Proof.
The log-linearized equilibrium sales, prices and output are derived by log-linearizing the
results of Lemma D.1, D.2 and D.3.
Derivation of Assumption 3.4 . Dene [χ]k = (1−αkηk)χk. Assumption 3.4 formally
implies the following. Let ∆PR and ∆RP be dened in (E.14) and let the parameter, χk∀k,
and the production structure be such that:
(a) The direct eect of distortions on prices outweighs the counteracting indirect eect







[W PP ]km −
M∑
n=1
(1− χn)[W PP ]kn[WRR ]nm











(1− χn)[W PP ]kn[WRR ]nm
Proof of Proposition 1. The credit wedges of revenues (E.7), prices (E.10) and output





ms ∀m, s direct and indirect upstream cost-eects
(2) φ̂Xcm ∀m, c direct and indirect downstream demand-eects
(3) φ̂Rm ∀m income eects from nancial intermediation
(4) φ̂SF nal demand income eects
for V ∈ {S, P,Q, Y }. The respective wedge responses are dened Denition E.2. The
rst-order conditions imply that: (1) An increase in credit wedges of k's supplier s aects
s's cost of production leading to an increase in the price charged on their output. (2)
Similarly, an increase in credit wedges aecting sector k's customer c increases c's cost
of production and therefore reduces the demand for k's output. (3) An increase in the
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revenue wedge of sector k increases it's income from extending trade credit for every out-
put sold. (4) An increase in the nal sales wedge decreases the income of households and
therefore the demand for the nal and subsequently for intermediate inputs.
In the following, I explicitly summarize and outline the components of (a) the inter-
mediate (φSκ,k) and nal sales wedge (φ
S
F ) (b) the price wedge (φ
P
κ,k) and (c) the output
(φQk ) using the results of Denition E.2.










































The respective coecients are all positive and dened in derivation of Denition E.2.


































All coecients are dened in the derivation of Denition E.2 and - assuming that the
demand structure is such that Assumption 3.4 holds - are non-negative.
127


























([W PP ]km + [W
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All coecients are dened derivation of Denition E.2 and are non-negative as outlined
in Assumption 3.4.
E.2 Credit Wedges
























s − [EθΦ]ksθ̂ks (E.17)


















Φ ]ks = (1− θks)rBk
φXks[E
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The sign of the elasticity of the change in the trade credit share from sector k to sector s
depends on the sign of the interest rate dierential ∆ks = rBk − rTk and therefore can take
on both positive and negative values. All remaining elasticities are positive.
128
Lemma E.1 (Sales Wedge). The combined sales wedge φSκ is dened in Equation (E.7)
such that an increase in the combined sales wedge of sector k reduces sector k's revenues.

















The entries of the respective elasticity matrices are a combination of the elasticity matrices
of the nal and intermediate sales wedge. The elasticity of the sales wedge with respect to





























































































The sign of the respective entries are functions of the nal demand structure such that
[W .φ(S)]ki is positive if (ω
F
k ≥ ωFk ) and non-positive if (ωFk < ωFk ), where
ωFk = max

























Proof of Lemma E.1. (a) The FG-sales wedge, φSF , is dened in Equation (E.9). Using




























































ms holds, implies that all entries of the elasticity
matrices are positive.
(b) The IG-sales wedge φSX is dened in Equation (E.7). Using Equations (E.16) and





























































> LB , where
LB = (rTk )
2(θCk − θck) Therefore, all entries of the respective elasticity matrices are non-
negative.





1 + rTk θ
C
k







The latter inequality is trivially fullled if sector k supplies to one rm only such that θCk = θck.
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(c) The combined-sales wedge φSκ is dened in Equation (E.7). The log-linearized wedge
is derived by combining the elasticity matrices of the nal and intermediate sales wedge
derived above. The response of sector k's combined sales wedge depends on the demand
structure in the economy: ωFk ∈ [0, 1]:
(1) (ωFk > 0) - If sector k sells its output to the nal good sector the nal sales wedge
also aects the combined sales wedge of sector k.
(2) (ωFk = 0) - If sector k does not sell its output to the nal good sector, any changes
in credit costs aecting the sales wedge and thus sales of the nal good producer do
not aect the sales wedge and thus sales of sector k.
Corollary E.1 (Total Sales Wedge). Using the results of Lemma E.1 and collecting terms
yields the response of the total sales wedge of sector k, φSκ , dened in Equation (E.1):
















An increase in the total sales wedge of sector k reduces sector k's revenues. The elasticity
of the total sales wedge of sector k wrt changes in
 the bank interest rate of sector m is
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ne Av = W
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Proof of Corollary E.1. Using Equation (E.1) and the results of Lemma E.1 yields the
response of the total sales wedge of sector k.







be dened in Corollary E.1. The subscript R(v) for v ∈ {R,P,Q} denotes the coecient
matrix summarizing the nal demand eects on (R) revenues AR = W
R
R, (P ) prices
AP = W
R
P , and (Q) output AQ = ∆RP .
Lemma E.2 (Price Wedge). The combined price wedge φ̂Pκ is dened in Equation (E.10)
and is a combination of the price wedge (E.11) and the combined sales wedge (E.7) due
to the presence of decreasing returns to scale such that prices are increasing in revenues.

















The typical entries of the elasticity matrices are derived below. The elasticity of the price
wedge with respect to
 the interest rate on bank credit is
















 the interest rate on trade credit









 the trade credit share of sector m obtained from sector s is
[Eθφ(P )]k,ms = [W
θ(X)
φ(P ) ]k,msAPms
The respective entries of the coecient matrices are given by
[W
B(L)





R(P )]km , [W
B(X)















− [W T (X)R(P ) ]k,cm
[W
θ(X)






(rBm − rTs ) + [W θ(X)R(P )]k,ms
The weight matrices (W ..R(P )) capturing the eect of revenues on prices are dened in
Denition E.3.
Proof of Lemma E.2. Using Equations (E.17) and (E.16), the price wedge response as





















The typical entries of the corresponding elasticity matrices are dened below



















0 ≶ [Eθ(S)φ(P,P )]ks = (r
B
k − rTs )
AP ks
Rk





The combined price wedge φ̂Pκ is dened in Equation (E.10) and is a combination of the
price wedge (E.11) derived above and the combined (total) sales wedge (E.7) derived in
Lemma E.1 and Corollary E.1. Straight forward calculations yield the results of Lemma
E.2.
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Lemma E.3 (Output Wedge). The sectoral output wedge φ̂Q is a combination of the

















The elasticity of the output wedge of sector k wrt to changes in






























































(rBm − rTs ) +
(
[W PP ]ks − Is=k
)
Rs
rTs − [W θ(X)R(Q)]k,ms
The weight matrices (W ..R(Q)) capturing the eect of revenues on output are dened in
Denition E.3. An increase in the output wedge of sector k reduces sector k's output.
Proof of Lemma E.3. The sectoral output wedge φ̂Q is a combination of the sales (E.7),
the revenue (E.16) and the price wedges (E.10). Using the results of Lemma 3.6, E.1 and
E.2, Lemma E.3 follows from straight forward calculations.
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E.3 Credit Costs, Links and Interest Rates
Credit Management Costs. The log-linearization of total management credit costs for





The typical entry of the elasticity matrix equals
CTk [E
θ

















where the last line exploits Equation (3.22), depicting the equilibrium trade credit share.
The sign of the change in credit management costs depends on the sign of [EθC(T )]ks which
is a function of {κT0,ks, κT1,ks} and (θks − θSk ).
Lemma E.4 (Trade Credit Share). The log-linearization of the trade credit share between

















The response of the trade credit share is a function of the response of the interest rate on
bank and trade credit derived in Lemma E.5 and the total sales wedge derived in Corollary
E.1. The elasticity of trade credit share wrt to changes in
 the bank interest rate of sector m is



















 the trade credit interest rate of sector m is



















[KRθ ]ks = sgn(∆ks)
∣∣∣∣ ∆ks[Kθ]ks
∣∣∣∣ ,where 0 < [Kθ]ks = ∆ks [ θksθks − θκks −∆ks θksφXks
]
the respective entries of the coecient matrices are given by
[W
B(θ)



















































and the weight matrix capturing the eect of revenues is dened in Corollary E.1.
Proof of Lemma E.4. Lemma E.4 follows from the log-linearization of Equation (3.22),
tedious algebra and applying the results of Corollary E.1.
Lemma E.5 (Interest Rates). The log-linearization of the interest rate on bank credit









Dening rZk = r
B
k − rB0 , and θZk = θD0 + θCk , the relevant entries of the elasticity matrices
are positive and given by
rBk [E
Zb

































The elasticity of the interest rate on trade credit with respect to
 the shock to the bank risk premium
[EZbT ]km = φ
R
k
the interest rate on bank credit is
















 the interest rate on trade credit is








 the trade credit share of sector m from sector s is
[EθT ]k,ms = [W
θ
T ]k,msAPms















































The entries of the coecient matrix related to the trade credit shares can be decomposed
into [W θT ]k,ms = [W
θ(C)
T ]k,msIs=k + [W
θ(S)








































The weight matrices capturing the eect of revenues are dened in Corollary E.1.
Proof of Lemma E.5. Using the results of Corollary E.1, Lemma E.5 follows from the
log-linearization of the interest rate on bank credit in Equation (3.8) and on trade credit
in Equation (3.24).
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E.4 Partial Equilibrum Structural Credit Response
Derivation of Credit Multiplier 3.4. In partial equilibrium assume that L̂ = 0 and
abstract for changes in quantity shares, wXck = xck(qk)
−1, such that [ŵX ]ck = 0∀c, k. Using
the results of Lemma E.4 and E.5, the responses of credit-costs and shares to nancial
shocks, ẑbk = ε
b













































Dene the vector of changes in credit costs and shares as τ = [r̂B, r̂T , θ̂], where the


























and the corresponding elasticity matrices, E̊.θ, E̊
θ
. , and E̊
θ
θ are of size (T ×M), (M × T )
and (T × T ), respectively, for T = M2. Furthermore, follow Denition 3.2 and let E
denote the cardinality of the edge set E indexed by e = 1, ..., E. The credit multiplier is
given by the rst order approximation of

















 ≈ Ψ̃τ = I +Eττ .
Proof of Proposition 2. Applying Denition 3.4, the responses of credit-costs and shares
to credit shocks ẑbk = ε
b


































The rst order approximation of the PE-credit multiplier Ψτ and using the results of
Lemma E.4 and E.5, implies that the rst order approximation of the responses of







[Ψ̃Bτ ]km = [E
Zb
B ]mmIm=k







[Ψ̃Tτ ]km = +[E
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The existence of trade credit links therefore implies that credit costs are linked and that
nancial shocks to the cost of bank credit are passed on through the IO-network via
payment schedules (both up- and downstream). Note that productivity shocks enter only
via the eect on the aggregate price-index on nal demand and thus aggregate labor,
which I have abstracted from.
E.5 Partial Equilibrum Structural Output Response
Proof of Proposition 3. (a) Consider the partial equilibrium in Denition 3.4 and let
the response of the interest rate on bank and trade credit and trade credit shares be given
in Equation (3.29) in the absence of productivity shocks, ẑqk = ε
q
k = 0. Using Equation
(E.5) and applying the rst order approximation of the trade credit multiplier derived in





































Dening [S̃QB,B]km = [S̃
B
Q ]km and [S̃
Q
B,T ]km = [S̃
T
Q]km − [S̃θQ]km completes the proof of
the rst part of Proposition 3.
(b) Following Denition 3.2, E denotes the cardinality of the edge set E indexed by
e = 1, ..., E. Straight forward but tedious algebra yields the rst order approximation of
the structural coecients related to the interest rate on bank, [S̃BQ ]km, and trade credit,
[S̃TQ]km, and trade credit shares, [S̃
θ
Q]km, where the respective entries of the elasticities
matrices are dened in Lemma E.3, E.4 and E.5. Combining the results of (b) with the




Q,B ]km = [W
B(L)
Q ]km and [S
B(X)
















































































and substituting into S̃QB,B and S̃
Q
B,T yields the partial equilibrium structural output
response in Equation (3.31) and (3.32). This completes the proof of Proposition 3.
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Proof of Proposition 4. The proof of Proposition 4 follows directly from Proposition
3, deriving the structural sectoral output response in partial equilibrium up to a rst order
approximation. The rst order approximation of the partial equilibrium structural output
response is given in Equation (3.30). Abstracting from productivity shocks (εqk = 0), the
output response for sector k to credit shocks, ẑbm = ε
b
m > 0, is given by







The corresponding structural elasticity of output wedge with respect to nancial shocks
can be decomposed into eects attributed to changes in the interest rate on bank credit
(S̃QB,B) as well as changes in the interest rate on trade credit and the composition of the
credit portfolio (S̃QB,T ) as shown in Proposition 3. The elasticity (S̃
Q
B,T ), captures the total
eect of trade credit on output and is dened as the dierence between the elasticities re-
lated to changes in the trade credit interest rates, [S̃TQ]km, and trade credit shares, [S̃
θ
Q]km.



































then, the adjustment of trade credit volumes and rates has a smoothing eect - e.g.
dampens the increase in the output wedge of sector k in response to a shock to the risk
premium of sector m. The left hand side is a function of the up-front nancing needs of
sector m - total equilibrium bank-dependency - and the right hand side is a function of
the accounts receivable extended by sector m. The weights/elasticities (S..Q,.) capture the
joint network-eect of (a) trade credit rates and shares on the output wedge and of (b)
the bank and trade credit rate on trade credit costs and shares. Proposition 4 follows.
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F. Appendix to Chapter 4
Using the dataset(s) on sectoral and rm level data described in Appendix B, Appendix
F.1 describes adjustments made to the input-output tables necessary to ensure a consistent
mapping of the equilibrium of the model introduced in Chapter 3 to the data. Appendix
F.2 contains additional results of the model-simulations.
F.1 Model Calibration
F.1.1 Adjustment of IO- and Financial Data
Trade Credit. Sectoral Trade Credit Shares. The share of accounts payable in
total input expenditures (θPk ) and the share of accounts receivable in total revenues (θ
R
s )
are used to construct a proxy of inter-industry credit ows using the approach suggested
in Altinoglu (2018). The inter-industry trade credit share from supplier s to customer
k is constructed as a (sales) weighted average of the total trade credit shares shown in
Equation (4.1).
Dealing with Missing Data and Domestic Non-Market Clearing. Since some industries
are not or under-represented in the Compustat sample, it is possible that observations on
industry trade credit share are missing. I account for missing observations as follows: (a)
If a sector is missing all trade credit data, all trade credit shares are set to zero which
implies that this sector is neither extending nor receiving trade credit. (b) If the time
series of trade credit shares of a sector contains some missing observations, I rst identify
the period with the highest number of consecutive non-missing observations. Using the
rst and last observation of this period, I use the median growth rate of trade credit shares
in the sample to extrapolate the level of trade credit shares for the remaining observations.
As the model assumes a closed economy, all trade credit relations are between domestic








I rst calculate the implied level of total sectoral accounts payable and receivables
using the sectoral trade credit shares derived from Compustat and the total intermediate
expenditures and sales as recorded in the IO-tables. If Equation (F.1) does not hold,
sectoral accounts receivable (shares) are adjusted by the share of exports (Xkt) in total
sales (Rkt) for each sector.
Prot Decomposition. Bank interest rate expenditures, are recorded as part of
the gross operating surplus in the IO-tables net of interest-income (idit). (see Horowitz
and Planting, 2009). I decompose the gross operating surplus - GOP - (π) into capital
expenditures (dp), dividend payments (ni+dv) and bank interest rate expenditures (xint)
using the shares of the respective counterparts in gross operating prots calculated from
the income statements of the panel of US rms from Compustat. From the income
statement it follows that π + idit = dp + ni + dv + xint = Σ. Thus, total actual
prots are a multiple of the observed prots π. The dividend, interest rate expenditure













The level of dividends, interest payments and capital expenditures then follows directly
from the GOP recorded in the IO-table.
Adjustments of IO-Tables. The model is calibrated using the summary tables on
"Use of Commodities by Industries After Redenitions" provided by the BEA. In order
to ensure an appropriate mapping of the model to the data, adjustments are made as
described below.
Treatment of Used and Non-Comparable Imports. The dollar value of the row entries on
expenditures on "Used Goods" and "Non-Comparable Imports" are redistributed pro-
portionally across sector k's intermediate supplier using the expenditure shares on each
sector in k's total intermediate sales. Any negative intermediate expenditures entries are
set to zero.
Treatment of FIRE. I follow BL(2017) and interpret the production function (3.1) as de-
scribing the technology at use related to physical production inputs rather than interest
rates, insurance premia or rental rates. As in BL(2017), the expenditures on FIRE-services
are treated as part of capital gains and not as intermediate production expenditures which
implies a reassignment of the corresponding rows of the IO-tables to gross-operating prof-
its. The purchases of the FIRE-sector are treated as part of nal demand. In order to avoid
double counting, the resulting share of capital gains attributed to FIRE-expenditures is
144
treated as income accruing to foreign households and thus excluded from the calculation
of GDP.
Inventories. Changes in inventories are recorded as part of nal uses. However, the
model is static and does not account for the accumulation of inventories. Therefore, as
in BL(2017), I subtract changes in inventories from nal uses and redistribute the dollar
value supplied by sector i proportionally across i's intermediate customers using the sales
share of each sector in i's total intermediate sales. Following the adjustment of interme-
diate sales for changes in inventories, I recalculate total intermediate expenditures and
total industry output for each sector.
Final Demand, Imports and Exports. While the model is a closed economy without invest-
ment, sectors in the US economy invest and engage in foreign trade. Two observations can
be made: (1) The majority of commodities in the US are (a) both produced domestically
and imported and (b) both used as intermediate inputs in production and consumed by
nal demand. (2) Total nal uses (consumption, investment and exports) of most sectors
exceed imports, which implies that the majority of commodities in the US are also pro-
duced domestically.
In order to take the data to the model, I treat investments and exports as part of domestic
demand of the nal good producer. In the calibration, I account for foreign trade (im-
ports) in the form a intermediate sales residual in order to ensure market-clearing. Note
that simply ignoring imports in the calibration of the model or assigning imports to nal
demand directly implies that good markets do not clear in equilibrium. The calibration
ensures that the national accounting identity equalizing total value added and total nal
demand holds.
Interest Income, Taxes and Prots. Gross operating prots as recorded in the IO-tables
include proprietor's and rental income, corporate prots, interest expenditures net of
interest income, capital expenditures, etc. In order to map the IO-tables to the model, I
follow the steps outlined below to obtain a separate measure of interest expenditures.
(1) Negative Gross Operating Surplus. Only a few sectors over the period 1997-2016
record negative prots in a few selected points in time (six observations). Since the
model does not allow for negative prots, I set the gross operating surplus to zero
if a negative value was recorded. (GOP1,kt)
(2) Total Interest Income (1). I then use the share of gross prots in total sales and
the share of interest income in gross prots based on Compustat data to calculate
a sector's interest income: IIR = shIIR · (shGPR ·Rkt).
(3) Gross Prots (1). Gross prots (GPR1,kt) are then calculated as the sum of the
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gross operating surplus adjusted for negative prots (GOP1,kt) and the imputed
interest income IIRkt.
(4) Winsorisation of Prot Ratio. I calculate the ratio of gross prots (GPR1,kt) to
gross operating prots (GOP1,kt) for the 90th-quantile and re-calculate the implied
adjusted gross operating prots (GOP2,kt). Using the share of interest income in
gross prots based on Compustat data, I then re-calculate gross prots (GPR2,kt)
and interest income (IIR2,kt).





stxks,t) to gross prots (GPR2,kt) for the 90th-quantile
and recalculate implied gross prots (GPR3,kt) and interest income (IIR3,kt).
(6) Adjustment of Taxes and Dividend. In order to ensure that total value added of a
sector is left unchanged, I reassign the imputed interest income for each sector by
adding the interest income to the gross operating surplus of a sector and deducting
it from taxes. Since the model does not account for taxes, I treat taxes as part
of dividend payments to households. Due to the reassignment of interest income,
tax-payments net of interest income and thus also total dividends can be negative.
Total Industry and Commodity Output. To ensure market clearing, the dierence between
total industry and total commodity output is added to nal uses such that nominal output
produced equals total sales. The sales residual is distributed between nal demand (sum
of consumption, investment and exports) and imports using the respective share in total
nal demand.
Labor Costs and Prices. Prices and Wages. I combine the respective variables
from the MFP- and the LPC-Database. Total hours worked are then used to infer an
aggregate wage rate from total labor expenditures recorded in the IO-tables. The wage
rate is chosen as the numeraire and all prices are normalized by the common wage rate.
Labor Expenditures and Hours Worked. Expenditures on non-productive labor input are
proportional to the fraction of management (55) and administrative services (561) in
w`Qk = wLk(1− sTk ) and w`Tk = wLksTk .
Interest Rates on Bank Credit. Risk Premium. The sectoral credit spreads
derived in Gilchrist and Zakraj²ek (2012) and provided to me by the authors are used as
a baseline measure for the risk premium. Additional adjustments are described below in
order to ensure that consistency with the accounting of the IO-tables. The components of
the risk premium are calibrated as follows: The risk-free interest rate on bank credit, rB0 ,
is set by calculating the time average (1997-2016) of the federal funds rate. The average
leverage in the economy, θD0 is calculated using the aggregate measures of the relevant
balance sheet items for the sample of US rms described above and taking the time mean.
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The exponent, µ, is estimated using a simple OLS-regression based on Equation (4.2) and
is set to 1.2 as described in the main text and shown below.
Adjustment of Bank Interest Rates. In order to ensure that the cost of bank credit
are consistent with the imputed interest rate expenditures for the extreme case that all
intermediate input expenditures and labor costs need to be nanced using bank credit, I
make the following adjustments:
(1) Interest Rate Expenditures. I rst calculate three dierent measures of the bank
interest rate and the maximal bank interest expenditures:
(a) The bank interest rate implied by the IO-expenditure data (rB0,kt) is calculated
using the interest expenditure share in gross prots based on Compustat data
(sπr,kt), the imputed gross prots and total operating costs
rB0,kt = (s
π




(b) The bank interest rate imposed by the model (rB1,kt) is calculated using the GZ-
spread based on which the maximal possible interest rate expenditures are de-
rived using the total operating costs as recorded in the IO-tables.
(c) As a third measure of the bank interest rate (rB2,kt), I combine the level of the
implied bank interest rate by the IO-tables at the beginning of the observation
period (rB0,k1) with the growth rate of the bank interest rate implied by the GZ-
spread (rB1,kt).
If the interest rate expenditure share in gross prots implied by the GZ-based interest
rate (b) is greater than one, then combined bank interest rate measure (c) is used
instead (rB3,kt), which represents a level adjustment of the imposed bank interest rate
in order to match the IO-tables.
(2) Winsorisation of Interest Expenditure Share in Gross Prots. In a nal step, I win-
sorize the interest rate expenditure share in gross prots using the 90th-quantile and
re-calculate the implied bank interest rate (rB4,kt), the bank interest rate spread and
the maximum interest rate expenditure share in gross prots.
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F.1.2 Calibration
List of Parameters. The iterative procedure outlined in Algorithm 1 is a rough
sketch of the steps involved in calculating the equilibrium of the model economy.
Algorithm 1 Calibration Steps
1: Load and Adjustment of Nominal IO-Tables and Credit Network
2: Calibration of Production Parameters
3: Calculate Steady State Shocks
4: Initial Guess of Intermediate Expenditure Shares ΩX
5: while |ΩXt − ΩXt−1| > εΩ do
6: Initial Guess of Quantity Shares (wck = xck/qk)
7: while do|wck,t − wck,t−1| > εw
8: Calculate Equilibrium Financial Variables
9: Calculate Equilibrium Prices and Quantities
10: Calculate Implied Productivity
11: Update Quantity Shares
12: end while
13: Update Intermediate Expenditure Shares
14: end while
15: Calculation of Parameters of Credit Management Cost Function
Parameters of Credit Management Costs. Following the discussion in the main
text, the link-specic cost parameters are derived by rst multiplying Equation (4.3) by
(θks/θPk ) such that
θks =
{[



























The link-specic cost parameters, κT0,ks and κ
T
1,ks, are then obtained by matching the
coecients of the net-interest expenditures on intermediate production expenditures in












The linear cost parameter, κT0,ks, is then obtained to ensure that Equation (3.22) holds.
Analogously, the cost parameter, κBk , is then obtained as a residual to ensure that Equation
(3.7) holds.
Parameters of Bank Interest Rate (µ). The parameter governing the convexity
of the risk-premium with respect to the combined default risk, µ, is calibrated by rst
estimating the following equation for each sector




kt) + εkt (F.4)
where θCkt denotes the share of sectoral accounts receivables in total sales and θ
D
0t denotes
the aggregate leverage - the ratio of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to total
assets. The data-counterpart for the risk premium is the sectoral credit spread calculated
in Gilchrist and Zakraj²ek (2012) and the data-counterpart for the aggregate leverage is
calculated directly from the corresponding balance sheet items in Compustat. Table F.1
reports the OLS-regressions results of Equation (F.4) for the sample period 2000-2013
and the corresponding standard errors. The convexity parameter µ is then calibrated
by calculating the sales-weighted (RW) average of the estimated coecients of log(θZkt),




kt such that µ = 1.2.
Table F.1: Calibrated Parameter µ of Risk-Premium
log(rZ) 11 21 22 23 31T33 42 44A5 48A9 51 54A6 62 71A2 81
RW (0.3) (4.6) (7.8) (0.6) (39.1) (7.7) (18.5) (6.0) (9.0) (2.7) (1.7) (1.8) (0.1)
log(θZ) 0.57 0.44 0.80 -2.07∗ 0.92 0.89 2.39∗∗ 3.31∗∗ 0.60 0.55 0.10 0.96 -1.05
(0.70) (0.26) (0.80) (0.68) (0.98) (1.11) (0.73) (0.95) (1.13) (1.07) (0.40) (1.15) (1.19)
R2 0.07 0.19 0.08 0.44 0.07 0.05 0.47 0.50 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.06
NObs 11 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Note: This table presents the results of an OLS regression of Equation F.4 for selected industries. The sales shares
in total sales of each industry in percent is reported in row (RW ). All regressions include a constant; Std.Errors in
recorded in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
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F.2 Additional Simulations
Table F.2 presents the trade credit multipliers for the respective variables associated with
the comparison of the benchmark economy with both bank and supplier credit, and an
equivalent economy where rms do not face any credit management costs (CTk = 0∀k)
and nance their working capital requirements with bank credit only, E(0). Using the
same nancial shocks to the sector-specic bank risk premium, the rst rows of Table F.2
report the percentage change in aggregate output, labor and both the eciency and labor
wedge in 2009 for the economy introduced in Chapter 3 and its equivalent counterpart.
The last two rows of Table F.2 refer to the simulation exercise conducted in (d)
by rst identifying the top ve net-borrowers and the top ve net-lenders based on the
net-lending position (see Denition 2.1). A symmetric shock series is fed into the model
aecting only one group of sectors at a time. The resulting trade credit multipliers with
respect to the benchmark and the counterfactual economy are reported in rows (NL) and
(NB).
Table F.2: Trade Credit Multipliers - No Credit Management Costs
Aggregate Sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)





E(θ) -0.880 -0.548 -0.525 -0.037 -0.718 -0.786 0.556
E(0) -0.480 -0.376 -0.207 -0.148 -0.191 -0.405 0.183
M 1.834 1.459 2.533 0.250 3.769 1.942 3.037
(d) N
L
E(θ) -0.045 -0.022 -0.031 0.008 -0.096 -0.093 0.068
E(0) -0.010 -0.008 -0.004 -0.003 -0.014 -0.048 0.012
M 4.538 2.894 7.008 -2.622 6.905 1.927 5.560
(d) N
B
E(θ) -0.236 -0.162 -0.131 -0.034 -0.046 -0.077 0.049
E(0) -0.177 -0.139 -0.076 -0.055 -0.017 -0.034 0.031
M 1.333 1.168 1.718 0.624 2.706 2.253 1.565
Note: This table documents the model simulated log-change of the following variables to shocks to sector-specic
bank risk premia in an economy with bank and supplier credit, E(θ), and in an equivalent economy without credit
managements costs and bank credit only, E(0): aggregate output (Y ), labor (L), the aggregate eciency (ΦZφ ) and
labor wedge (ΦLφ ), the average sectoral output (q), labor (`) and credit cost wedge (φ
V ). The trade credit multipliers
(M) are calculated as the ratio of responses of the variable in E(θ) to their counterparts in E(0). The equivalent
economy of the counterfactual exercises considered is an economy with bank nance only (TC0); (NL/NB) denotes
the simulation exercise in which only net-lenders (net-borrowers) experience an increase in their bank interest rates
using Denition 2.1. All log-changes are reported in percent.
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